98. Telegram From the Delegation at the London Working Group to the Department of State1

4812. From Beam. At meeting working group this morning Blankenhorn gave outline German position re necessity for four-power talks, importance of German reunification issue and desirability [Page 155] West’s recapturing initiative from Soviets (Embtel 47962). He said Austrian developments had deepened German feelings these subjects but added Germans realized Austrian solution unthinkable for them, and Chancellor not willing consider any formula for neutralizing Germany. He said Big Four should not touch newly created Western treaty system since Germany completely devoted to its present obligations. He mentioned there was strong German opposition but this not increasing and Chancellor can continue to rely on big majority for support of treaty system.

On agenda he believed West should go further than at Berlin and might propose European security system. In reply French question Blankenhorn, stressed Germans not now tabling proposal this complex and vital subject but looking forward discussions Foreign Minister level Paris. He thought such plan could be development (though not extension) Paris Agreement and should include all European states (including Soviet Union) as well as US and Canada. Without going into further detail he thought plan should include following principles: (1) mutual non-aggression guarantees; (2) mutual assistance by all members if one member attacked; (3) loss of treaty rights if violations discovered; (4) armament restrictions and controls; and (5) exclusion of resort to force for settlement territorial disputes. He said it important maintain secrecy developments here.

British and French agreed with general outlines German presentations as did we, but none commented on Blankenhorn’s statements re European security arrangements except to ask clarifications.

Discussing same hypotheses brought out by Seydoux yesterday, Blankenhorn indicated strong feeling Soviets would not accept Eden Plan for free elections and were not prepared to surrender East German Government unless some high price such as US troop withdrawal from Europe occurred or implementation military clauses Paris Agreements suspended. Seydoux recognized differences with Austrian situation but said French were astounded Soviets willing withdraw their troops from Austria as this was first time single Soviet soldier had evacuated occupied territory, and he thought this indicated increasingly flexible policy which might be shown in Germany.

French and Germans agreed most likely possibility was Soviet decision leave Germany divided. In that event French remain seriously concerned how four-power conference can appear make progress. Blankenhorn suggested perhaps conference can be adjourned without breaking up and could appoint committees study European security program. Seydoux agreed with desirability thus keeping conference [Page 156] in being but stressed need that in public presentation in forthcoming weeks we not indicate we expect no immediate results.

On discussion time, place and participation, Blankenhorn indicated he thought invitations might go out before Austrian peace treaty but appeared agree tripartite position that international situation prevented meeting before July at earliest. As to place, Blankenhorn was agreeable to Switzerland but strongly opposed Berlin and found objections to all other suggestions for various reasons. On participation he said, as last resort, Adenauer might prefer permit East and West German Governments present separate statements to four participants rather than have Federal Republic entirely unheard.

All delegations agree paper covering procedural problems as well as certain other topics such as Soviet intentions, for four Foreign Ministers to study should be completed by May 6.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–2855. Secret. Drafted by Beam and McBride. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.
  2. Supra.