172. Despatch From the Ambassador in Costa Rica (Woodward) to the Department of State 2
SUBJECT
- Suggestion that Advance Consideration be given to Interpretation of Article 3 of Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
Even though tension and alarm about a possible “invasion” subsided during the holiday season in Costa Rica, there is no indication that the Costa Rican opposition forces generally assumed to be organized in some nearby country are disbanding. Because these forces are outside of Costa Rica and do not seem to have a correlated organization within Costa Rica, this Embassy is not in as good a position to estimate the significance of the forces as are the Department and related intelligence agencies in Washington.
If the Department has not recently done so, I believe it would be useful for the Department to request the intelligence agencies of our Government to provide a current estimate of the strength of this organization and the possibility that it may actually attack the Costa Rican Government.
If the intelligence estimate indicates real possibility of an attack, I suggest for the consideration of the Department that it may be a wise precaution to attempt to obtain an advance decision in the National Security Council on the question: What would be the response of the Government of the United States if requested by the Costa Rican Government to give “immediate measures” of assistance under paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, if the Costa Rican Government is attacked by airplanes which are not identifiable as those of another “State” so that [Page 582] the attack is not clearly within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 3?
If the Costa Rican Government is attacked, it appears probable that this is the precise question with which our Government will be faced. If this should happen, there would probably not be time to find out whether the attack was made possible by another “State” before the decision whether to give armed assistance or not would be academic. Therefore, the question of whether our Government would wish to make a broad or narrow interpretation of Article 3 might depend entirely upon judgment as to which way is to our greater national interest. The agencies of our Government represented on the National Security Council probably have all the information they require in order to form this judgment. This Embassy will endeavor to supply any additional information requested and which is obtainable within Costa Rica.
One of the factors that may increase the possibility of an attack is that the Costa Rican Government is afraid to “present the whole problem of Central American friction to the Organization of American States” as suggested in Deptel 160, December 23, 1954,3 until such time as it is fairly certain that the potential attackers can be proved virtually flagrante delicto. The Costa Rican Government is afraid that it might be censured for the events of last April when an assassination attempt against President Somoza was prepared in Costa Rica. Such a censure might reawaken the public disapproval within Costa Rica of suspected international meddling by the Figueres Government which seriously shook public confidence in the regime last summer.
In Deptel 160, December 23, it was stated that the Costa Rican Government should not rely on the United States to solve its problems. In this connection, there is more likelihood that the Costa Rican Government would present to the OAS evidence of preparations for a possible attack before an attack is flagrante delicto, if this Embassy or the Department were to disabuse the Costa Rican Government of the impression it now harbors that the United States would come to its assistance in the event of an attack by airplanes.
There is less likelihood that the Costa Rican Government would request assistance to meet Costa Rican attackers if they do not use airplanes, even though the attackers clearly move into Costa Rica from a neighboring country. However, if the question presented in this despatch is answered, it might at the same time be useful to attempt to answer the hypothetical question: What would be the response of the United States Government if requested by the Costa Rican Government to give “immediate measures” of assistance under [Page 583] paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, if the Costa Rican Government is attacked by Costa Rican forces or mixed forces not clearly identifiable as including forces of another “State” but which clearly move into Costa Rica from some place or places outside of Costa Rica in order to make their attack?