28. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs (Cale) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland)1
SUBJECT
- Military Problems for Discussion with Gordon Gray.
In accordance with your request, an appointment has been made for you to call on Gordon Gray at the Department of Defense (2E860, Pentagon) at 4:30 p.m. on Wednesday, December 7. It is suggested that you may like to have Mr. Sanders and Mr. Sayre accompany you.2
All of the problems listed in our enclosed memorandum of October 31 to you merit discussion with Mr. Gray. It may be, however, that time will not permit taking up all of these matters in one interview. We recommend that you concentrate, first, on the implementation of the grant assistance program and, second, on the question of credit. We consider these two problems to be the most important and most urgent ones.
Grant Assistance. The program is not being implemented as effectively as it might be in terms of our undertakings with the countries participating in the program. In addition, we have repeated requests from countries participating in the program for additional grant military assistance. This situation creates continuing problems in our overall relations with these countries. The problem of implementation [Page 237] consists of three major parts: one, adequate appropriations to implement the program; second, slow delivery of equipment and spare parts; and three, the need for replacing propeller aircraft with jets, if our Government is to continue to support air units in Latin America.
The Department of Defense has proposed a program of $46.5 millions for Latin America in fiscal year 1957. Of this amount some $31 millions is for maintenance support and training, approximately $4 [millions] for rehabilitation of two submarines to be loaned to Brazil and a patrol boat for Haiti, and about $11 millions for direct forces support programs in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. The amount proposed, if approved, should make it possible for Defense to fulfill our commitments under the program and carry it out in a creditable manner. While making it clear that the requested amount should be justified primarily on a military basis, it is suggested that you assure Mr. Gray of our support for the program on a political basis.
The slow delivery of equipment may be explained in part by the very limited funds which have been made available for the program, but this does not explain the fact that some of [the] equipment and spares programmed in fiscal years 1952–54 remains to be delivered. Of the equipment and spare parts originally programmed in fiscal years 1952–1954, according to reports of the three armed services as of September 30, 1955, about 25 percent remains to be delivered, as indicated in the following table: (Figures do not add because of rounding).
| Total Equipment and Spare Parts | Delivered | Remaining | |
| Army | $43.6 | $37.8 | $ 5.7 |
| Navy | $22.4 | $14.9 | $ 7.5 |
| Air Force | $25.2 | $16.2 | $ 8.1 |
| $91.0 | $69.0 | $22.0 |
The current status report of the Air Force indicated that the latter expects to deliver the remaining equipment by the first half of 1956. The Navy, however, is not planning to deliver the equipment now programmed until the last half of 1957—that is, almost two years from now. The Army plans delivery after December 1957—that is, more than two years from now.
The grant assistance program in Uruguay is an example of our slow deliveries. The agreement with Uruguay was signed in 1952, but presently scheduled deliveries (six aircraft by the Navy; complete equipment for an anti-aircraft battalion by the Army) are not to be made until 1957 or 1958. It is true that deliveries to Uruguay were held up in part because the Uruguayan Government did not [Page 238] agree to the necessary arrangements for the assignment of US Navy personnel until late in 1954 and US Army personnel until June 1955. But further protracted delay on our part would not appear desirable. In view of the arrival in Washington this month of both the President and Chief of Naval Operations of Uruguay, and the expected arrival of the Chief of Staff of the Uruguayan Army in January, it would be particularly desirable if something could be done to assure these officials that the equipment will be delivered promptly.
Under agreements with eight Latin American countries we have undertaken to help develop ten fighter squadrons, which we have equipped with F–47 and F–51 (propeller) aircraft but which can no longer be supported because of the non-availability of spare parts. The impossibility of continuing support was probably foreseen in 1953, when delivery of the planes began, and it may well be questioned why the obsolete aircraft was ever programmed in the first place. In the case of Colombia, the entire squadron of planes we provided is already grounded. All the other squadrons we have equipped will, it seems, likewise be non-operational within a year.
Whether the MDA air units in Latin America are needed for hemispheric defense and should, therefore, be converted to jets is, of course, a military decision. There are, however, political reasons for supporting an affirmative decision. Providing US jets on a grant basis would: (a) discourage the continued sale in Latin America of European jets, which contributes to “arms races” and also to the possible introduction of European military missions; (b) help keep the politically influential Latin American military oriented toward the US; (c) give us greater control over the employment of Latin American air force because the US would be the source of spare parts for the planes; (d) help satisfy the repeated Latin American demands for additional grant assistance; and (e) help free Latin American funds, which are now going into the purchase of European jets, for economic development projects.
On the subject of credit, we do not yet have an agreed position with E and ICA, although U/MSA and ARA are generally in accord. It is suggested, therefore, that on our proposals for credit you make clear that you are speaking only for ARA.
Attached is a brief memorandum on grant assistance and credit.3 A second attached memorandum describes ARA’s credit proposals in more detail.4 It is thought that you may wish to give copies of these memoranda to Mr. Gray.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.5–MSP/12–555. Secret. Drafted by Sanders.↩
- The proposed meeting between Holland and Gray did not take place until December 12; see infra .↩
- Dated December 5, 1955, entitled “Military Grant Aid and Credit Operations in Latin America,” not printed.↩
- Dated November 3, 1955, not printed.↩