355. Letter From the Ambassador in Haiti (Drew) to the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland)1

Dear Bill: This is a follow-up on my telegram No. 21 of July 17, 1957,2 on the meeting with Kebreau and company. It was a great disappointment to me. I suppose I am the incurable optimist, but I did think on the basis that this was a formal meeting I might be able to extract something from the other side. I got little or nothing out of it except a play-back of the familiar record which we have heard before both directly and indirectly. It all boiled down to something along the line that “We want you to recognize us; therefore you have to recognize us because everything is wonderful”.

My telegram pretty well covered the question of elections. I think it made it clear that they were far from convincing that they had any serious intention of getting on with them. Their clinching argument was that, on their word as gentlemen and soldiers that they would hold elections, everything was settled and we had no recourse but to recognize. My repeated and emphatic insistence that I was not making elections or anything else a prerequisite to recognition fell on unwilling ears.

I got absolutely no where with my reference to political arrests, cleavage within the Army or similar matters. My statements were pooh-poohed as being based on rumors designed to cause friction between the Embassy and the Junta. As an example of such naughty rumors, Kebreau mentioned a story that the Embassy was going to be burned down. (If it did happen it would solve a lot of our problems here.)

It was obvious that during the 36-hour notice of the meeting, the Haitian side had done quite a bit of rehearsing. Kebreau was his usual dignified and rather impressive self. Zamor started out with a glowering and sulky expression but warmed up as the conversation proceeded and at the close had impressed me as reasonably friendly and quite a forceful individual. Valvule was a complete cipher. Captain Farau impressed me as a smart-aleck who wanted sitting on particularly when he read me a curtain lecture on the principles of recognition which was intended to show me that we had no recourse [Page 960] but to recognize. Colonel Roumain’s principal contribution was a repeated demand to know “When do you recognize us?”.

Throughout the meeting there were occasional remarks which may or may not have been intended as threatening. I have in mind Kebreau’s reference to a newspaper story that we had “broken relations” with Haiti. He also referred to rumors that we were working against the regime. To these I answered that he was quite at liberty to put an end to such rumors by leaking or announcing the fact of our meeting as proof that we entertained friendly if not official relations. I got no reaction at all, as I gather that was not in the script.

The fact that the meeting took place is pretty well known to the public. Various rumors are spreading, among them, one that unless we recognize at once all Americans will be evicted from the country. Another one is that Kebreau will “break relations” and withdraw all Haitian personnel from their Embassy in Washington. While I am not taking them too seriously, I would not be at all surprised if the Junta does embark on something of a war of nerves. It is a fact that they desperately want our recognition to put the seal of respectability on the regime. They also know that unless we make the first move none of the major powers will do so.

I am sure that the Department too was disappointed that this second meeting was not more productive of progress. Obviously, I am fully prepared to abide by the Department’s decision if for reasons not known to me it should see fit to override my recommendation and proceed with recognition. I have in mind the danger that Haiti might at least threaten to turn to the Soviets for help or that the Communists in this hemisphere or elsewhere might try to make propaganda out of our protracted non-recognition. I have also thought of the possibility that more delay might embarrass us in some way in the hemisphere. I am sure I don’t have to tell you that I would accept the Department’s decision gracefully and as cheerfully as possible if it should decide to overrule me.

Incidentally, I am in frequent touch with my Diplomatic colleagues, some of whom inspire confidence in matters of this kind, and they are unanimous in their feeling that this Government has not earned recognition. I made a courtesy visit on the Archbishop this morning and found him surprisingly vehement in his hostility to the regime. The press and responsible elements—and I don’t mean just supporters of Dejoie3—are becoming increasingly outspoken against it. The reasons are not all tangible, although the principal ones are those we have recorded.

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For background, in case anyone is interested, I enclose some rough notes which I prepared in advance of the meeting as a script from which to talk, as well as a Memorandum of Conversation prepared by Assistant Attaché Rodney Landreth who was present at the conversation.4 Between the two—I followed my script fairly closely—you should have a fairly good idea of the course of the conversation.

Please don’t ask me where we go from here. I don’t know.

Sincerely,

Jerry
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 738.00/7–1857. Confidential; Official–Informal.
  2. In telegram 21, Drew described his discussion with the members of the Junta on July 16. (Ibid., 738.00/7–1757)
  3. Louis Dejoie, Haitian Senator and Presidential candidate in the elections on September 22.
  4. Drew’s preparatory notes and the memorandum of conversation, July 16, are not printed.