359. Despatch From the Ambassador in Haiti (Drew) to the Department of State 1

No. 246

SUBJECT

  • Political Situation; A Brief Appraisal of the Duvalier Administration’s First Month in Office

Summary

Since the election of Dr. Francois Duvalier as President of Haiti on September 22, 1957, and his inauguration on October 22, 1957, the country has enjoyed an uneasy political peace resulting in part from the disorganization of opposition forces, from emotional exhaustion of the comparatively small politically-conscious segment of the public at large, and from fear of the Army’s demonstrated firm policy of containing opposition activity by force. The continuing financial crisis has been temporarily ameliorated by the first proceeds of a good coffee crop. On the other hand, President Duvalier’s announced policy of “national unity” has been negated by a ruthless “spoils system” undermining all branches of the Government; campaign promises of wider employment, higher wages and better working conditions remain unfulfilled; more evident is the public’s dislike of the obvious Army domination of the civil Government; opposition forces are plotting to capitalize on the public’s disillusionment; and the failure of the present Government of Haiti to bring about a satisfactory solution of the “Talamas Case”2 has postponed effective United States economic and financial assistance. Continued economic dislocation and political disillusionment is emboldening the opposition forces which are seeking an opportunity for overt action to overthrow the administration and the Army high command.

Possibly offsetting some of these adverse factors is the fact that the Army is reasonably well unified under the Chief of Staff, General Kebreau. Some hope for economic recovery springs from expressions of private American interest in a number of new investment possibilities. Loans are being sought from Cuba, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. However, there is little indication that private funds or the proceeds of foreign borrowing will be made [Page 965] available in time or in the quantity necessary to remove the economic threat to the stability of the present administration. These positive factors and circumstances might develop and combine to enable the Government to remain in power. Nevertheless, it can only be concluded that the Duvalier administration has ahead of it during the next few months an extremely difficult road to survival.

Discussion

Comparative political tranquility has been enjoyed by Haiti during the interim rule by the Military Junta from June 15 to the inauguration of President Duvalier on October 22 and since then under his civil Government. This surface calm is due largely to the public’s fear of the strong repressive policy of the Army to intimidate the masses and the opposition leadership. Purely political arrests and threats of arrests continue, as do police entry and search of private homes without warrants. The beating to death of an American citizen, without yet punishment of those guilty, has added to these fears. This tranquility by intimidation is assisted by the emotional exhaustion of much of the politically conscious public after a year of tension and economic crisis.

President Duvalier’s election with open Army support to assure a considerably larger vote than he would have obtained in a wholly free election has prolonged the bitterness of opposition groups. His plan to temper this situation by a policy of “national unity”, i.e. political amnesty and rapprochement with opposition supporters to be kept in and brought into all echelons of his Government, has given way to new political arrests and the operation of a “spoils system” more extensive than Haiti has seen for a generation. Political wounds remain unhealed; bitterness has increased; the Government’s ability to administer the nation has been further decreased; and hope that the President might lead his country out of political chaos and economic depression is waning.

The scattered labor unions in Port-au-Prince are voicing discontent with working conditions and wages. The politically influential taxi drivers’ union is unhappy with the low level of tourism blamed in part on the failure of the Government to give satisfaction to the United States in the “Talamas Case.” The doubt and discontent of the laboring classes is matched by a general disillusionment of the business community in the “do nothingness” of the new administration with respect to the economic problems confronting the nation. In the field of governmental administration, the President and his advisors have not shown ability, clarity or firmness of purpose. At least a half a dozen American economic, legal, industrial and public relations advisors have been retained without apparent coordination of their activities or counsel. Some self interest in their various [Page 966] activities seems likely. Forthrightness in attacking the nation’s serious financial condition is not yet apparent. Much-discussed economic planning has taken no tangible form. The President and his Minister appear preoccupied in appeasing job-hunters.

A more fundamental source of public apprehension stems from the increasingly obvious domination of the civil Government by the Army under Chief of Staff General Kebreau, the former head of the Military Junta. Haitians traditionally fear and have not long tolerated pure military rule. In apparent realization of the public’s attitude, General Kebreau seems satisfied to exercise rule through personal domination of the President and his Ministers. It is generally conceded that President Duvalier would not long stay in office without Army support and that on the other hand the Army could not long rule without the reasonably popular President as its front man. The uneasy alliance between the two does not add to the public’s estimation of the permanence or objectivity of the present regime.

The situation lends itself to the plans of the opposition forces which hope to drive a wedge between the President and the Chief of Staff in order to weaken the alliance and seize the power by force of arms if necessary. However, these forces are not wholly united in their efforts and objectives and are kept off balance by Army harassment of their leaders. Consequently, successful overt action is unlikely in the immediate future but possible before the turn of the year. The threat is constant and will grow with further signs of Government weakness or of internal strife among those now exercising the ruling power.

On the other hand it is possible that certain positive factors and circumstances may combine to strengthen the Government’s position. The instinct of self preservation will probably keep the Army unified in a showdown. The Talamas Case might be satisfactorily resolved in the near future. Resumption of normal relations with the United States and consequent prospect of some additional financial and economic aid would greatly strengthen the President’s position. Greater hope for new American private capital investment might have a stimulating effect. The good coffee crop and a fair tourist season could tide the economy over until the next “dead season” starting about April 1958. The public might accept the fact of Army rule through the civil Government or the President might find a way to throw off the Army yoke and thus increase his popularity. Finally, widespread current political apathy, a willingness to accept an end to political tension even at the price of unpopular behind-the-scenes Army control, coupled with lost hopes that democratic processes could produce a better government, must be considered as a positive factor in favor of the survival of the Duvalier administration.

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Conclusion

On balance, present factors and circumstances point only to the exacerbation of the extreme difficulties facing the month-old Duvalier administration. The political and economic problems are inextricably related. It is not clear how or when they can be solved. Even if the political opposition can be contained for the next few months, the administration will again face serious economic problems with the advent of the “dead season” starting in the Spring of 1958. Hopes for the protracted survival of the Duvalier Government must be greatly tempered until it shows a more forthright ability to deal with its problems.

For the Ambassador:
J. Paul Barringer
Counselor of Embassy
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 738.00/11–3057. Confidential.
  2. Shibly Jean Talamas, an American national, died the night of September 29 while in the custody of Haitian police in Port-au-Prince. In telegram 101 from Port-au-Prince, October 1, the Embassy transmitted to the Department the text of a note delivered that day to the Haitian Foreign Office registering an official protest over the death of Talamas. (Ibid., 238.113–Talamas, Shibly Jean/10–157) Additional documentation is ibid.