44. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)1
SUBJECT
- Naval Ship Loan Program for Latin America
Background: In a letter of October [7] 1955,2 Mr. Murphy brought to Defense’s attention repeated requests of Latin American governments to purchase naval vessels and the suggestion that we lend naval vessels from the “moth ball” fleet to satisfy this demand if Defense considered that the Latin American countries had a military requirement for such naval vessels. The Navy proposed the loan of a total of seventeen destroyers, destroyer escorts, and submarines to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru and Uruguay. These ships are World War II types and would be used to train naval personnel in the countries concerned in antisubmarine warfare tactics. The JCS and Defense agreed that these countries required the [Page 276] ships, in addition to those they already have, so that they will be better able to defend their ports and sea lines of communication off their coast, and therefore approved the program and so informed us on May 11, 1956.3 This program has been discussed with all of the Latin American governments concerned and they have evinced a strong desire to receive the vessels proposed. We do not have a commitment to provide the naval vessels but these countries may be expected to criticize us strongly if the proposal is not submitted to the Congress.
This program has been approved by all the Executive agencies concerned except the Bureau of the Budget. Budget considers it (1) inconsistent with the military policy stated in NSC 5613/1 and (2) objects to the added requirement for appropriated funds. Budget’s second point can be easily disposed of because the ships are being loaned on the understanding that the recipient will pay the cost of reactivation. Budget’s first point is a manifestation of the disagreement on our military policy which was brought to your attention during your briefing in ARA. Paragraph 32 of NSC 5613/1 authorizes military assistance to Latin American countries to enable them to (a) maintain their internal security (b) defend their ports, strategic installation and communications routes and (c) participate in combined operations for the defense of the hemisphere. Paragraph 33 of NSC 5613/1 authorizes this assistance to be given on a grant, credit or cash basis. The proposed naval program is justified under (b) and (c).
Budget considers that the “legislative history” of NSC 5613/1 authorizes military assistance only for internal security. In revising the policy last year, the NSC recommended (1) deleting a paragraph on encouraging the Latin Americans to participate in extra-continental defense activities, (2) revising our policy on hemisphere defense to make it less open-handed and (3) emphasizing defense of national territory and internal security. Defense submitted the list of forces it considered we should help the Latin Americans support, on a grant basis, and this list was included as an annex. State concurred in the revised policy because it provided authority for the program we are carrying out as well as the proposed ship loan program and seemed more consistent with Latin American capabilities than the previous policy. The President approved this policy on September 25.
We consider Budget’s position inconsistent with (1) our treaty commitments under the Rio Treaty, (2) military assistance agreements with twelve Latin American countries, (3) the plans of the Inter-American Defense Board for hemisphere defense which the U.S. has approved and (4) NSC 5613/1.
[Page 277]Our failure to present the ship loan program to the Congress will aside from military reasons which Defense will advance, have serious adverse effects on our relations with Latin America. These countries have been critical of us because of the limited military assistance we have furnished and especially of our inability or failure to provide naval vessels and aircraft. They have been purchasing naval vessels in Europe which (a) has been a drain on their economic resources and (b) has increased European influence in Latin America and proportionately reduced our influence. Failure to proceed with this program would jeopardize our military relations, the position of our military missions, and would also have serious effects on our political relations. I should like to stress particularly the effects on Argentina, Brazil and Colombia.
We are taking every step possible to strengthen our relations with the present Argentine Government to get it firmly committed to the inter-American system and close ties with the United States. This Government is at present headed by military officers. So far we have been able to do very little on the military side and we therefore view the proposed ship loans as a valuable contribution to our over-all objective.
In the recent negotiations with Brazil, for a guided missile tracking station, as well as the current negotiation for other military facilities, our military assistance has been a key issue. We consider the proposed loan of four destroyers not only essential to the success of these negotiations but as important to improving our current unsatisfactory military relations with Brazil.
Legislation was introduced during the last session of Congress to lend two destroyers to Colombia. The Colombians will find it particularly difficult to understand why we are unwilling to reintroduce this legislation.
Recommendations: (1) That you indicate in the OCB meeting that the Latin American governments are prepared to pay the cost of reactivation.
(2) That we support Defense’s view that these ships are fully justified within NSC 5613/1.
(3) That our failure to present the program to Congress would have serious adverse repercussions on our relations with the countries concerned and would cause further deterioration in our military relations with these countries.4
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Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Latin America, January–May, 1957. Secret. Drafted by Sayre and concurred in by Richards, the Offices of the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs and Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning, and the Department of Defense.
This memorandum is Tab D in a set of briefing papers drafted for the Under Secretary of State in preparation for an OCB meeting on March 27, when the subject of the naval ship program for Latin America was to be considered. Tab A is a letter from Sprague, March 26, infra . Tab B consists of excerpts from NSC 5613/1; see Document 16. Tab C is a letter, March 21, from Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget A.R. Jones to the Secretary of Defense; see paragraph 3, infra .
↩ - Document 27.↩
- Document 37.↩
- There is no indication on the source text that these recommendations were approved, but see Document 46.↩