Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

196. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Lyon) to the Secretary of State ¹

Washington , October 7, 1955 .

SUBJECT

• Motives of the Argentine Revolution

The following is a summary of an Embassy, Buenos Aires telegram analyzing the motives of the recent revolt in Argentina.²

The Embassy believes that there was no single motivation, but a complex of forces which prompted the revolt. While it concedes that it is as yet too early to ascertain the specific motives with any precision, it suggests four factors as playing an important part in building up sufficient steam to overthrow Perón:

1. Desire for a Change. Coupled with the fact that any government becomes shop-worn after a long period of rule, was a growing disaffection and uneasiness over the trend of the Government’s program as time went on. Perón rode to power in a crusade to correct certain social and economic inequities. As these objectives were achieved and new ones undertaken, many supporters fell away either out of lack of interest or because of other phases of his program. The serious moral let-down during the latter period of Perón’s rule–marked particularly by a drive for more and more absolute power, abolition of many civil liberties, perversion of schools, and a growing belief of the existence of widespread corruption–increased the numbers and force of those who felt Argentina could not indefinitely support this type of a government, and who at first no longer supported the government and later deeply and bitterly opposed it.

2. Church–State Conflict. Perón’s attack on the position and prerogatives of the Catholic Church, but more especially the methods he employed, struck a chord which aroused deep distrust of Perón and uneasiness in that Catholic nation. The Embassy believes that if there was any one immediate cause of the revolt and the abortive June 16 attack it was the Church matter, which acted as a catalyst bringing to a head latent dissatisfaction and desire for a change, coalescing the opposition around a popular issue and undermining Perón’s own political and military supporters who now had their loyalty divided.

3. Uneasiness in Armed Forces. The Argentine Navy was long known to be anti-Perón, but it was small and if kept isolated its chances of successful revolt were remote. The Air Force was likewise uneasy but strongly loyal to its leaders who kept it in line. The Army was much more Perón’s instrument and moulded to his use by identification of high-ranking officers their position and prerogatives with the regime, and by identification of non-commissioned officers and many regular soldiers with his social reforms. Loyalty to military tradition, however, and distaste for the Church conflict made it impossible for increasing numbers to follow Perón blindly. Officers retired by Perón for one reason or the other were able to exploit this discontent particularly among intermediate level officers. More recently, Perón’s projection of labor into the arena with intimations in August that the labor organizations might be made into a sort of civilian army, prompted even some of the higher echelon officers still in the service to the conclusion that they had had enough. Thus even they were ready to defect to the rebels, which more than anything else determined the final outcome after the revolt had been set in motion by numerically inferior forces.

4. Weakness of Controlled Labor Movement. The danger of a general strike or mob violence by some elements of labor had long been a weapon in Perón’s hands. Why the labor unions were not mobilized when the crisis came is still a mystery and was part of the paralysis which seemed to grip Perónista leadership during the revolution. The Embassy suggests that the answer may lie in the fact that the labor movement seemed to have lost much of its vitality with time and as a result of imposition of leadership and control from above without real rank-and-file participation. It also appears that loyal army leaders, who had no love for labor as an organized force, assumed complete control of the government’s defense. In any case, the rebel military leaders were ready and willing to cope with a labor threat if it developed.

The Embassy states it has never considered the oil contract with Standard of California, which was awaiting approval by Congress, as a cause of the revolution or an important factor in its success, although there have been rumors that opposition to it motivated Army desertion of Perón. The Embassy states that at least some of the higher military officers favored the contract, and it strongly doubts that any considerable portion of the Army, if indeed any at all, defected because of a conviction that Perón would press for its approval. The Embassy also points out that President Lonardi, by his own account, began active opposition to Perón and to organize his overthrow several years before the contract was signed.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 735.00/10–755. Confidential. Drafted by Vaky. A handwritten note on the source text by Barnes indicates that the Secretary was informed of the contents of this memorandum.
2. Telegram 405 from Buenos Aires, October 5. (Ibid., 735.00/10–555)
3. In a letter to Holland, September 28, Nufer reported that Lonardi stated publicly that the oil contract would be rejected. The letter reads in part as follows: “It is unfortunate that Lonardi thought it necessary to commit himself about the contract so early in the game. I can only assume that pressure from nationalist elements and perhaps even from his associates in the armed forces, must have been very strong. … I am afraid that for the time being petroleum is a dead issue and I doubt the provisional government will be inclined to revive it even in the event it should later on consider itself strong enough to do so.” (Ibid., Holland Files: Lot 57 D 295, Argentina)