The Argentines will soon send to Washington a delegation which will
explain the programs of the present government and will make specific
requests for aid from the United States. We do not know just what
requests they will submit.
I have no desire to prejudge requests not yet received; nor do I feel
that we should adopt an attitude of willingness to accede to whatever
requests the Argentines may make of us. However, I believe that it is
constructive that the general nature and dimensions of the Argentine
problem be understood by those people in our Government who will be
dealing with matters raised by the Argentine delegation.
I have prepared and attach a memorandum analyzing the present status and
significance of our relations with Argentina. With your approval I would
like to send it to Treasury, Commerce, Defense and the Export-Import
Bank with an explanation substantially along the lines of this
note.2
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs (Holland)
SUBJECT
- Present Significance of our Argentine Relations
Argentina is one of the three most important Latin American
countries, the other two being, of course, Brazil and Mexico. Never
have our relations with Argentina been in so delicate a state as
they are today. Their conduct in the immediate future will determine
for years to come the nature of our relations with Argentina; will
profoundly affect our relations with other South American countries,
and will be a major factor in our campaign against Communism
throughout South America.
Argentina’s traditional attitude toward the United States has been
suspicious, aloof and competitive. There are several reasons. Their
economy is basically strong and considerably industrialized. It is
competitive with our own in the agricultural field which is the
origin of Argentina’s principal exports. This has meant competition
with us in world markets and inability to finance a large volume of
imports from the United States.
The Argentine army has been German-trained for many years. This has
made it a factor weighing against good relations with the United
States.
The factors above have caused considerable anti-United States
sentiment among the upper classes of Argentina. During a substantial
part of the ten-year Perón
regime the Government encouraged anti-United States feeling among
the working classes, thus extending considerably the base of
hostility toward the United States.
In the last two years of the Perón regime his enemies accused the United States
of excessive friendliness to the existing Argentine government.
Considerable pressure was exerted on us in the United States and by
anti-Perón elements
abroad to adopt a policy of hostility to the Perón regime. We followed, however,
the same policy of economic assistance and friendship which we have
pursued with all the American states regardless of the degree of
dictatorship of the government. The fall of the Perón regime has placed in power a
number of people who harbor deep resentments against the United
States.
[Page 402]
The problems of the present government are further intensified by the
fact that it represents an uneasy alliance between the Army and the
Navy. Admiral Rojas, head
of the Navy, and the real leader of the recent revolution, although
Vice President is actually the strongest man in the government. Just
why he occupies the second place is not clear. He states that it is
because of the Navy’s long tradition of forswearing political
activity. More probably the Army has been given the top post as an
additional means of insuring its support for the new government.
The Communist party in Argentina is large and well-organized. Today
it is exceedingly active and is trying to take advantage of the
existing unsettled conditions to capture the largest possible number
of the orphaned pro-Perón
element—heretofore the most numerous politically organized group in
the country.
Balanced against the foregoing are factors which, in my judgment, put
it within our power largely to obliterate the old and new
resentments against the United States, to create a completely new
relationship of mutual understanding, confidence and friendship and
to make of Argentina an aggressive partner in our war against
Communist subversion in this hemisphere. These factors are discussed
below:
The new government realizes that the country needs badly an almost
Herculean work of economic reconstruction. The industrial plant is
dilapidated and neglected. Transportation, power and communication
are likewise. Agriculture has been decapitalized and discriminated
against in a vain effort to achieve a showy and impractical kind of
industrialization.
The new administration is convinced that it cannot succeed in the
economic field without strong assistance from abroad. It has turned
first to the United States. It appreciates realistically that this
assistance will not be forthcoming unless Argentina is prepared to
adopt a frankly pro-United States and anti-Communist attitude. It is
willing to follow that course, one that requires considerable
courage because of the broad sectors of all classes of society who
would readily sympathize with an anti-United States policy.
The present cabinet includes a number of men who impress us as having
integrity, intelligence, courage and sufficient experience to enable
them to perform a constructive job in the fields of industry,
agriculture, commerce, labor and banking. Such men must begin to
show a degree of immediate accomplishment; otherwise groups with a
greater demagogic appeal will be able to engineer their
downfall.
[Page 403]
The new government has already endorsed the Pact of Bogotá,3 one of the
three treaties in the inter-American structure. This eliminates the
last holdout against the Pact. The government has expressed its
intention to adhere to the anti-Communist resolution adopted by the
Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas. If Argentina adopts a
policy of frank hostility to Communism and cooperates with us
effectively in hindering the operation of the international
Communist apparatus, the effect throughout South America will be
very significant. The Communist organization will immediately find
it more difficult to operate in Chile, Bolivia, Brazil and Uruguay,
in all of which it is now causing us serious problems.
If Argentina adopts a policy of frank support of the private
enterprise system, the efforts of socialistically-minded politicians
and economists in the same four surrounding countries will be
considerably weakened.
In conclusion the Argentine situation today gives to the United
States an opportunity to establish a kind of relationship with an
exceedingly important American republic which we have never enjoyed,
an opportunity to achieve a major advance in our hemispheric fight
against Communism and an opportunity to establish the private
enterprise system far more firmly in the entire South American
continent.
This opportunity is a passing one. Argentina cannot wait to find help
in solving her urgent problems. If we do not extend help she will
welcome it from other sources prepared to give it and whose
participation will prejudice United States interests. The United
States public, influenced by our strongly anti-Perón press, will enthusiastically
support a policy of generous aid to Argentina.
Failure to exploit this opportunity may well mean that the present
Government, which is prepared to adopt a strongly pro-United States
attitude, will collapse and be supplanted by another hostile to the
United States. Failure to exploit this opportunity will surely cause
Argentina to adopt a course which can seriously prejudice our
interests there and elsewhere in the hemisphere.
The purpose of this memorandum is to alert all those who will
participate in decisions relating to Argentina of the significance
of the problems with which they will be dealing.
