28. Telegram From the Ambassador in Guatemala (Armour) to the Department of State 1
599. Officials concerned have reviewed problems internal security (Department circular telegram 6492) and agree US security policies this hemisphere have thus far paid more attention building up defenses against threat of overt hostilities with non-American state than to continuing menace internal Communist subversion which deserves more attention. Our basic concept is that danger of successful Communist insurrection here is presently more remote than in areas contingent [contiguous] to Soviet sphere and while there is substantial room for improvement in Guatemalan security services we should not deceive ourselves such improvement would provide [Page 76] substitute for basic measures to reduce political and economic instabilities and to create climate in which Communist conspiracy could not thrive.
In this context following are our answers Department circular telegram 559.3
- I.
- Threat of Communist subversion: Overt Communist apparatus collapsed last summer with overthrow of Arbenz regime and has not yet been reconstituted underground to point where in itself presents current threat to stability. It is outlawed, its visible activities are largely confined to small scale clandestine propaganda and it has apparently not yet achieved any important penetration of government or other key parts of social structure. Its main chance for comeback lies in continuing political instabilities and unsatisfactory economic conditions. Castillo Armas government continues be threatened with dissident or ambitious groups to left and right which in cooperation with military elements and encouraged by economic dissatisfactions potentially have capability overthrowing government and creating political confusion in which Communist conspiracy could blossom again. That this has not occurred is at least partially due to fact potential opposition is itself deeply divided. Basic facts are that Castillo regime depends on will of armed forces and that at present they are divided by conflicting personal ambitions and by unhealed breach between liberation and regular officers; former favoring tough authoritarian rule with widespread purges. Castillo’s current policy is to follow middle path between two, playing one off against other and relying on his personal popularity and backing of US to discourage united move against his government. If this policy should break down possibility would exist of increased scope for Communist subversion.
- II.
- Adequacy of indigenous counter measures.
- a.
- Castillo government recognized threat and has will to act. However on most secondary levels of government officials have insufficient detailed knowledge of Communist organization tactics and personality to strike accurately at Communist conspiracy.
- b.
-
Capabilities of indigenous forces.
- (1)
-
(a) Principal Guatemalan agencies concerned with suppression Communist subversion are Committee for National Defense against Communism (CDNCC), National Police, security police, military intelligence and special Presidential investigating police. All devoid of trained personnel and ill-defined authority agencies leads to confusion. In early days after fall Arbenz, agencies failed to apprehend single top Communist most of whom appear to have escaped country. Since then less than half dozen second echelon Communists [Page 77] rooted out within country. Only known arrest of Communists this year is of two small groups putting out clandestine literature.
(b) Since fall of Arbenz about 5 thousand persons arrested, some several times, on suspicion Communist activities, most in first weeks after revolution. Virtually all released after administrative hearings. This year practice has been arrest “suspects”, hold them for few days or weeks, and then release them for lack of proof, leading to building up of resentment against regime and giving real Communists opportunity benefit from growing presumption authorities don’t know what they are doing.
(c) No court cases involving specifically Communist activities have arisen except one of persons accused of putting out clandestine party paper which has not been resolved. Under anti-Communist law CDNCC has power detain persons up to six months without trial. Its indiscriminate use of this power has raised possibility forthcoming constitution will contain article forbidding imprisonments by special administrative action.
(d) Guatemala has sufficient police and military power to apply limited force in any likely situation.
- (2)
- Military action: Need to apply full scale military action against insurrection does not appear likely at this time.
- c.
- Support of countermeasures by local population: Support Guatemalans will give in future depends on improvement of security system. Majority of politically conscious Guatemalans are anti-Communist and would like to see Communist subversives caught. However there is increasing resentment against CDNCC’s methods arrest and increasing tendency to forget reason for anti-Communist measures and to focus on injustices of system.
- III.
- Analysis of programs: US programs here have consisted of advice and supplying of data on local Communist movement on case to case basis assistance towards improving CDNCC, sending of police officials for training, making available radio equipment and technicians for location clandestine stations, and assignment of US military intelligence officer to work with Guatemala military intelligence. These programs have not yet matured because (a) insufficient time for effects of training and advice to be felt and (b) highly delicate political and personality problems in Guatemalan security agencies which have to date precluded rapid action towards necessary reforms and reorganization.
- IV.
- Recommendations.
- (1)
- That we continue to place primarily emphasis on adequate economic, technical, military assistance and diplomatic programs designed to promote sufficient political and economic stability to minimize subversive danger.
- (2)
- That we continue programs outlined in paragraph 3 above with special emphasis on seeking to persuade government to improve organization and staffing of security organization.
- (3)
- That we … convey to local authorities information concerning activities of Guatemalan Communists in exile and others potentially linked with Communist underground here. They cannot do this for themselves.
- (4)
- We have not hitherto recommended material or financial aid to raise standards of police security forces because this would involve greater expenditures which Circular 559 confirms Department does not want. Apart from obvious political risks we could not subsidize police without stimulating demands other organizations. However we wish to underscore effective machinery to control Communist subversion unlikely unless it can attract competent personnel.
- (5)
- We agree fully with logic that local government should be encouraged look upon their regular forces primarily as instrument for dealing with subversion. We doubt, however, that it is realistic here at this time because of psychological factors. Guatemalan officers corps is deeply inculcated with ancient traditional and ethical concepts of profession of arms and any effort to regard them or make them regard themselves as policemen would be an outrage to their sense of honor. Our military missions have been working quietly to reduce pressure for combat material in favor of support but it has been impossible to go beyond this without causing resentment. There is little we could do which would open breach between Castillo and military so quickly than to pressure him into making military give up their traditional role as soldiers.