70. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 27, 19561
SUBJECT
- Honduras: Delay in Return of Ambassador Willauer
PARTICIPANTS
- ARA—Mr. Rubottom
- Ambassador Willauer
- MID—Mr. Neal, Mr. Wollam
During the course of a general conversation on the Honduran political crisis, Ambassador Willauer referred to a previous conference attended by him with Mr. Holland, Mr. Neal and Mr. Wollam. At that conference, the Ambassador pointed out that he felt he could possibly aid in bringing about a peaceful compromise solution between all the parties in the forthcoming elections but that he was not free to do so under Department’s instructions of June 26.2 He reminded those present at the current meeting that it had been decided at the previous meeting that the Ambassador’s instructions should not be changed, but that another course of action in the [Page 162] interests of peace should be formulated and attempted with the aid of other agencies and with the Ambassador’s assistance in the planning.
The Ambassador went on to say that he had heard that the Department was considering the advisability of his not returning to Honduras until after elections. He commented that because of certain special high-level instructions under which he had acted during the Guatemalan crisis3 and the sequence of events during and after the elections of 1954, when he had worked with all political leaders to preserve peace in Honduras, all important Honduran politicians looked to him as a personal friend and as a force for peace and compromise in their countries. In the upcoming crisis, probable at the time of the October elections, it would be difficult for him to be in Honduras and still see these leaders without the risk of unfounded accusations of intervention from those who might ultimately lose out particularly because in any conversation which he might have, he would feel precluded by the aforementioned instruction from trying to work out a compromise whereby nobody would be seriously hurt in the elections.
After a general discussion of this problem, it was the consensus that in view of the Department’s policy in these instructions and the other factors involved, it would probably be better for Ambassador Willauer to remain away from Honduras until after the elections. Ambassador Willauer agreed to the suggestion that since the Department in this situation desired to be very strictly non-interventionist, his staying away, resulting in having no part in any negotiations, would help to confirm in the minds of the Hondurans our policy of strict non-intervention.
It was then pointed out that while it would be entirely normal and usual for the Ambassador to be present during elections, Mr. Rubottom and Mr. Neal agreed that under the circumstances it would be preferable for the Ambassador to stay away if a reasonable excuse could be found. The Ambassador then stated that it was well-known in Honduras that he had had a mild illness which had been diagnosed locally as a case of typhoid, and had been under medical treatment for three weeks during the month of July. Since it is well-known that typhoid is difficult to contract after proper inoculations, the Ambassador has been taking special checkups in the States to find out just what his previous illness had been. The fact of the matter is that he has been given a clean bill of health by the highest authorities in the United States. Nevertheless, since this is not known publicly, it would be possible to build a very plausible [Page 163] story around the Ambassador’s absence, on the grounds that additional checks were still needed.
It accordingly was decided to cable in the clear to the Embassy that the Ambassador needed additional checks and therefore could not be back during the elections.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 715.00/9–2756. Confidential. Drafted by Willauer.↩
- In instruction 140 to Tegucigalpa, June 26, the Department stated that the Embassy should abstain from any activity which gave the appearance of interference in the domestic politics of Honduras. (Ibid., 715.00/6–2656) In a memorandum of conversation dated August 15, Ambassador Willauer stated in part that “he thought the only hope for Honduras was a tripartite coalition government which would provide all groups with participation in the big business of government. He felt that the Department’s instruction did not give sufficient latitude for him to take advantage of opportunities to use his influence with the various factional leaders to this end.” (Ibid., 715.00/8–1556)↩
- For documentation on the overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz by Carlos Castillo Armas in June 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. iv, pp. 1173 ff.↩