9. Despatch From the Ambassador in El Salvador (Hill) to the Department of State 1

No. 98

SUBJECT

  • Memorandum of Conversation of September 7, 1955.

PARTICIPANTS

  • Salvadorans
    • (In order of appearance)
    • President Osorio
    • Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs Azucar Chavez
    • Tomas Regalado, businessman
    • Rafael Meza Ayau, former Minister of Economy
    • Federico Garcia Prieto, businessman
    • Jose Maria Peralta Salazar, President of Legislative Assembly and Vice-President
  • Americans
    • Ambassador Hill
    • Counselor of Embassy Braggiotti
    • Col. Henry J. Muller, Jr., Army Attaché

President Osorio invited Ambassador Hill to meet with him at his residence at 5:00 o’clock, Wednesday, September 7, 1955, along with the above-listed individuals. When we arrived, the President was alone and was later joined by Under-Secretary Azucar Chavez which gave Ambassador Hill the opportunity to take up some official matters before the arrival of the other guests. The following topics were discussed:

1. Ambassador Hill’s Departure.

The Ambassador informed President Osorio regarding his imminent transfer to serve as Special Assistant to Under-Secretary Hoover in the State Department and told the President that he would depart on Wednesday, September 21, 1955. The Ambassador added that to date he had not been informed regarding the name of his successor. The President said he was sorry to hear that the Ambassador was definitely leaving and stated that in his opinion the President considered the Ambassador to be a wonderful example of a man who is dedicated to serve his country (espiritu de servicio) and the President added that he had enjoyed a closer relationship with Ambassador Hill than he had with any previous American Ambassador and that he genuinely liked to do business with him. The President added that he knew that Salvador would continue to have [Page 36] a friend in Washington and that perhaps the Ambassador could continue to maintain his interest in this country.

2. Post-Geneva Policy of the United States.

In accordance with Instruction No. 1 dated August 15, 19552 from the Department, Ambassador Hill discussed the attachment with President Osorio and Under-Secretary Azucar Chavez. The President expressed considerable interest in the main points of the instruction and commented that it was a pity that it was confidential as he felt that the United States would do itself a great deal of good by disseminating these points in the press and other media.

The President also expressed the opinion that he felt that the United States had been too “soft” in dealing with its major allies, the United Kingdom and France; he felt that we had often gone too far in acceding to their demands instead of standing firm and persuading them to follow our lead. He spoke of this in connection with the Geneva Conference as well as with previous tri-partite meetings which had been held.

3. Elections.

In commenting on the forthcoming elections, the President made the following points:

A.
He was determined to do everything possible to give the people a “free” election and up to a certain limit he would allow the opposition a free hand. He was grieved by certain of their actions but was restraining himself. If he had to crack down, he would and was ready to do so.
B.
He had been very much disturbed at the premature start of the election campaign but as “every cloud has a silver lining” it has turned out rather fortuitously for his Administration, the President said, because the premature campaigning had flushed out certain information of which he had not previously been aware and which was extremely valuable to him in diagnosing the present political situation.
C.
Free elections “Salvador style” were admittedly not as free as we understood them in the United States. Certain supporters like Dueñas and Regalado, for example, could influence many votes. They were great “electors”. What they couldn’t supply, he could.
D.
He felt he was in a stronger position than any time since 1948.
E.
He had no intention of letting any irresponsible leader seize power and undo his achievements of the past seven years.
F.
He felt fortunate to be in power at this time in history when El Salvador was almost, if not entirely, ready for democracy.
G.
The only way his present plan could be a fracaso would be if he were to be assassinated. He wasn’t too concerned with this possibility because “he was born under a lucky star.”
H.
He realized his responsibility to continue a responsible and stable government and was sure he would succeed in this. He knew that Regalado and others present doubted the wisdom of his present attitude of tolerance.
I.
A seemingly free election would prevent strong dissatisfaction on the part of the minority opposition and would make the work of his successor that much easier.
J.
He would stress his views on the elections in his speech on September 14, 1955.
K.
He admitted, in effect, that he was being idealistic in his attitude toward the elections but concluded this phase of the conversation by stating: “I will continue to keep my head in the sky but my feet solidly on the ground.”

4. Communism.

President Osorio stated that the communist problem was becoming quite a severe one in this country but that his administration had assumed the attitude towards the communists of a “cat and mouse technique” whereby the communists were continually caught off balance. The President did not appear to convince his guests that the Government had been very successful in this technique. The President also stated that up until now he had only been forced to use strong methods in two cases. (No further details were forthcoming from the President concerning this remark.)

Comment: It is interesting to note that since the official Government Party (PRUD) has opened up its campaign attacking Canessa and his Party (PAN) of being infiltrated with communists, the President and other officials have spoken out definitely against communism and its influence in this country in a much more realistic manner.

5. MDAP (Military Defense Assistance Pact).

President Osorio spontaneously mentioned to Ambassador Hill that Salvador intended to negotiate a Military Defense Assistance Pact with the United States. The President explained that the delay since January, 1954 was not due to Salvador’s unwillingness to enter into such a pact but only because things moved slowly here and there were many factors that had to be ironed out. Ambassador Hill merely said that Salvador’s position was understood and that certainly there was no urgency in the matter.

6. ODECA .

President Osorio volunteered the information that he had been taken by surprise when Foreign Minister Trabanino telephoned him [Page 38] from Antigua to request his permission to accept the position as Secretary General of ODECA. As he had not authorized Trabanino to be a candidate for the position, he asked for a fifteen minute period to consider the offer. He was reluctant to grant permission as he felt that a Salvadoran should not be the first Secretary General but he decided that if he refused, it might mean the torpedoing of ODECA and, therefore, he acceded to the request.

7. ICA .

With reference to ICA, the President observed that:

A.
The Administration had to be certain it was getting full value for each colón spent. The Government’s budget was very limited in consideration of the many things which had to be done for the country. Careful planning was necessary to insure that funds were well spent and this called for qualified technicians to advise the Government in all fields.
B.
He was satisfied that his Government was receiving an adequate return for the money it spent on ICA activities.
C.
He believed that the quality of the ICA technicians was generally satisfactory, certainly much higher than those of the various United Nations missions. In his opinion, El Salvador had better technicians locally than some of the U.N. personnel sent here. Moreover, some of the U.N. representatives, he believed, had leftist ideologies.
D.
It was true that his Government was often criticized for employing too many foreign técnicos, often at salaries many times that of their Salvadoran counterparts. He wasn’t too concerned about this, however, as this type of criticism is normal and proper in a “democracy”. He knew the value of the ICA advisors but admitted that the people were not sufficiently familiar with their activities and their accomplishments. The President believed that it was a mistake on our part not to give more publicity to ICA activities such as a recent jointly produced ICA-Ministry of Labor propaganda film regarding the purpose of labor inspections. When one of the United States participants asked the President if he would not object to more of this type of pro-ICA propaganda in his country, he replied that, on the contrary, he would welcome it.

8. Need for Improving Educational Level and Diet of the People.

A.
The President several times stressed that the most urgent need in El Salvador was improving the education (cultura) of the people in all fields. He said, in effect, that the Salvadorans were a very backward or retarded people and that this was the principal obstacle to political, economic and sociologic progress.
B.
Another priority objective was improving the national diet which now consisted principally of corn, beans and rice. Although the people looked well-fed and were generally strong, he pointed out that the most serious effect of the inadequate diet was the extremely high infant mortality rate. This he attributed to the fact [Page 39] that the mothers’ milk lacked the various dietary elements necessary for a healthy baby.

9. Fertilizer Plant and Lempa Project.

A.
The President stated that he had directed a study made on the feasibility of building a fertilizer plant which would produce nitrates from the atmosphere. This would solve two urgent problems; i.e., low-cost fertilizer (an estimated seven colones a hundred weight as compared with about twelve colones for imported chemical fertilizers) and would make use of the large amount of surplus electrical power from the Lempa hydroelectric plant which was now being wasted “down the river” during all but the peak-load periods. He estimated that there was surplus power for about eighteen hours a day.
B.
The sale of power to such a fertilizer plant would serve to correct the present deficit under which the Lempa project was now operating.
C.
In connection with the Lempa project, he said that he hoped it would eventually be out of the red with or without the fertilizer plant as soon as distribution systems were expanded. He pointed out that one reason for the deficit was that El Salvador had been required to begin its interest payments to the World Bank in 1952, two years before the project could begin selling power in June, 1954. The date that interest payments were to begin had been predetermined in the loan agreement. An unforeseen delay was encountered in completing the project due to difficulties in obtaining certain materials during the Korean war.
D.
When the Ambassador asked if El Salvador had considered selling its surplus power to neighboring countries, the President and others present expressed the opinion that this was not feasible at present. For one thing, El Salvador actually has no great surplus during peak-load periods. The surplus would, therefore, have to be utilized by a Government-controlled project operating during specified periods of the day. Further, the only neighboring areas where a market for power existed were Guatemala City and Tegucigalpa. These capitals, however, were too distant from the project and their power requirements still too limited to warrant the expense of erecting distribution lines.
E.
The President then arranged by telephone for Ambassador Hill to visit the Lempa Dam on Friday, September 9, 1955.

10. Machete Plant.

The Ambassador told the President of his recent visit to a new machete plant in Zacatecoluca. Mr. Meza Ayau, the former Economic Minister, commented that this would be a sound project provided [Page 40] the machetes could be made of local scrap iron but that if fine steel had to be imported from the United States or Sweden, there would be little saving in view of the probable inefficiency of the local operation. The President showed little interest in the project except to make two joking, but perhaps pointed, remarks. To the Army Attaché he said that the machete factory could be considered an essential arms industry since if El Salvador experienced difficulties in importing modem arms, he could always organize machete battalions which might be quite effective. To Mr. Meza Ayau he commented, “If you were still Economic Minister, you would probably want to impose an immediate tariff on United States and European machetes.”

11. The Church.

During a discussion of the current events in Argentina, the President again stated his firm opposition to the secular influence of the Church. He said that this was a matter which we in Central America definitely settled over a century ago.

12. Central American Union.

President Osorio stated that the Salvadorans had traditionally been the strongest supporters of a Central American union, and this was particularly true at the present time since El Salvador, with its large population and limited land area, clearly had the most to gain by such a union.

13. Low-Cost Housing.

When Mr. Regalado commented that the low-cost housing projects in El Salvador were only possible because of Government subsidies, the President claimed that the project was proving to be economically sound for the Government, but more than this, the greatest value was the sociologie aspects of the project. He said that each family that occupies such a house becomes a stable element in the country. They have “their roots in the ground” and become more concerned with progress and good government.

14. Farewell Dinner for Ambassador Hill .

The President concluded the evening by inviting the Ambassador to a farewell, black-tie dinner in his honor on September 20, 1955.

The conversation was cordial throughout the eight hour get-together; the President appeared to be in better health than the last time we had seen him and also was in very good spirits, exhibiting [Page 41] considerable energy and force in his dissertation on the forthcoming elections.

For the Ambassador:
D. Chadwick Braggiotti
Counselor of Embassy
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 716.00/9–855. Confidential; Limit Distribution. The source text indicates that Ambassador Hill approved this despatch.
  2. Not printed.