Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

12. Memorandum of Discussion at the 239th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 3, 1955¹

Washington , March 3, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–2.]

3. Psychological Reactions to the AEC Announcement of the Effects, Particularly Fall-out, of Thermonuclear Weapons (NSC Actions Nos. 925 and 1320-b; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Official Statements Regarding Nuclear Weapons”, dated October 8, 1953; Memo for Executive Secretary, NSC, from Executive Secretary, OCB, subject: “Overseas Reaction to the AEC Report on the Effects of High-Yield Nuclear Explosions”, dated March 2, 1955)²

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the contents of the OCB report, and emphasized that the report confined itself strictly to the statement issued by the Atomic Energy Commission respecting the effects of thermonuclear explosions. The paper did not deal with the larger problem of the attitude of the peoples of foreign nations toward the prospect of nuclear warfare. Mr. Cutler then pointed out that the Planning Board had reviewed the OCB report and agreed with the recommendations in paragraph 8 thereof.³

After a brief discussion, Admiral Strauss pointed out to the Council that the President’s earlier directive of October 8, 1953, which required Government officials who proposed to make public statements with regard to nuclear weapons to check in advance with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. This directive, said Admiral Strauss, had been more often observed in the breach than in the observance, and accordingly he recommended that the Council reaffirm this directive. The Council agreed with Admiral Strauss’ point.

The National Security Council: ⁴

a. Noted and discussed the study on the subject, prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1320–b, enclosed with the reference memorandum of March 2, 1955.

b. Adopted the Recommendations in paragraph 8 of the above-mentioned OCB study.

c. Noted the President’s directive that, in lieu of NSC Action No. 925 as transmitted by the reference memorandum of October 8, 1953, oral or written statements to be made public by Government officials regarding nuclear weapons, which contain information not previously made public officially, must be checked in advance with the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, who will coordinate the intelligence and foreign climate of opinion aspects with the Operations Coordinating Board.⁵

Note: The reference memorandum of March 2, 1955, subsequently circulated to the Council for information, and for implementation by appropriate agencies of the Recommendations contained therein, as adopted in b above and approved by the President. The directive in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to appropriate departments and agencies for implementation.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on March 4.
2. NSC Action No. 925, October 7, 1953, “noted the President’s directive that any public statements to be made by Government officials regarding thermonuclear weapons must be cleared in advance with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions) Regarding NSC Action No. 1320, see footnote 6, Document 5. For copies of the memorandum from the Executive Secretary, OCB, to the Executive Secretary, NSC, and the OCB report, both dated March 2, see Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Planning Board Member File.
3. Paragraph 8(e) of the OCB report recommended a further report to the NSC in 90 days. That recommendation led to another OCB memorandum for the Executive Secretary, NSC, June 10, on the subject, “Follow-up Report on Overseas Reaction to the AEC February 15, 1955 Statement on the Effects of High-Yield Nuclear Weapons,” dated June 8. This OCB report concluded: “There has been no significant or widespread foreign reactions [sic] to the February 15 statement in so far as radiation effects are concerned”. The report noted, however, that “it appears that the generalized fears with respect to nuclear weapons are increasing throughout the world.” (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Planning Board Member File)

   The memorandum of discussion of the 255th meeting of the NSC on July 14 considered this report along with NIE 100–5–55, “Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World”, dated June 14. The NSC memorandum of discussion of the July 14 meeting noted: “The only comment was made by the President to the effect that the people of the world are getting thoroughly scared of the implications of nuclear war. They were running for cover as fast as they could go.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

4. Paragraphs a-c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1344, approved by the President on March 3, 1955. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

5. At the meeting of the NSC on March 24, the President approved NSC Action No. 1360, “Official Statements Regarding Nuclear Weapons,” which revised NSC Action No. 1340-c as follows:

   “Noted the President’s directive that, in lieu of NSC Action No. 925 as transmitted by the reference memorandum of October 8, 1953, oral or written statements to be made public by Government officials regarding nuclear weapons, which contain information not previously made public officially, must be checked in advance with the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, who will coordinate the intelligence aspects with the Director of Central Intelligence and the foreign climate of opinion aspects with the Operations Coordinating Board.

   “Note: The above revision of NSC Action No. 1344–c, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all recipients of the reference memorandum.” (Ibid.)