237. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Makins), Secretary Dulles’ Residence, Washington, April 29, 19561
Sir Roger reported on the Bulganin–Khrushchev 2 talks as follows:
- (1)
- As regards the Arab-Israel controversy, there was a vague implication that the Soviets would not use the veto power. As regards the Middle Eastern oil, the British make it clear that they will, if necessary, “fight for oil”. It was felt that some progress had been made in persuading the Russians that the Baghdad Pact was purely defensive, and above all designed to defend the British oil position. Nevertheless, the Russians were stubborn in their view that so long as this Pact existed, they would make trouble for the British in the area.
- (2)
- Eden asked “Why do you make trouble for us everywhere?”, and cited Libya where the Soviets had a huge staff connected with the Embassy with nothing to do but carry on anti-British propaganda. The Russians said they would “look into this matter”.
- (3)
-
On disarmament, the Russians said the London talks were a complete waste of time.3 Khrushchev remarked “Nutting and Gromyko are relatively young men. Why should they be wasting the best years of their lives on this performance. They are like organ grinders. First one grinds in one direction, and then the other grinds in the other direction.”
The British got the impression that the Soviets might perhaps take some unilateral action along the lines of their 630,000 reduction of a year ago.
- (4)
- The discussion of Germany indicated no softening of the Soviet position. Khrushchev talked about the defense of Stalingrad and German atrocities. He said the Germans are beginning to get “uppish” again, and it was probably a good thing for everybody that Germany was divided.
- (5)
- There was no effort to drive a wedge between the US and the UK. The close friendship of the two countries was apparently taken for granted. There was relatively little comment about the US. What there was showed respect for the President, recognition of the problems of an election year, and a desire for improved relations.
- (6)
- With reference to trade, the British held stubbornly to the line that they would not give up on strategic goods.
- (7)
- Eden agreed to visit Moscow, but he will be in no hurry to do so. In the absence of some special reason for going earlier, he would have in mind in about a year.
- (8)
- The lecture on thermonuclear matters4 was not regarded as involving any major disclosures but probably designed to elicit through comments and questions information as to the state of UK development of this art. If so, it did not succeed as the British scientists kept quiet.
- (9)
- Bulganin, although much less vocal than Khrushchev, still did not appear to be a negligible factor, although he seemed somewhat frail in health. The British got the impression that they did not feel 100% secure and took off time frequently to contact with and report to the Presidium. There was an almost pathetic desire to be popular. They realized that boos were not a sign of popularity and interpreted whistles as applause.
- (10)
- There was a general impression that the Soviets’ outlook was considerably changed and that the likelihood of war was much reduced, but that the generally aggressive character of the leadership still remained.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles on April 30.↩
- Details of the State visit to Great Britain of the Soviet leaders, April 18–27, and the substance of their discussions with the British, who kept the United States fully informed, are in Department of State, Central File 033.6141. For texts of letters exchanged between Eisenhower and Eden (April 5 and 18, respectively) on subjects to be discussed with the Soviets, see vol. see vol. XV, pp. 467 and 547.↩
- The U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee met in London, March 19–May 4, 1956, but reached no agreement.↩
- Not further identified.↩