243. Memorandum of a Conversation, London, July 16, 19561
PARTICIPANTS
- The Hon. Donald A. Quarles, Secretary of the U.S. Air Force
- Sir Walter Monckton, Minister of Defence, HMG
- Rt. Hon. Nigel Birch, Secretary of State for Air, HMG
- Air Chief Marshal Sir Dermot Boyle, Chief of the Air Staff, HMG
- Rt. Hon. Reginald Maudling, Minister of Supply, HMG
- Sir Frederick Brundrett, Chief Scientific Advisor, Ministry of Defence, HMG
- The Hon. Winthrop G. Brown, Minister for Economic Affairs, American Embassy, London
Mr. Quarles said that there were two points which he would like to discuss very informally. The first was the possibility of stationing U.S. guided missile units in the U.K. The second was the question of what assistance the U.S. might give to the U.K. in provision of an advanced fire control system for interceptor fighters.
Mr. Quarles said that the U.S. development of guided missiles is now coming to the stage when the U.S. would be in a position to become operational in the middle or latter part of 1958, with guided missiles with approximately a 1500 mile range. For these missiles to exercise deterrent effect, it would be necessary to have launching sites near enough to prospective targets. He would like to open with HMG, in a very preliminary way, the question of what their reaction would be to a proposal that several American IRBM units might be stationed in the U.K. If there were a real possibility that this suggestion would be favorably received, he could then pursue the matter further through diplomatic channels. He did not wish to raise it formally with HMG if it was apparent that the reaction was to be definitely unfavorable.
In response to questions from the British Ministers, the following points were brought out:
The U.S. didn’t contemplate any firing of the missiles unless perhaps it might be possible to fire a northerly course from a Scottish base where practice firing could take place without any risks. The weapons would be fully equipped. It was suggested that there be about 6 or 8 separate units of about 15 or 20 weapons each, for normal reasons of defensive dispersal. There would be several launchers in each unit. The number of men required to man the units would not be large and the first effort would be to see if these new units could be integrated into U.S. bases. The U.S. would be prepared to train British personnel in the use of this equipment, although HMG would understand that it would not be possible to give any information with respect to the warheads. It would not be possible to guarantee complete operational efficiency, but the weapon in question would have been actively fired more than one hundred times and would have been subjected to ground tests several hundred times.
There would have to be a certain amount of rotation of personnel who manned these units and this would be done through moving them around between the base here, Patrick Field, and other operational bases in the U.S.
Mr. Quarles said that at the present stage, the IRBM was primarily a cold war weapon. The U.S. was convinced that for at least the next 5 years, atomic weapons could be delivered much more effectively by [Page 665] the use of manned bombers. In another 5 years, such delivery might be “quite perilous”. However, having the IRBM operational with launching sites near enough to prospective targets to be effective would, in our view, add considerably to the basic deterrent.
Mr. Birch pointed out the major political questions which would be raised by any such proposal. The British Ministers agreed to consider the matter carefully. The impression which they gave was that their initial reaction was rather favorable.2
[Here follows discussion on fire control apparatus for British interceptor aircraft.]
- Source: Department of State, London Embassy Files: Lot 61 F 14, IRBM. Top Secret. Drafted by Brown. Enclosed in a letter from Brown to Elbrick, July 20.↩
- Despite this démarche, it was decided not to pursue the question of establishing IRBM bases in the United Kingdom at this time because, as Brown noted in a memorandum to Ambassador Aldrich and Minister Barbour on October 9, “it would cost approximately $200 million to equip the bases.” (Ibid.)↩