250. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Caccia), Secretary of State Dulles’ Residence, Washington, December 24, 19561
Ambassador Caccia called at 10:00 a.m. and stayed with me until 11:40. He first discussed generally the matter of our working relations and his distress that they were not yet on a better basis. I said it was not possible to have such events as had occurred and then suddenly expect everything to be just as it was before. We felt that we had been subjected to a calculated deception which had shaken confidence and [Page 679] it would take time to rebuild that confidence, particularly so far as Congress was concerned. This did not reflect any desire on the part of the President or myself to keep apart but was incident to the inevitability of depending upon time to be a healer.
The Ambassador referred to the growing feeling in England, as reflected by the Middleton story in today’s New York Times, 2 that we were “letting them down” and that we were not sympathetic to their problems. I said that we might very well talk more freely to British correspondents to explain our point of view and show them that we had in advance forecast the inevitable bad effects of the use of force, and that what was now happening was despite counsel and advice which I thought events had fully justified. We might, for example, let it be known what President Eisenhower had written to Sir Anthony Eden. However, we were refraining from that because that might seem to be directed against the present British Government and we had no desire to be cast in that role.
I was confident that matters would work out, but urged that the Government do everything possible to help us gain time.
The Ambassador raised the question of the Baghdad Pact and strongly urged that we promptly join it. I said that while we were prepared to exert a helpful influence in the area and in relation to the Pact, as indicated by our statement of mid-December,3 we were hesitant about the merits of joining a pact which was not merely anti-Communist but interpreted as being anti some of the anti-Communist Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia. I said that if the Pact were acceptable to Saudi Arabia, they might change our views as to the merits of joining and I said that perhaps they could help that by doing something about Buraimi. The Ambassador indicated that he did not think this was a price they could pay. I also spoke of the domestic political difficulties involved in getting ratification of the Baghdad Pact either with or without a comparable pact with Israel. The Ambassador said he had the impression that Israel was less opposed to the Baghdad Pact. I said that unless, in fact, Saudi Arabia would join the Pact and Israel would drop its lobbying against the Pact unless counterbalanced by an Israeli Pact, I doubted that we would ourselves join the Pact. In this connection, I spoke of the activities spearheaded by Senator Javits4 which had been touched off by our statement in support of the Baghdad Pact.
[Page 680]The Ambassador asked whether, in the circumstances, I felt it might be useful for the British to drop out of the Baghdad Pact. I said that I doubted that that would be a useful step at this time, although I did envisage the possibility of some grouping which might usefully supplant or supplement the Baghdad Pact.
The Ambassador said that he would like to feel that they could talk to us at the working level with reference to such problems as Libya (which they would like to discuss in London), Syria and Jordan. I said I saw no objection to this if the talks were not publicized.
[2 paragraphs (13 lines of source text) not declassified]
I said that it had occurred to me that the situation now existing in the Middle East bore a certain resemblance to the Greek-Turkey situation which had arisen in 1947, and I read a portion of the message of the President to the Congress of March 12, 19475 which said that the British Government could give no further financial or economic aid and was under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world. The Ambassador said that it was indeed a close parallel.
[1 paragraph (12½ lines of source text) not declassified]
The Ambassador spoke about the situation in Cyprus and the Radcliffe Report.6 I said that I recognized that it was not possible to devise a constitution where the powers of one branch could not be perverted and that I could understand that the Greeks with their suspicion felt that the Governor-General would have too much power. I said a great deal depended upon a spirit of non-encroachment by one branch against another such as was advocated by George Washington in his Farewell Address. I said that it would seem to me that, from a theoretical standpoint at least, the Greeks should support any substantial move toward self-government realizing that any such move would make it more likely and possible that there would be further moves. On the other hand, I recognized that a Greek Government might be the prisoner of an emotionally aroused public opinion. I asked whether the terms of the Radcliffe Report were in any respect negotiable. He said no—they could be explained but not revised. The Ambassador said that if the self-government formula was not acceptable, he saw no alternative but partition. This was bad as illustrated by Germany, Korea, and Vietnam but might be the lesser of two evils.
The Ambassador urged that we make some kind of statement and do so quickly. He pointed out that the Cypriots themselves had not yet made a pronouncement on the plan. I said I was working on a possible [Page 681] statement but we did not feel that it was appropriate for us to express the view about the merits of the matter. The Ambassador again urged that if we did anything we do it promptly.
The Ambassador talked about the disarmament problem and the difficulty for them of the date (December 31, 1957) after which newly-produced fissionable material would be used only for peaceful purposes.7 He said the date caused them problems. I explained why, for propaganda effect, I thought a date was very important although, in fact, I doubted greatly that the necessary supervision could be developed by that date. I said indeed if they wanted to suggest a date six months later we might sympathetically consider it in view of the lapse of time since the December 31, 1957 date had first been suggested in our intergovernmental discussions. I said, of course, that I did not make this as a governmental suggestion and that any decision would have to be approved by various Departments of the Government and by the President, but that perhaps July 1, 1958 might be a discussable alternative.
He said that Mr. Stassen had said that if the formula was accepted by the British, the exchange of atomic material would be coupled with “political conditions” to be approved by the Congress. He asked what these “political conditions” might be. I said I was not sufficiently familiar with the problem to answer that question.
The Ambassador then asked about the status of the agreement for certain exchange of information about reactors which he understood was being held up because of Democratic objections. I said he would have to get information on this from Admiral Strauss.
Reference was made to Congressional action to waive interest on the British 1946 loan.8 I said that I had the impression that the Treasury Department favored asking for authority not merely to waive interest but also to waive capital repayments. The Ambassador expressed some concern at this, feeling that it might shake confidence and he indicated that he had not thought this was the purpose of our Treasury. I said that perhaps I was not up to date as I had not discussed this with Secretary Humphrey since our return from Paris.
The Ambassador thanked me for the full exchange of views we had had.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.↩
- Drew Middleton, “British Say U.S. Lags on Mideast,” The New York Times, December 24, 1956, p. 1.↩
- For text of this statement, released by the Department of State on November 29, see Department of State Bulletin, December 10, 1956, p. 318.↩
- Jacob K. Javits, Senator-elect from New York.↩
- For text of President Truman’s message to Congress on U.S. economic assistance to Greece and Turkey, see Department of State Bulletin, March 23, 1947, pp. 534–537.↩
- Reference is to proposals, published on December 19, by Baron Radcliffe, British Constitutional Commissioner for Cyprus, on the lines on which a constitution for Cyprus might be drawn.↩
- On November 21, 1956, the National Security Council approved a proposal that after December 31, 1957, or within a month of the establishment of a satisfactory inspection system, all future production of fissionable materials would be subject to effective international inspection and would be used or stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes. Secretary Dulles presented the proposal to the First Committee of U.N. General Assembly on January 14, 1957.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 285.↩