253. Notes on a Discussion Between the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) and the British Minister of Defence (Sandys), Pentagon, Washington, January 28, 19571

In outlining the British position at the opening of the meeting, Mr. Sandys made the following points:

1.
It was essential for the UK to reduce the burden of defense upon its economy. It would be better for the UK and for its allies if the UK were financially sound because the reduced commitments which it then undertook would be much more reliable. The Government was determined to make substantial economies on the civilian side as well as in defense.
2.
On the defense side, the UK proposed to go ahead immediately with cutting their ground forces in Germany from 80,000 to 50,000 men. They expected this reduction to be accomplished in the first [Page 684] quarter of 1958. They also proposed to cut the first line aircraft in the Second Tactical Air Force from 466 to 220. These aircraft would not be simply brought back to the UK, but would be dispensed with entirely.
3.
The purpose of the Government was to get a firm plan for their forces for the next several years and end the uncertainty under which their forces has been laboring for several years past.
4.
They proposed to withdraw their forces from Korea entirely. They only had 1,600 men there and it cost them 2.5 million pounds a year. They expected that Commonwealth forces would also be completely withdrawn. When queried by Secretary Wilson as to whether they would not feel it important to maintain a token contribution in Korea, Mr. Sandys made a comment which is symptomatic of the new Government’s attitude toward its military commitments, namely, “We are not interested in flying our flag over nothing.”
5.
The British hope for a good agreement with Germany this year with respect to support costs. They see, however, little hope of any substantial contribution from the Germans for the support of British troops in Europe next year. Sandys wanted to make it quite clear that HMG was not prepared to spend any foreign exchange on the maintenance of troops in Germany next year, and therefore to put us clearly on notice that the issue of whether any British forces could be maintained in Europe would arise “in acute form” in a year’s time.
6.

The British were extremely anxious to increase the fire power per man of their reduced forces.

[2 paragraphs (12 lines of source text) not declassified]

8.
Mr. Sandys said that while US/UK cooperation in the field of research and development in guided missiles had been excellent, he would like to extend these arrangements. It was extremely important to avoid overlapping between the two efforts.
9.

Mr. Sandys said that the British felt that from a military point of view, the best organization of the 50,000 men that would remain in Germany after March 1958 would be one armored division, five brigade groups, with three divisional and one Corps headquarters. However, if SACEUR and other NATO partners felt that it would be politically and psychologically helpful to organize these forces in four divisions, HMG was quite prepared to consider this proposition even though they felt it to be militarily less effective.

[Numbered paragraph 10 (14 lines of source text) not declassified]

11.
He indicated strong reliance by HMG on the “trip wire” theory of defense, but emphasized that he still felt that effective ground forces were required in sufficient strength to make it impossible for the Russians to make any significant incursion into Western Europe without a “major engagement and real delay”. He said that he was very glad to hear Admiral Radford lay out the concept of a “balanced international force” in which each NATO partner would [Page 685] contribute what it was best able to provide, rather than having each country try to have a completely rounded force of its own.2 The implication of his remarks was that British contributions should be more in the field of major equipment and nuclear weapons than in the field of ground or naval forces. He specifically stated that this concept of a “balanced international force” had its major implications for the U.K., in his thinking, for the Royal Navy.

The balance of the meeting was primarily occupied in a discussion of the IRBM which is being separately reported.3

  1. Source: Department of State, London Embassy Files: Lot 61 F 14, 320 Western Bloc. Secret. Enclosed in a letter from Timmons to Winthrop G. Brown, February 5, which indicates that the notes were prepared by Brown. Sandys became Minister of Defence on January 13.
  2. The Radford presentation has not been identified further.
  3. No record of the rest of the meeting has been found in Department of State files. However, a 13-page record of two meetings on this subject on January 29 is in Department of State, Paris Embassy Files: Lot 61 F 100, USRO/OES Files.