255. Notes on a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Minister of Defence (Sandys), Washington, January 29, 19571
Dulles indicated he understood British intended withdraw Commonwealth forces from Korea. Sandys said this was correct, as this was a most uneconomic part of their defense arrangement. Asked by Dulles to express Defense views, Gray said they understood British problems, but greatly concerned at loss all U.K. and Commonwealth influence in handling UN force. Withdrawal would leave only Turks and Thais, in addition to U.S. and Korean forces. It would tend to make Rhee more unmanageable and more desirous of getting his troops out from U.N. control, but hope British could at least leave liaison officer so that the British flag could be kept flying. In return Defense hoped U.K. would support our proposals with respect to modernization of U.S. forces in Korea. Sandys said that if continued U.K. presence was desired on essentially fictional basis, he was sure they could work it out.
Secretary then returned to modernization program saying that State thought it would be extremely helpful if U.K. could support proposals to withdraw some U.S. forces from Korea, but maintain strength by introduction of dual-purpose weapons in defensive positions. It was extravagance to keep present structure on 1952 basis, as might be considered to be required by armistice agreement. Armistice, of course, not being observed by North Koreans, but we did not wish to break it in way which would give South Koreans excuse for taking offensive. Sandys said he had just heard of proposal today and it [Page 689] sounded reasonable. However, he only wished it could have been put forward some months earlier, as we then might have traded Suez for Korea.
Secretary reaffirmed desire to keep U.K. forces in Korea, although could not stand in way of cut-back. He pointed out armistice was for six months but it now looks as though it may last for sixty years and we can’t be frozen in its terms. We want only defensive changes, but they must be such that Koreans will not feel that cutback in size U.S. forces will permit them again to be over-run. They are sensitive on this point and not to be persuaded by reference to strength of U.S. units on Okinawa, which is too far away. Sandys again agreed to keep flag there, but on modernization asked for written proposal. Caccia added would need to see legal case, but would look at sympathetically. Gray agreed to provide such a paper.
Dulles indicated we were vacillating on legal side. We could call off armistice on basis violations by North Koreans, but this would raise problems with Rhee. We could cite violation of Article 13 d2 while leaving rest of armistice intact and argue this gives us necessary freedom to act. Or we could cite changing conditions since signature of armistice as justifying adjustments in our forces so long as we do not exceed “equivalent fighting capacity”. Sandys thought it was difficult to argue. Nuclear weapons did not increase fighting capacity. Dulles said our lawyers think some substitution of weapons can be justified, but introduction of dual-purpose weapons raises considerable questions. In answer to U.K. question, Gray said we did not plan to introduce nuclear heads now, but we would not foreclose possibility of putting in later.
- Source: Department of State, Martin Files: Lot 64 D 484, S/WF. Top Secret. Drafted by Martin. Numerous handwritten corrections to the roughly-typed text have been incorporated. Separate notes covering the portion of the conversation dealing with British force cuts and the IRBM are printed supra. ↩
- Article 13 d of the Armistice Agreement between the U.N. Commander in Korea and the Commanders of Communist Forces in Korea, July 27, 1953, limited the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to replacement items only.↩