256. Memorandum for the Files by the Alternate Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Martin)1

SUBJECT

  • Duncan Sandys Talks, Thursday and Friday, January 31–February 1, 1957

On behalf of State Department I attended meeting at Pentagon morning of Thursday with British technical personnel. Meeting was chaired by Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, Richard Horner. To a large extent discussion was quite technical in character, dealing particularly with the IRBM. However, toward end of meeting, a British official arrived, saying text would be distributed shortly of what they understood had been proposed by the U.S. as the basis for the transferral of IRBMs, which they wanted U.S. to examine and check as they proposed to show it to Sandys that evening on his return from Ottawa. If he approved it, as they felt sure he would, he would then at the concluding meeting on Friday request Wilson to initial it. He also would initial it and there would then be a government-to-government agreement.

In discussing arrangements covered in memorandum before text finally arrived, U.S. chairman was asked whether there were any political strings attached to IRBM. He said there were none. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

When text arrived and was distributed, U.S. representative agreed to examine it promptly and telephone British Embassy his comments in course of afternoon.2 I indicated in meeting that, without having seen text I could not be sure, but that there were some aspects of matter that were of interest to Department of State, in particular questions of political conditions which had been referred to by Secretary Dulles in his meeting with Sandys on Tuesday,3 and that it would be necessary for us to coordinate before any response. We would do our best to expedite our action but could not guarantee just when this could be completed.

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After the meeting, having seen text and noted that political sections did not conform to Secretary’s statement, I specifically called to attention of U.S. chairman fact that it would be necessary to get State Department comments before he could reply to British request for comments.

In view of comments made during morning meeting and nature of text submitted by British for action next day at governmental level, Murphy was persuaded to call meeting for late Thursday afternoon of Defense representatives to review situation. Defense was represented by Mr. Horner, General Guthrie, and the admiral who is principal assistant to Admiral Radford. In the course of a somewhat lengthy discussion, the following points emerged:

1.
Without awaiting State Department comments, Mr. Horner had already told British their memo was satisfactory subject to one or two minor technical points. Mr. Horner could not understand any possible basis for State’s wishing to establish political conditions on the transfer of IRBMs apart from the purely legal question of atomic energy legislation as it affects the heads. He indicated that, when we had agreed to supply them information and cooperate fully with them in the development of their own IRBM, no new problem should be raised merely because we were giving them our model and thus advancing by several years the date of availability to the British of this weapon. I finally intervened to suggest that, after Suez, we might just want to think about whether we wanted to give them a completely free hand on a U.S. weapon of this potency.
2.
He pressed very hard, as Air Force had been doing all week, for the need of a prompt decision and particularly for approval of the British document the next day. On questioning by Murphy, the only basis we could find for this was his understanding that there was a NSC policy that these weapons should be put in place as soon as possible and he expected to have some experiments made in the summer of ’58. If sites were to be erected by that time, agreement had to be reached immediately. When asked how effective these experimental models would be in terms of accuracy, he indicated that their military value was quite doubtful and he assumed their major purpose was a State Department one of improving morale and increasing the apparent threat. Murphy indicated he had never heard of this.
3.
He was pressed hard on a subject on which we had gotten no satisfaction heretofore from Defense: How they expected to finance the transfer of the IRBMs. He finally said he assumed it would be MDAP money. When asked if the programming of this money had been taken up with those responsible for MDAP funds in Defense, he said: Oh no, that was something he hadn’t concerned himself with. When asked if he realized that, if it were programmed under MDAP, there would be political conditions not covered in the British memo, he confessed that it was not something he knew anything about.

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Nevertheless, in parting, he said that he still thought the memo was a good one, that Robertson4 had approved it and saw nothing wrong with it, and that he saw no reason why we should not go ahead and sign it.

In preparation for the final meeting Friday afternoon, a meeting was held with Murphy at noon on Friday for State people only. In the course of the meeting, I urged strongly that Robertson be called and State insist that neither this memo nor any other memo be approved on Friday, even though we had drafted amendments to make it acceptable. I said I thought this willingness to grant British IRBMs was probably the most significant step the U.S. could make in foreseeable future for U.S.–U.K. rapprochement and we should not make it until we had discussed with British during Bermuda talks at highest level range of U.S.–U.K. policy views. At that time it could be used as important negotiating or symbol weapon.

Before meeting closed, Murphy received call from Robertson or Gray reporting that Robertson had met with President that morning and had submitted British draft note to him for approval so that Wilson or Robertson could initial it that afternoon with Sandys. (Whether this was done to bypass State or whether Robertson was there on other matters, and this came up, was not clear. In view of Thursday meeting, it looked like it might well have been attempt to bypass State, since we had no knowledge of this meeting until after it had taken place.) The President took firm position that the note was unacceptable. He had not approved giving IRBMs to U.K. but had only heard NSC presentation. He wanted matter studied further from number of angles in order that he might be ready to take action, if desirable, at Bermuda, but nothing was to be done prior to that time which would bind the U.S. in any way. Since this position conformed officially closely with State position, there was no futher trouble on this matter.

Technical Note:

In the course of the Thursday morning discussions, it appeared that there was a real problem of a technical character with respect to IRBM. It was considered desirable that they be able to be discharged fifteen minutes after warning was given. However, it would take several hours to move the projectile and put it in the launching mechanism; hence, U.S. custody of the nuclear component raised difficulties.

It was also noted that the cost of launching installation was very substantial and would create a considerable burden for the U.K. financially.

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The U.S. made clear that it was prepared to give the U.K. manufacturing information with respect to all principal parts of IRBM and assumed that British firms would pick up manufacture of parts and eventually probably total unit. It was also understood that U.S. would continue development work but would expect U.K. also to try to improve weapon. Information would be shared.

  1. Source: Department of State, Paris Embassy Files: Lot 61 F 100, USRO/OES Files. Top Secret.
  2. No copy of this memorandum has been found in Department of State files.
  3. January 29; see Document 254.
  4. Reuben S. Robertson, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense.