275. Memorandum of a Conversation, President Eisenhower’s Quarters, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, March 22, 1957, 3:20 p.m.1
PARTICIPANTS
-
United States
- The President
- The Secretary of State
- Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson
- Secretary of the Air Force Quarles
- Admiral Strauss, Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy Affairs
- Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy
- General Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary
- Mr. Timmons, Director, EUR/RA, State Department
-
United Kingdom
- The Prime Minister
- The Foreign Secretary
- Sir Norman Brooke, Secretary to the Cabinet
- Sir Richard Powell, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defense
- Mr. P.H. Dean, Deputy Under Secretary, Foreign Office
SUBJECTS
- Wilson–Sandys talks
- Possible declaration on limitation of nuclear testing
After a luncheon given by the President and attended by the U.S. side, the President invited Mr. Macmillan to call on him. Mr. Macmillan arrived at 3:20 p.m., accompanied by the above and indicated advisers.
[Page 737]The President indicated to the Prime Minister that he wished to discuss the question of guided missiles. He informed the Prime Minister that the U.S. was agreeable in principle to working out arrangements to make available to the U.K. certain intermediate range ballistic missiles. He emphasized that this decision related only to the principle of making these missiles available; all of the specific arrangements that would be required to implement this decision in principle would have to be worked out later and agreed upon.
The President emphasized that with respect to these arrangements the U.S. does not at this time know just what it will be able to do in this matter. Congress must be apprised. For all these reasons it would not be possible to decide upon or announce any details of the arrangements.
The President went on to speak of the uncertainties affecting the IRBM program. He said we do not yet know whether the missile will in fact become operational. There was also the possibility that a better piece of equipment would become available in the future. For all these reasons, the President continued, he did not wish at this time to work out any fixed or rigid arrangements on the IRBM between the U.S. and U.K. Governments or between the U.S. Government and Congress. The President reiterated that all that could be done now was to approve the idea in principle, in the interest of greater mutual efficiency and economy. He indicated his desire that any public reference to this matter merely speak in terms of guided missiles and not refer specifically to the IRBM.
The President said that one concept of deployment had been discussed with U.K. Defense Minister Sandys when the latter had been in Washington in January last.2 This concept of deployment had spoken of the possibility that four squadrons of IRBMs would be transferred to British hands by December 1960. Another concept of deployment about which the U.S. Government was thinking would provide that two squadrons of IRBMs deployed in the U.K. would remain in U.S. hands and two squadrons of IRBMs would be transferred to British hands. The President pointed out that there was a possibility that after the first missiles had been deployed to the U.K., the U.S. might wish to withdraw them and replace them with improved models. The President repeated that he believed all that could be said on this subject in the final communiqué to come out of this conference would be that the U.S. had agreed to make available to the U.K. certain guided missiles under arrangements to be worked out, in the interest of mutual economy and mutual security.
[Page 738]The Prime Minister said that he welcomed the statement that had just been made by the President. Mr. Macmillan went on to say that as he saw it there were two things that now had to be put down on paper. One was what could be said publicly in the final communiqué, and the second was what had been agreed as a result of this discussion. The latter could be put down in the form of a secret minute. The Prime Minister stressed that it was important to be clear on just what had been agreed, in order that the British might get on with their defense planning. He then repeated that the first step was to agree upon an eventual public statement, and then to get on with working out the details of the arrangements the President had referred to.
The President then referred to the question of nuclear warheads for IRBM. He noted that Mr. Macmillan had earlier spoken of the fact that the United States would “keep the key to the cupboard”, meaning that United States nuclear warheads for any IRBMs made available to the United Kingdom would of course remain in full U.S. custody, as is required by U.S. law.
The President and the Secretary of State noted that the IRBMs to be made available to the British might be provided on a “lend-lease” basis, or perhaps financed with part of the available Plan K funds. The President also noted that one of the questions that had been discussed with Mr. Sandys was the application of Plan K funds to the purchase of Corporal missiles in the United States.
Mr. Macmillan said that as he saw the arrangements that would have to be worked out, they looked something like this: Four sites would be required for the four squadrons to be deployed in the U.K. The U.K. would finance the preparation on the bases. The warheads would remain in U.S. custody. The missiles, which are quite separate from the warheads, would be provided to the U.K. under Plan K financing or on some other basis. The Prime Minister went on to say that the U.K. needs as soon as possible some picture of the timing of the deployment envisioned by the United States.
The President said that we must be careful in any estimates that are made of the timing of deployment. The Defense Department has taken precautions against delays in development by approaching the development of key items of the missile in two or more alternative ways. In spite of this “built-in insurance”, the Defense Department could not of course yet guarantee that the missile would work.
Mr. Macmillan said that he understood perfectly that the missile is in the development stage.
The President noted that the next test of the IRBM would take place in the next two or three weeks.
Mr. Quarles noted that with respect to the anticipated timing of deployment, as the President had said these were dates fixed by the scientists and research people. However, the present timing estimates [Page 739] show that a handful of IRBMs, say 5 to 7, would be deployed in the U.K. by July 1958. The first full squadron of 15 missiles would be deployed in the U.K. by July 1959, and the 4 complete squadrons would be in place by July 1960.
The Prime Minister said that information on the progress being made on the IRBM would be of great help to the United Kingdom from the standpoint of two broad decisions which the U.K. must take. If the IRBM will actually work, the U.K. would be inclined to knock out its development program for its own missile, except for a few million pounds a year on continuing research. This would enable the funds now being put into the U.K.’s comparable missile to be transferred into some other defense area.
The President replied that the U.S. intends to go forward with the IRBM but that the U.S. was not in a position to firm up any further decisions on the IRBM today.
The Prime Minister then said that the second broad decision confronting the U.K. was what to do about the development of the bomber that would succeed the present bomber in service, i.e. the “Super V” bomber. The Prime Minister added that if the U.S. IRBM “proves out”, he would be inclined to depend on missiles. He would need to know as soon as possible what the prospects are that the U.S. missile will work.
The President said that in his personal opinion the U.K. should keep on putting some money into bombers. The President then said that if there should be a war in which general reliance was placed on missiles of the IRBM and ICBM type, this could mean the end of civilization. The prospect that such missiles might be used might help to bring closer the possibility of real disarmament negotiations with the Soviets.
Mr. Macmillan then turned to the question of the Corporal missile. The President said that as he understood it the question of the Corporals was settled. He asked Mr. Robertson to comment. Mr. Robertson said that it was agreed that the financing of U.K. purchases of Corporals in the United States would be worked out, utilizing approximately 30 million dollars of Plan K funds. Mr. Robertson said that we were in a position to confirm this to the British. Mr. Robertson also referred to the question of nuclear warheads for Corporals. Admiral Austin, Director of the Joint Staff of the United States [Joint] Chiefs of Staff, had addressed a memorandum on January 31, 1957 to the Commander of the British Army Staff, British Joint Services Mission in Washington, outlining the lines of an agreement whereby the U.S. would stockpile in U.S. custody nuclear warheads for Corporals near the British Corporal units.3 The U.S. was prepared to go forward and [Page 740] work out an agreement along the lines of Admiral Austin’s memorandum. Mr. Macmillan inquired of Mr. Robertson whether the use of approximately 30 million dollars of Plan K funds for Corporals had been cleared with the Congress. Mr. Robertson replied that it had been.
The President said there was one other point stemming from the Wilson–Sandys talk which he wished to mention. The United States Air Force has one fighter wing, consisting of three squadrons, stationed in the U.K. This wing is equipped with F–86–D aircraft. It had been proposed that U.S. Air Force turn over the aircraft and equipment to the Royal Air Force, which would then assume the mission of the wing, and the U.S. personnel would be withdrawn. The President said that this matter had been broached with Mr. Sandys when the latter was in Washington in January.
The Prime Minister said he had heard of the matter “vaguely” from Mr. Sandys. He said that he understood there was some difficulty on the U.K. side, and asked Sir Richard Powell to comment.
Sir Richard Powell said that he thought the proposal was “not really worth it” from the U.K. side. The British were not interested in taking over F–86–D aircraft. If the wing could be equipped with newer aircraft, then they would be interested.
[1 paragraph (6–½ lines of source text) not declassified]
The Prime Minister suggested that Mr. Patrick Dean and Sir Richard Powell might serve as the British members of a drafting group to prepare minutes of this conversation which could be agreed to by both sides.4 The President said that Mr. Robertson, Mr. Quarles and Mr. Murphy would be the U.S. members.
Turning to another subject, the President said that Admiral Strauss had come up with an idea bearing on the problem of testing hydrogen and atomic weapons that might be incorporated in the final Bermuda communiqué. The general idea would be to have a declaration saying our two Governments had agreed not to test nuclear weapons beyond the point of safety. The President suggested that this idea be looked at in order to see if it were useful.
The Prime Minister said that he was receiving questions every week on matter of limiting nuclear test explosions. Some of his critics were of course naive but underneath it all there was a strong feeling in Britain that nuclear tests should in some way be limited.
Admiral Strauss said that the idea the President had referred to had been embodied in a draft paper, to the effect that the two Governments would not test to a point which would endanger life. The [Page 741] declaration might also indicate that the U.S. and U.K. were willing to register tests in advance with the UN and also to have limited international observation on a reciprocal basis.
The President said that any such statement should make it clear that the U.S. and U.K. tests would remain far below the amount of radiation which would be dangerous.
The Prime Minister stressed again that this matter of nuclear test limitation was an important domestic political issue in the U.K., and that the declaration referred to by the President and Admiral Strauss might well be very useful. Admiral Strauss then proceeded to read the draft that had been prepared on the U.S. side.5 The President again emphasized the need for saying something which was quite positive, to the effect that not only would we stay below the safety limit but that we might take some still lower figure and then say that we will remain well below such lower figure. Admiral Strauss said that one difficulty with fixing precise figure was that no reports on the effects of radiation have fixed a precise danger point.
Mr. Macmillan inquired of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd as to his estimate of what the Soviets might propose with respect to nuclear test limitation. Mr. Lloyd hazarded the guess that the Soviets might come out for complete prohibition. The Prime Minister wondered where this whole matter was going. He observed that the U.K. was going to have a test shortly. Would this stimulate other countries to go in for the manufacture and testing of atomic weapons?
The President referred to the “Fourth Country” problem and the danger that atomic weapons might come into the hands of irresponsible countries.
The Secretary of State said that if the Soviets would accept our disarmament proposal on the cessation of the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes, this could put a stop to the nuclear race.
Mr. Macmillan inquired whether the U.S. and U.K. could protect themselves against clandestine Soviet testing. Mr. Quarles said that he doubted that there could be any assurance that we could protect ourselves against this possibility. Sir Richard Powell thought that Soviet “cheating” could not be detected in a range of about 5%. We of course know that the Soviets have a sizeable stock of nuclear weapons. The possibility of “fourth countries” developing atomic weapons is the real problem.
[Page 742]The Prime Minister said that any announcement on this question should strike the world as an indication that the U.S. and U.K. are looking in the direction of limiting nuclear tests, and should not convey the impression that we are planning to go on indefinitely with tests. The President agreed that this was an important consideration. He said we should stress that we are voluntarily imposing on ourselves a limitation, yet we must maintain sufficient latitude to continue necessary tests.
The Secretary of State inquired of Admiral Strauss where is the danger line to be drawn as regards the effect of radiation on the human body. Admiral Strauss said that the increase in radiation resulting from tests up to the present time had not been an important factor. Scientists estimate that during an average man’s life he receives 4 roentgens of radiation from cosmic radiation and from the soil. He receives 3 additional roentgens from normal x-rays, medical, dental, etc. From all tests to date, and if tests were to continue at the present rate, he would receive one-tenth of one roentgen from this source.
It was agreed that Admiral Strauss would work with Mr. Dean of the British delegation and see what could be developed out of the nuclear test limitation idea which Admiral Strauss had advanced. The discussion ended at 4:10 p.m.
(Note: As a result of this meeting, three memoranda of conversation were prepared, one of which was sent to Selwyn Lloyd and two of which were sent to Sir Richard Powell, with a covering letter from the Secretary and from Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson. These documents, along with the replies from Lloyd and Powell, are attached. The entire exchange of documents was cleared by the President, the Secretary, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson, Secretary Quarles, Admiral Strauss, and Messrs. Murphy, Elbrick, SMITH, Phleger, General Loper, and Mr. Sullivan.)
[Page 743] [Page 745] [Page 746]- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 867. Top Secret. Drafted by Timmons, cleared by Murphy and Strauss, and circulated to appropriate U.S. officials on March 22. This conversation is also reported supra. ↩
- See Documents 253–256.↩
- Tab E to Document 262, not declassified.↩
- See Annexes 1 and 2 below.↩
- The text of the draft was sent to London in telegram 8 and to the Department of State in Secto 11 from Bermuda, March 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/3–2257)↩
- Top Secret. Drafted by Timmons.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩
- Top Secret. Prepared by the U.S. Delegation.↩
- See footnote 3 above.↩
- Confidential. Prepared by the U.S. Delegation.↩
- Top Secret.↩
- Top Secret. Drafted by Timmons.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩
- Top Secret. Prepared by the U.S. Delegation.↩
- See Tab A to Document 262.↩
- Top Secret.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩