145. Memorandum of a Conversation Between President Aramburu and the Ambassador in Argentina (Beaulac), Buenos Aires, April 23, 19581
I told the President that everyone I had talked to in Washington was watching with admiration the process of turning the Argentina Government over to an elected regime and his leadership of the process. I said that the same people were fearful of the economic problems that President-elect Frondizi would face and wondering whether he would meet them promptly.
The President said that Dr. Frondizi would have to meet them. Dr. Frondizi is a realist and he will have to act promptly.
I said that one problem which the State Department hoped the President would solve before he left office was the ANSEC problem. The Department knew the President wanted to solve it and it had the impression that it was on the way to solution. In this connection, I said I had learned that Mr. Sargent of American & Foreign Power had had a meeting yesterday with Mr. Dillon, Mr. Black, and Secretary Anderson,2 and it was my hope that the Bank would agree to act as arbitrator in order to fix the price which Argentina would pay for the American & Foreign Power properties. It was my hope that the Bank would agree as an institution to do this and I was confident that it would if it were able to.
The President noted that the Bank had been alleging that this did not come within its powers as a Bank.
I asked him if this were not two or three days ago and he said it was.
[Page 475]I said I hoped now that the Bank would agree although I did not know, of course, and that if it did that a solution to the problem would be immediately forthcoming.
The President made no comment.
I said I would like to refer also to the meatpackers’ problem. I knew he wanted to see this solved, too, before he left office and I had, therefore, asked the packers to give me a couple of paragraphs outlining their present situation. I noted the problem was not yet solved and that I was taking the liberty of leaving with him the packers’ memorandum3 in the event it might be useful to him.
The President said he understood the problem would be solved this week. He said he was very glad to have the memorandum.
Taking advantage of the presence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I told the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs that although both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Navy had promised that Argentina would support the American proposal for a six-mile territorial seas limit at the Geneva Conference, the Argentine delegate voted against the United States proposal, alleging that his instructions left him no alternative. After some discussion, the Minister agreed to telephone to Geneva specific instructions to support the United States proposal.
The President, in a relaxed manner, asked how everything had gone with me in the States. He asked what people thought of Dr. Frondizi up there.
I said that people knew Frondizi’s history and knew what he had preached for many years. However, they had noted that his public statements since election day would not stand in the way of realistic solutions to Argentina’s urgent economic problems and that these people were hopeful that Dr. Frondizi would actually meet the problems facing him, as he had said in private conversations that he would.
The President repeated that Dr. Frondizi was a realist and he thought he would face up to the problems. He said he would have to.
I reverted to the ANSEC problem and said it was one problem which Argentina’s friends hoped Dr. Frondizi would not inherit.
The President said it was Dr. Frondizi who had made settlement of the problem impossible.
I said that my impression had been the opposite. I said it was my impression that the Balbinistas had interfered with the settlement of the problem. I recalled that the problem was on the point of being settled when the President brought the Balbinista Ministers into the Cabinet and that they had vetoed the solution.
[Page 476]The President said that he had had trouble with them but that Dr. Frondizi had whipped up a public attitude of opposition.
I said I had the impression that there was very little public opposition to a settlement of the ANSEC problem.
The President said that there was much more opposition than I was aware of. He mentioned the opposition of the Balbinistas, the Socialists and all the other opposite parties.
I suggested to the President that this was the kind of problem that a Government did not submit to a plebiscite. It was a problem that a Government solved if it could do so in an equitable manner.
The President said he would settle the problem if Dr. Frondizi asked him to. I asked the President if he meant if Dr. Frondizi agreed with the solution.
The President said he did.
I asked if Dr. Frondizi had not already offered to express agreement with a solution.
The President said he had not.
I asked the President if Dr. Frondizi wrote him a letter saying that he was aware of the agreement reached and had no suggestions to make, whether that would be sufficient for his purposes.
The President said that it would be sufficient.
I said that it was too bad that I could not convey this message to Dr. Frondizi.
The President said Dr. Frondizi already knew it.
I said, “Yes, but Dr. Frondizi doesn’t know that I know it.”
The President said he regretted that he could not authorize me to convey this message to Dr. Frondizi.
I thanked the President for his friendship and cooperation during our association of nearly two years, and he expressed appreciation of the Embassy’s cooperation.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 735.11/4–2558. Confidential. Drafted by Beaulac. Transmitted to the Department of State as enclosure 1 to despatch 1641 from Buenos Aires, April 25.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Not printed. The memorandum included a brief discussion of the Argentine Government’s Decree 9096 stipulating the conditions and terms which the Junta Nacional de Carnes would have to follow in conducting an audit of the accounts of the Frigorifico industry.↩