304. Editorial Note

Documentation on relations between the United States and Costa Rica is being printed in an accompanying microform publication. A narrative summary, based on that documentation, is provided below along with a purport list of the documents published in the microform supplement.

Relations with Cost Rica during the 3-year period were unmarked by crises and difficult problems. The close of the period, however, saw the emergence of an issue that plagued the United States in Latin America and other parts of the world: the effect of the threat of communism on everyday U.S. relations with friendly and sympathetic governments. The question was whether that threat made the United States neglect its old friends while pursuing the support of more recalcitrant countries.

Early in 1958 the election of Mario Echandi Jimenez to the Presidency of Costa Rica offered a leader whom the United States saw as both friendly and oriented toward the stability of business and investment. (CR–1) During March, President-elect Echandi visited Washington and met with President Eisenhower and officials from the Departments of State and the Treasury. Echandi stressed the need for economic development in his country and also gave assurances of his awareness of the threat of communism in the hemisphere, particularly from infiltration of labor unions. Proud of his country’s record for tolerance, he said that Costa Rica would continue to provide safety to political exiles but would not allow them to launch subversive operations from Costa Rican territory. (CR–2, 3, 4, 5)

One of the principal issues during 1958 and 1959 concerned Echandi’s desire for a reallocation of tax revenues stemming from the profits of the United Fruit Company’s operations so that Costa Rica would receive more than the 50–50 division currently in effect. U.S. officials, particularly in the Department of State, were quite agreeable to an arrangement on a 75–25 basis. In fact, however, legal technicalities uncovered by the Department of the Treasury served to delay a resolution until the end of 1959. At that time, a 60–40 arrangement [Page 805] retroactive to January 1, 1958, was announced, but the smaller than hoped for reallocation and the seemingly endless delays left Costa Rica less than totally satisfied. (CR–6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 17, 18)

Echandi continually stressed his commitment to democratic principles and private enterprise as well as his concern for modest financial assistance and loans which would boost the local economic structure. (CR–5, 9, 10) Lack of immediate response from the United States, however, produced a further feeling of dismay and dissatisfaction in San José. This in turn affected Echandi’s attitude toward U.S. efforts in 1960 to get the Central American nations to break relations with the Cuba of Fidel Castro. (CR–23) Ambassador Whiting Willauer in San José reported on the widespread feeling in the country that the United States was very often too slow to aid its old friends like Costa Rica and too responsive to threats from allies or neutrals of unfriendly actions. Willauer wanted quick favorable action on Costa Rica’s modest economic requests. He also stated that, while Echandi personally detested Fidelismo, the President was in no position politically to buck public opinion by severing relations with Cuba. (CR–24)

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom assured Willauer of U.S. sympathy for Costa Rica’s request, but cautioned that lack of overall planning in San José had resulted in indecisiveness and lack of followthrough, which had delayed U.S. action. (CR–25) In November 1960, Rubottom’s successor, Thomas Mann, wrote to Echandi promising U.S. support for Costa Rica’s applications for loans from the Development Loan Fund and the Export-Import Bank for water projects and development of new farms. (CR–27)

The compilation closes with coverage of Costa Rican actions to control antigovernment Nicaraguans operating out of northwest Costa Rica against the Somoza government in Nicaragua. (CR–28, 29) Costa Rica, which had pointedly announced its intention to abolish a standing army (CR–5), nevertheless wanted to demonstrate its ability to maintain peace within its borders and friendly relations with the neighboring states.