306. Editorial Note
Documentation on relations between the United States and Ecuador is being printed in an accompanying microform publication. A narrative summary, based on that documentation, is provided below, along with a purport list of the documents published in the microform supplement. The document numbers cited in the summary correspond to the document numbers in the purport list and the microform supplement.
Except for a brief period in 1960, U.S. relations with Ecuador during the closing years of the Eisenhower administration were normal and uncomplicated.
In April 1958, President Eisenhower in a letter to President Camillo Ponce Enriquez described Ecuador as “a nation enjoying political stability, freedom and steady economic development.” (EC–3) In the following month, Vice President Richard Nixon’s visit to Ecuador was described as an unqualified success, in contrast to his visits to Peru and Venezuela where violent anti-American protests broke out. Nixon said there were no great problems between the two countries. (EC–5) During his conversations with Ponce, the Vice President stressed the need to resolve the area’s economic problems as a prerequisite to curing the political problems. Ponce stated that stabilization of the Latin American economies would make all the countries better customers for American products. (EC–4, 5, 6, 7)
The United States did involve itself in loans to improve the Ecuadorean infrastructure and aid economic development, and was also ready to provide military assistance for internal security programs to combat Communist subversion and disruption within the country. (EC–8, 11)
In June 1960, José Maria Velasco Ibarra was elected President by what Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom termed a surprisingly large margin. (EC–15) Velasco had held the office on three previous occasions and was believed to be basically friendly to the United States; no insuperable problems were anticipated in dealing with the new administration. The President-elect [Page 810] indicated his willingness to cooperate in fighting communism and opposing Fidel Castro, and Ambassador Christian Ravndal emphasized that the United States would offer technical aid and assist the Ecuadorean economy, particularly with housing for the poor. (EC–16)
At the time of Velasco’s inauguration at the end of August 1960; however, evidence began to surface that Ecuador wished to focus attention on its boundary dispute with Peru. The Rio Protocol of 1942 which dealt with that question, noted the new administration, was unfavorable and unfair to Ecuador. Velasco and Foreign Minister José Ricardo Chiriboga Villagomez said they did not wish to push to a solution at once, but only to reiterate strongly the Ecuadorean position. The United States, as it consistently had, stressed its desire for a mutually acceptable settlement. (EC–17) At the same time, Ecuador needed help quickly in terms of highway construction, electric power, housing, and medium industries. The United States stressed the need for careful planning, but noted it was anxious to assist. (EC–18)
Shortly thereafter, in September 1960, the Embassy in Quito reported that students, demonstrating over the boundary dispute, stoned the Consulate General in Guayaquil. (EC–19) The Guarantors of the 1942 Rio Protocol, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, meeting informally, cautioned against unilateral action by Ecuador to denounce the Protocol, stating that most of the provisions of that agreement had already been implemented and unilateral denunciation was unacceptable. (EC–20, 21)
On October 23, however, Ecuador announced its repudiation of the 1942 Protocol. The United States, responding as a Guarantor on December 7, stated that such unilateral action was not allowable. The Guarantors stood ready to assist in a mutual resolution by Peru and Ecuador of a satisfactory demarcation of the remaining areas of the boundary line still at issue. At the same time, the United States assured Ecuador that aggression by the other party would invoke the security guarantees of the inter-American system against armed attack. (EC–22)
An Intelligence Note to Secretary of State Christian Herter on December 16 informed him that the December 7 statement had provoked attacks resulting in considerable damage to the Embassy and other U.S. buildings in Quito and Guayaquil. (EC–23) Since taking office, Velasco, rather than concentrating on economic problems, had focused on the boundary question. Ecuadorean overtures toward Cuba and the Soviet Union appeared designed to gain support on this issue. Meanwhile, leftist agitation was undoubtedly a factor in the assaults on U.S. property.
Within a few days, however, relations took a turn for the better, according to the Embassy in Quito. (EC–24) Velasco dismissed his Minister of Government, Manuel Araujo, characterized as rabidly leftist [Page 811] and pro-Castro in his views. This dismissal brought to a close an unprecedented period of leftist agitation in the country. Just before the end of the year, Foreign Minister Chiriboga visited Washington. A joint statement issued on the occasion concentrated on economic development and indicated U.S. desire to provide loans for projects such as the establishment of savings and loan institutions, and construction of highways, municipal water systems, and electric power installations. The boundary dispute was not mentioned. (EC–25)