Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

273. Memorandum of Discussion at the 467th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Augusta, Georgia, November 17, 1960.¹

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. NATO in the 1960’s (NIE 20–60; SNIE 20–2-60; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Issues of U.S. Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO”, dated November 10, 1959; NSC Actions Nos. 2149, 2204–c, 2274, 2292 and 2323; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Increased Nuclear Sharing With Allies,” dated August 23, 1960; NSC 6017; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “NATO in the 1960’s”, dated November 16, 1960; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Special NSC Meeting”, dated November 16, 1960)²

Mr. Gray briefly explained the background of the report on the subject which was being considered by the Council and asked Secretary Herter if he would like to summarize it.³ Secretary Herter suggested instead that the Council deal with the urgent issues since the paper as a whole would have to be reviewed further before being put to the President for final approval.

Mr. Gray then asked whether there was agreement on the proposal that the U.S. commit itself to maintain available for NATO those nuclear weapons required for approved NATO military plans. After a brief explanation of this proposal by Secretary Herter, no disagreement was expressed to this proposal.

Mr. Gray then turned to the proposal for a NATOMRBM program.⁴ He said that there had been a “Convair caucus” of State, Defense, and AEC on the way down and he thought only two splits remained to be resolved.

Secretary Herter said that he thought everybody had the same objective in this matter. He, however, hesitated to put the plan forward as a firm proposal at the NATO meeting on December 15 because he felt that to make it effective, it would require (1) Congressional approval and (2) approval of the incoming administration. He thought it doubtful that you could get clearances on this matter in time. If such clearances could be gotten, he would be delighted but if we are to make specific proposals, these clearances should be obtained during the next two weeks so that our allies could have in the neighborhood of two weeks before the NATO meeting to consider it. The issue was really a question of presentation; namely, how do we answer the question as to whether the U.S. Government will feel the same way six weeks after the NATO meeting. Obviously, we will have to say that U.S. approval would be subject to Congressional action.

Secretary Gates said that, speaking philosophically, he felt that this administration had an obligation and an opportunity to wind up with a firm proposal on this subject with whatever caveats are necessary. Obviously, we cannot deliver because of the need for a change in the law. Besides, there are two separate phases anyway. He thought this was a very imaginative idea and he was afraid that, if we put this only in for discussion at NATO, we will not be clearing up our proper business. The next President may reverse anything we do, but we should present this proposal as the best opinion of the people who have been working in this field all these years.

The President commented that we almost always have to say to our allies that we will have to get legal authority for our proposals. He saw no reason why we should not say that, under certain assumptions, these are the things we think ought to be done.

Secretary Herter noted that the paper under Council consideration says that Congressional action would be required. This could go hand in hand with Executive action and he believed it provided enough of a caveat.

The President said that this administration should not hesitate to say what we think is good for NATO. After all, the next administration may not even agree to the general concept of NATO. Secretary Herter commented that it would not hurt his feelings if the President said we should make this a firm proposal.

Mr. Stans said that there was some ambiguity as to what is intended since the paper glosses over the question of financing. He noted that we are proposing to deploy five Polaris submarines by 1963 and not to withdraw them without North Atlantic Council agreement. Secretary Gates pointed out that our commitment not to withdraw was effective only if NATO agreed to the second phase.

Mr. Stans said that the five Polaris submarines would probably cost about $500 million and then we were proposing 100 additional missiles. Secretary Gates noted that the latter missiles were to be bought by the NATO countries. Mr. Stans said that the paper still did not indicate what was meant by “multilateral financing” in Paragraph 3-a.⁵ The President noted that this would still have to be worked out.

Mr. Stans said that he, nevertheless, thought that the cost to us and others ought to be indicated. Secretary Gates said that this was impossible except on the five U.S. Polaris submarines because we do not know the configuration of the remainder and do not know whether they will be land or sea based.

In answer to Mr. Stans’ question as to whether the five Polaris submarines were within the approved Polaris program, Secretary Gates said that he had asked the President this question and did not yet have a definite answer. Secretary Gates thought that we would be producing Polaris submarines at the rate of about five per year for the next few years. He thought we could handle the NATO submarines by lending them as they are ready and then arranging to pay back the U.S. program. We might contribute one at a time and replace it in the budget as we go along. Technically, he admitted that this meant the five submarines were additional to the present program. The President said he agreed with the proposal for the five Polaris submarines being deployed to NATO.

In answer to Mr. Stans’ question as to whether we were agreeing not to withdraw them, Secretary Gates said that there would be no conditions on that deployment (it would be the same as the Sixth Fleet) until NATO goes along with the second phase. Secretary Gates thought that if we could get a NATOMRBM force, we would probably want to be tied up in it.

Secretary Herter said that the basic problem was a fear of NATO that if the Soviets attacks Europe only, we would not join with them. This proposal would give NATO its own deterrent strength.

In answer to Mr. Stans’ question as to whether this constituted a precedent, the President commented that there was no precedent in the first phase. He added, however, that he thought it would be a good deal if we could get the second phase force in being down the road. Mr. McCone said that he thought we would have to make a commitment to NATO regarding tactical missiles.

The President said that he had recently been listening to the views of Robert Bowie and others and he thought that we must have the right to sell nuclear weapons to our allies if we feel they needed them. The President asked Secretary Gates as to what the proportion of expense would be in the MRBM program over the years.

Secretary Gates said that we were not committing ourselves in principle until NATO agreed to a 100 missile force and made it subject to NATO control. Only then would we put our five submarines under NATO control. Meanwhile, we have no commitment affecting the freedom of our sovereignty until NATO agrees to the second phase. Mr. Gates admitted that he thinks there is a real question as to whether Congress will ever agree to NATO control as proposed in the second phase because it involves a constitutional issue.

The President said that before we start dealing with the tough French negotiators, we should know what proportion of the cost we will have to bear. Secretary Gates said that at present we were only planning to bear the cost of our own five submarines which will run about $750 million, including the missiles.

[4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Irwin said that, because there is still a political problem of deploying nuclear weapons on the continent, one solution would be to have them sea based. By 1963 there would only be the Polaris missiles available and the five U.S. submarines would meet General Norstad’s [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] requirement by that time. At the same time, we were asking Europe to build 100 missiles, which together with our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would meet General Norstad’s 1964 requirement. The cost of the additional 100 missiles would depend on the type deployed. If they are submarines, they would cost about $100 million each. It might be possible, however, to put the missiles on coastal steamers which might then make the cost for the 100 missiles about $300-$400 million.

Mr. McCone asked why there was still a political problem regarding land based nuclear weapons and pointed to the agreed deployment of Redstone missiles on the continent. The President noted that all of these were deployed in Germany and that they had a much more limited range than Polaris. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Secretary Gates said that while General Norstad is not responsible for making political judgments, General Norstad feels that the missiles should be both sea and land based. Mr. Irwin said that General Norstad was thinking that after his [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] missile requirement had been met, there might then be a further requirement for third generation missiles, possibly like the Pershing, a new Polaris, or an entirely new type of missile. Mr. Irwin said that the research and development people estimate that such a third generation missile could be developed by 1964.

Mr. Stans noted that Paragraph 6 of the proposal says that NATO should parallel the MRBM advances with strengthening of other forces.⁶ He felt that there was no request for a concession to reduce NATO requirements in any other respect if the MRBM proposal was agreed.

Mr. Irwin said that Defense did think it might be possible to reduce aircraft requirements. He pointed out, however, that NATO has no defense against missiles. If NATO knows that there is no such defense, the European members’ support of NATO will deteriorate if we take the position that they can have no missiles with a 1000–1500 mile range. We would then be saying that they have no defense and no offense and we do not think it necessary for them to have either. Mr. Irwin thought this position would fracture the alliance.

The President said that as he sees it, until there is some basic change in the world situation, there is no escape from the arms race. What we ought to be talking about are the millions that we spend at home which cut into our budget as we strain for an adequate defense. We seem to be licked [locked?] on the need not only for butter and eggs but also champagne while we continue to spend heavily for world defense.

Mr. Stans noted that as we do this, we and others are also being urged to build up our conventional forces. Secretary Gates said that he disagreed with any concept that conventional forces were needed for a limited war in Europe. Mr. Stans thought that if the MRBM proposal led to a reconsideration of conventional forces, we might achieve a better balance. He thought the U.S. had still made no judgment as to the effect of the planned Russian demobilization on our requirements.⁷ He thought that the Russian demobilization would certainly change their mobilization potential. Secretary Gates thought that there was no real change in the threat to NATO. Mr. Dulles said that the Russian demobilization seemed to be slowing down. Mr. Stans said that if they, nevertheless, go through with it, they will be changing to a nuclear threat to NATO. He still felt we should study the implications of the proposed Russian demobilization.

The President remarked that at yesterday’s press conference, he had been asked if the reduction in dependents overseas indicated that the U.S. was planning any redeployment of forces.⁸ He had reminded them that our deployment to Europe was originally considered an interim emergency matter. He thought it was high time that we should say to the Europeans that with their 225 million people, they should do more so that we could bring some of our troops out. The only flaw is the fact that De Gaulle is keeping 600 thousand French troops in Algeria. The President noted that Foster Dulles was always against any reduction in our forces in Europe because he thought it would break up the alliance. That is why the President had been obliged to remind the press conference yesterday that our deployment was originally an emergency measure.

Mr. McCone thought one way to solve that problem might be to give the Europeans their own nuclear deterrent. After all, they were only spending one-third to one-half of what we are spending on our military forces.

The President stated that he had no objection whatever to the proposed MRBM program. He thought it should be put forward but he thought we should put it in the context that we are going to cut down on some other things.

Secretary Herter said that the Europeans already suspect that we are going to cut down our forces in Europe. The President noted that State and Defense have always said that if we cut our European forces at all, it will result in the neutralization of Europe. Secretary Gates noted that we have recently been putting the pressure on the Europeans to live up to MC-70 and we have been pretty successful in getting them to build up their forces. He agreed with the President, however, that we should not be locked in concrete on our European forces forever. Secretary Herter admitted that he could not visualize a war in Europe which would not lead to the use of nuclear weapons.

Secretary Gates noted that the cost of maintaining U.S. forces at their present level was so high that it left only about $5 billion in the Defense budget for modernization. He thought that there were still too many people in the military services and too many deployed overseas. The President thought that we should figure out a plan which was reasonable over the long term. At the time this was going on, we should also try to cut other expenses in Europe. Secretary Herter expressed the hope that we would not cut our forces while the Berlin threat remained.

The President commented that if Europe was going neutral, we had better find it out now. He said that he did not mean for us to deny our responsibilities because we had established our defense line in Europe but we should not have to do it all. He noted that the Europeans had built up their industry to the point where they can compete very successfully with us.

Mr. Patterson⁹ asked whether the MRBM proposal would not put the pressure on the Europeans to put up more forces and Secretary Gates agreed. The President said that this sounded like the theory of giving a spoiled child ten more dollars to do what he should. Secretary Gates pointed out that we would not give up our control of our submarines until NATO agreed to build theirs. In answer to Mr. Stans’ question, Secretary Gates repeated that we would keep U.S. control of those Polaris submarines until the second phase had been agreed upon. Mr. Stans said he thought it was wishful thinking to believe that NATO would also build up its conventional forces.

The President said that he wanted to leave a legacy of the finest ideas and plans this administration could develop. He thought that we must think what is the proper balance during the next six weeks. We should develop programs and plans that we think are feasible and that Congress would not feel it had to cut down.

Mr. Gray asked Mr. McCone if he wished to press the AEC proposal regarding Paragraph 2 of the MRBM paper, that the U.S. should decide under what conditions it would be willing to release the Polaris submarines for NATO use.¹⁰ Mr. McCone said that while he wanted that AEC view noted, he was enthusiastic about the MRBM program. He thought that making the use of the submarines subject to North Atlantic Council agreed procedures left the question of conditions open. Mr. Gray pointed out that the bracketed phrase in Paragraph 2 was now to be deleted and Mr. McCone said that this made the proposal O.K. from his viewpoint.

Mr. Gray then asked whether the President felt that representatives of the next administration should be informed before the MRBM proposal is made to NATO. The President thought that we should make clear to NATO that this is what we are suggesting but that the next administration may change it.

Mr. Scribner pointed out that Paragraph 6 says that the U.S. as well as other NATO nations should strengthen its conventional forces. The President said that the first sentence of Paragraph 6 should say that “the U.S. believes that other NATO nations” should strengthen conventional forces.

Mr. Gray then called on Mr. McCone to explain his view about the inadequacy of existing NATO stockpile arrangements. Mr. McCone said that he had recently examined bases in NATO and, realizing our heavy dependence on nuclear weapons, he believed that the procedures do not permit a proper response due to the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act.¹¹ He thought this problem should be re-examined urgently, recognizing that any changes will require amendment of the law.

The President said that his idea was that we must get every single modification in the law that will allow a quick response but not delegate it to someone who would inadvertently start a war. He thought we should get the change in the law and then provide regulations which will prevent unfortunate accidents.

[1 paragraph (12 lines of source text) not declassified]

General Lemnitzer said that our missile bases are distributed and not concentrated. He said that the present arrangements were satisfactory to General Norstad. However, General Lemnitzer said he would like to go into this matter further with Mr. McCone.

Mr. McCone said he was not critical of what our military were doing in Europe. They were only living up to the requirements of the law. He described a weapon arrangement in the Netherlands.

Secretary Herter noted that the Joint Atomic Energy Committee was going over to Europe and that this trip might prove helpful. He thought, however, that it would be desirable if Mr. McCone could join the Committee on the trip. Mr. McCone indicated that he might be able to do so for a few days.

Mr. Gray suggested that the Record show that Defense and JCS and the Chairman, AEC, should re-examine NATO stockpile arrangements in order to see what changes in the law might be required to give assurance of prompt and proper response. The President agreed and thought we should leave a legacy of thought about all such restrictive laws which we think are very bad. He cited the requirement of notifying the Joint Committee on certain decisions 60 days before they could be put into effect. The President thought possibly Mr. Kennedy could get some of these changed during the “honeymoon” period with Congress.

[13 paragraphs (2 pages of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Herter asked if the MRBM proposal could be worked out and made available to NATO about ten days in advance of the December 15 meeting. The President agreed. General Lemnitzer reported that the Joint Chiefs were in full agreement on the MRBM proposal, nothing that the U.S. in the first phase keeps control of the submarines. General Lemnitzer said the Joint Chiefs feel very strongly that the proposal should be put forward to NATO as a firm proposal.

Mr. Gray then referred to the proposed nuclear submarine cooperation with the Netherlands, France, and Italy.¹² Mr. Gates thought this was agreeable if the other nations were willing to buy and pay for the submarines. He did not think that we should provide any grant aid in connection with it. From his point of view, Mr. Gates said this is just a new propulsion system for any anti-submarine submarines. Mr. McCone said that the AEC objects because it will involve the disclosure of sensitive information.

Secretary Herter read the statement by Secretary of State Dulles in 1957 which offered such nuclear assistance to NATO nations while the President was in attendance.¹³

Mr. Stans said the only question he had was regarding the type of submarines. He noted that the Skipjack was the only type mentioned in the offer. The 100 MRBM plan would need submarines and therefore he wondered why it should not be kept open as to whether the type of submarine should be Skipjack or Polaris. Secretary Gates said that this was really a different subject because the other nations wanted a modern propulsion system for their anti-submarine submarines.

Mr. McCone thought that the important restricted data involved should be retained by the U.S. as long as we can. Also this proposal involves a certification by the AEC that it would assist the mutual defense and security. He thought the AEC believes that the money required could be better spent elsewhere.

The President understood that the Netherlands had withdrawn their request for a nuclear submarine. However, he could not go along at all with Mr. McCone’s view. He thought that this made second class countries of our allies. He did not think we could say to them that we did not trust them with this information when we know that the Russians have nuclear submarines. He did not see any reason for holding back on this proposal if the other nations will pay for the submarines. The President said he thought we were still trying to keep secrets under the same laws as when we thought we had an exclusive nuclear capability.

Mr. McCone said that he only wished the AEC’s view to be reflected here but that if the nuclear submarine plan was part of an overall program involving many matters of vital interest, this might override the AEC view on the nuclear submarine proposal. In any case, Mr. McCone noted that the decision was up to the President.

The President said that he had been over this question for two years and he saw no reason why we should not go ahead with it. The only reason we had delayed in the case of France was because of their change in control of the Mediterranean fleet. The President said, however, that no grant aid should be involved. Secretary Gates thought that we should move forward on this slowly.

Mr. Gray questioned whether the Record should show that there would be no grant aid for the submarines or whether the entire program was dependent on the country receiving no grant aid from the U.S.

Secretary Gates said that he was in a minority with Secretary Anderson in opposing grant aid for these countries. He noted that France was not now getting any grant aid. Mr. Smith reported that the Netherlands was now receiving grant aid at the rate of about $75 million a year.

Mr. McCone noted that if we were to give these countries the propulsion system to be used on the nuclear ship Savannah, no classified data would be involved. The President reiterated his approval of the nuclear submarine plan provided the recipient nations were not receiving any significant grant aid from the U.S.

As the President was leaving the meeting, Mr. Gray recommended to him and the President approved that the remainder of the State-Defense report (NSC 6017) be referred to the Planning Board for further study and recommendation.

The National Security Council:¹⁴

a. Noted and discussed certain issues contained in a report on the subject (NSC 6017), prepared by the Departments of State and Defense, in response to the reference NSC Actions calling for reports on (a) The Future of NATO; (b) The Roles and Contributions of the United States and Other NATO Nations; (c) Future NATO Nuclear Capabilities and the Problem of Nuclear Sharing; on the basis of a presentation by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of certain policy issues (identified by the reference memoranda of November 16, 1960) connected with U.S. planning and guidance required for U.S. participation in the forthcoming North Atlantic Council meetings, as indicated below.

b. Noted the President’s approval of the presentation at the forthcoming North Atlantic Council meeting of the following firm U.S. proposals, subject to the caveat regarding necessary U.S. Congressional action:¹⁵

(1) The United States will make a commitment to keep in the European NATO area (including Turkey), under U.S. custody, such U.S. nuclear weapons as are furnished for the accomplishment of approved NATO military plans.

(2) The NATOMRBM proposal (contained in the enclosure to the reference memorandum on the subject, “Special NSC Meeting”, dated November 16, 1960), subject to the following amendments:

(a) Paragraph 2, page 1: Delete the bracketed phrase and the footnotes thereto.

(b) Paragraph 3, page 1: In the third line insert the words “buy and” between “therefore” and “contribute”.¹⁶

(c) Paragraph 3-a, page 2: Delete the Defense version; include the State version, deleting the brackets and the footnote thereto; and add a new footnote reading as follows:

“*As indicated above, the multilateral financing of the 100 additional MRBMs will be exclusive of U.S. participation.”¹⁷

(d) Paragraph 3-c, page 2: Delete the footnote thereto.¹⁸

(e) Paragraph 4, page 3: Revise the third and fourth lines to read as follows:

“would be prepared to facilitate NATO procurement by sale of Polaris missiles and of the required equipment”.¹⁹

(f) Paragraph 6, page 3: Revise the first line to read as follows:

“6. The United States emphasizes that other NATO nations should undertake.”

In the third line, substitute “their” for “its”.²⁰

c. Noted the President’s directive that the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, arrange for a re-examination of present NATO stockpile procedures in order to indicate what legislative changes might be required to give assurance of a prompt and proper response within the short reaction times of missile warfare.

[1 paragraph (9 lines of source text) not declassified]

e. Noted that the President approved the proposal for nuclear submarine cooperation contained in paragraph 90 of NSC 6017, subject to the understanding that any U.S. assistance in the form of submarines or components must be purchased by the recipient government and will be made available only if the recipient government is not receiving significant grant aid from the United States.²¹

f. Referred the subject report (NSC 6017) and related memoranda to the NSC Planning Board for further study and comment on policy issues not covered by the above actions, with particular reference to consideration of studies looking toward a long-term plan to reduce U.S. force deployments and expenditures in Europe.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate implementation.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, JCS, and the Chairman, AEC, for appropriate implementation.

The actions in d and e above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC.

James S. Lay, Jr.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Lay.
1. The source text incorrectly indicates Atlanta as the place of the meeting. In a November 21 memorandum to Wilton B. Persons, Assistant to the President, however, Gordon Gray noted that this NSC meeting took place in Augusta. (ibid., Staff Secretary Records, Gordon Gray III)
2. NIE 20–60, “Problems Affecting the North Atlantic Alliance,” November 1, and SNIE 20–2–60, “NATO Country Reactions to Certain Forms of US Nuclear Assistance,” October 11, are in Department of State, INR-NIE Files. The November 10 memorandum has not been found. Regarding NSC Action No. 2149, see footnote 6, Document 228. Regarding NSC Action Nos. 2204 and 2292, see footnotes 1 and 8, Document 265. Regarding NSC Action No. 2274, see footnote 7, Document 261. NSC Action No. 2323, October 20 (approved by the President on October 26), noted that a report on future nuclear capabilities in the NATO area would be incorporated in a comprehensive report on U.S. policy toward NATO which was being prepared by the Departments of State and Defense and the AEC for consideration by the NSC. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Regarding the August 23 memorandum, see footnote 1, Document 265. NSC 6017, “NATO in the 1960s,” November 8, was intended to serve as a basis for long-range U.S. planning and guidance for U.S. participation in the preparation of the proposed 10-year plan for NATO. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 6017) The November 16 memorandum on “NATO in the 1960s” transmitted to the NSC a draft record of action as a basis for discussion at the November 17 meeting. (Ibid., Records of Action by the National Security Council) The other November 16 memorandum is ibid., NSC 6017.
3. Reference is to NSC 6017.
4. This paper was a revision of the October 3 paper agreed to by the Departments of State and Defense; see footnotes 6 and 7, Document 268.
5. Paragraph 3-a of the November 16 paper on NATOMRBMs contained separate proposals in brackets by the Departments of State and Defense. State cited the language of the revised version of paragraph 4-a of the October 3 paper on NATOMRBMs, which is quoted in footnote 6, Document 268. Defense preferred the following language: “that the force be developed on the basis of multilateral control. The concept of multilateral ownership and financing of the force should be the subject of examination and negotiation. Mixed-manning should be adopted to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR.”
6. Paragraph 6 of the November 16 paper on NATOMRBMs, reads: “The U.S. believes that NATO should undertake to parallel these advances with additional vigorous measures to strengthen its other forces which are equally essential for deterrence in accordance with NATO military plans. It is of great importance for NATO to maintain a flexibility of response. Progress in the MRBM system should not be permitted at the sacrifice of progress in building NATO’s other forces.”
7. On January 14, Khrushchev announced that Soviet Armed Forces would be reduced from 3,623,000 to 2,423,000 during the next 2 years and that missiles and submarines would be emphasized.
8. For text of Eisenhower’s remarks at his news conference in Augusta on November 16, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pp. 864–865.
9. John S. Patterson, Acting Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.
10. Paragraph 2 of the November 16 paper on NATOMRBMs contained a bracketed clause and explanatory footnote, in which the AEC proposed that prior to making an offer, formal or informal, of five Polaris submarines as an interim NATOMRBM force, the United States should decide the conditions under which it would be willing to release for use.
11. According to a memorandum of McCone’s conversation with the President on November 8, prepared by Colonel Eisenhower, McCone visited the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and on his way back stopped at NATO (presumably in Paris), a base in the Netherlands, and the Thor and B–47 installations in the United Kingdom. The memorandum also summarized their discussion on the need for further amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)
12. Regarding U.S. negotiations with France on nuclear submarines, see Part 2, Documents 71 ff. Documentation on U.S. negotiations with the Netherlands and Italy on nuclear submarines is in Department of State, Central File 740.5611.
13. Reference presumably is to Dulles’ statement to the meeting of Heads of Government of NATO countries in Paris on December 16, 1957, in which he said that the United States planned to seek the necessary legislation to enable the United States “to cooperate with interested members of NATO in the development, production, and fueling of nuclear propulsion and power plants for submarines and other military purposes.” (Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1958, p. 11)
14. Paragraphs a-f and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2334, approved by the President on December 17. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Changes in the text that led to the President’s approval were in NSC Action No. 2336; see footnote 10, Document 274. Additional changes were made at the December 8 NSC meeting, resulting in NSC Action No. 2340. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
15. See NSC Action No. 2336-c for a further agreement on the procedure to be used at the forthcoming NSC meeting. [Footnote in the source text. For NSC Action No. 2336, see footnote 10, Document 274.]
16. The first sentence of paragraph 3 reads: “The U.S. would expect that other NATO governments will want to join in the creation of a NATOMRBM Force and that they would therefore contribute approximately 100 additional MRBMs in order to meet SACEUR’s MRBM requirements through 1964.”
17. Regarding paragraph 3-a, see footnote 5 above. The footnote to the Department of State proposal reads: “This is the language which was in the paper approved in principle by the President on October 3 at meeting with Secretary Gates and Under Secretary Merchant, and which was subsequently made known to M. Spaak.”
18. The footnote to paragraph 3-c, which called for a plan to safeguard the security of the classified design data for the weapons and delivery system, reads: “AEC believes U.S. should decide in advance of the offer whether it would approve multinational custody and access to design.”
19. The first sentence of paragraph 4 reads: “If a plan as indicated under paragraph 3 above is developed which is acceptable to the NAC, the U.S. would be prepared to facilitate NATO procurement of Polaris missiles together with the required equipment and vehicles for deployment.”
20. Regarding paragraph 6, see footnote 6 above.

21. Paragraph 90 of NSC 6017 reads as follows:

    “Nuclear Submarine Cooperation. Present policy authorizing negotiation of nuclear submarine cooperation agreements with NATO allies under certain conditions is satisfactory, and no additional requirements in terms of policy guidance or legislative authorization are foreseen. With respect to the implementation of existing policy, the Executive Branch should initiate action of a more liberal basis toward the Netherlands, France, and Italy in the field of submarine nuclear propulsion for Skipjack-type submarines. An unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States does not appear to be involved if appropriate bilateral agreements, including adequate provision for safeguarding classified information and material, are entered into. Specifically, the United States should:

    “a. Inform the Netherlands, France and Italy that we would be prepared to open negotiations on the same basis as the present cooperation agreement with the United Kingdom and on the understanding that any submarines built under such cooperation agreements will be committed to NATO for the duration of the Treaty. However, in each case the United States should also suggest that the allied government may wish to reconsider its interest in nuclear submarine cooperation in view of the possibility that the meeting of MRBM and other NATO force goals may represent conflicting requirements in terms of resource allocation.

    “[2 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

    “c. Seek the United Kingdom’s agreement to commit to NATO any nuclear-powered submarines built by it as a result of U.S. assistance.”