Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

206. Letter From the Assistant Chief of the Mission at Berlin (Lightner) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler)⁰

Berlin, August 8, 1960.

Dear Foy: In recent weeks I have been impressed by the apparent conflicting influences of two antithetical philosophies that seem to shape U.S. and Allied policies and actions relating to Berlin. (Actually these philosophies underlie our relations with the Soviet Union on a global basis, but I am looking at the problem from the Berlin angle.) One philosophy takes the form of extreme caution to avoid doing anything that the Soviets might construe as “provocation” for taking strong action in Berlin, such as signing a separate peace treaty with the East Germans. In the course of implementation, particularly when tripartite agreement is involved, this philosophy frequently produces very defensive results. This was recently illustrated by the last-minute French demand to delete two innocuous sentences from the note on the Bundeswehr and by the handling of the UPI story about the Berlin intelligence report of imminent military action against Berlin.¹ To deny knowledge of such a report was all right but it was most disappointing here in Berlin to read that a top intelligence source in the administration gave his assurance that our estimate was that the Soviets had no intention of taking any such action at this time. Surely we might have been expected to have seized this opportunity to go on to say that we of course had to assume that such plans existed, that our troops in Berlin were constantly on the alert and would effectively defend Berlin in the event the other side were so foolhardy as to embark on such a venture.

I am not suggesting that the West is in any position to wield a “big stick”, but I do suggest that too much caution causes many observers in Berlin to fear that the West may be operating under the misapprehension that major Soviet strategy is seriously influenced by so-called “provocations” on our part. Sitting here in Berlin where nearly every week several incidents occur which could at any time be blown up to serve as “provocations,” one is impressed by the danger that Soviet knowledge of our fear-to-provoke will stimulate rather than deter the kind of move we seek to forestall.

Recognition of this danger would lead to greater acceptance of the second philosophy that I mentioned at the beginning of this letter. This is the continuing, urgent need to impress upon Khrushchev and his followers the fact that despite the U.S. election campaign, the sometimes divisive interests of the Allied powers, the changing power relationships in the world, etc. etc., the U.S. will go the limit to carry out its pledges to stand by Berlin. Possibly the main deterrent to major Sov/GDR harassment of our position in West Berlin and to other action designed to produce a “solution” of the Berlin problem remains Soviet respect for our strength of purpose here. Recent reports citing important Soviet and GDR leaders as doubting our willingness to go all the way for Berlin are alarming because if true they could lead to a tragic miscalculation. They point to the need right now to demonstrate that we are as determined as ever and will defend Berlin whatever the cost.

Many recent U.S. statements on Berlin have been favorably received here (statements by both Presidential candidates, statements by the Department’s spokesman and notes to the Soviet Government). Unfortunately, the good effects of Linc White’s recent statement,² refuting the East German blast about the Potsdam agreement were somewhat offset in Berlin by the unfortunate impressions created by newspaper stories out of Washington the same day claiming that State Department officials believed Khrushchev was not bluffing when he warned he would sign a separate peace treaty if the Bundestag should meet in Berlin. (Why the hell we have to tell the world when we think Khrushchev is bluffing and when he is not bluffing is a mystery to me.) However, I am not really primarily concerned with Berlin reactions to U.S. policy but rather with the possibility of Soviet miscalculation of our capabilities and determination to defend Berlin.

Under constant pressure from the East Germans to solve the Berlin problem, Khrushchev might even decide to let them make a power play here if he came to believe the reports that we and our Allies were incapable of moving decisively to hold Berlin against concerted East German effort. Gromyko’s statement to Kreisky as reported in Vienna’s 156, July 18³ (“no one would fight over the signs … passes …”),⁴ can’t be laughed off. East Germans also are very cocky and may doubt our readiness to go the limit on the Berlin issue. (I refer to several recent intelligence reports, including a fascinating one quoting a high SED official Otto Winzer and indirectly a group of British Labor MPs.) We felt the observation of the new Ceylonese Ambassador in Moscow to Mrs. Thompson (Moscow’s 36, July 6)⁵ was a most timely message. You recall he expressed the view that the West should take steps to convince the Soviets they were prepared to fight for Berlin because the Soviets did not now believe this was true.

With conditions deteriorating in East Germany we must assume Ulbricht may be all the more persuasive in his current talks with Khrushchev to try to get the latter’s approval for a move against West Berlin. It is vital for us at this time to make sure no one doubts the fact of our determination to go down to the line with them on the Berlin issue.

If I were to come up with a few specific suggestions as to what we ought to do beyond what we are already doing to convince the Soviets of our determination, I would suggest consideration be given to the following overt moves: 1) give immediate consideration to Mayor Brandt’s suggestions to the Commandants at their meeting on July 12 for an Allied statement reiterating our position on a separate peace treaty.⁶ He suggested the following points be made: a) Allied rights in Berlin would not be affected in any way by a separate peace treaty; b) the Allies in any event intend to continue to exercise their rights; and c) a separate peace treaty with the “consequences” stated by the Soviets could constitute a threat to world peace. (It might be a stronger and more timely statement if it were to be made by the U.S. alone, possibly by “the State Department spokesman.”) 2) At some stage it might be desirable to consider addressing a diplomatic note in very serious vein to the Soviet Government explaining in clear-cut terms the danger to world peace that would be involved were the Soviets to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR and to withdraw from control of the access routes to Berlin.

I started this out as a draft telegram, but somewhere along the route decided it would be more appropriate to send as a letter, particularly in view of the present policy to restrict the telegraphic traffic. I am, however, taking the liberty of sending copies of this letter to a rather larger list than usual.

Sincerely yours,

E. Allan Lightner, Jr.⁷

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8–860. Secret; Official–Informal. Copies were also sent to Dowling, Tyler, Freers, Lyon, Barbour, Merchant, Bohlen, Berding, and Hillenbrand. Attached to the source text was a reply from Merchant, August 15, which stated that he knew “of no one in the State Department or across the river who subscribes to the philosophy you fear of trying to avoid provoking the Soviets.”
1. For text of this August 8 note, see Department of State Bulletin, August 29, 1960, p.348. Documentation on the drafting of the note is in Department of State, Central File 762.00. The UPI story under reference has not been further identified.
2. For text of White’s August 2 statement, see Dokumente, Band 5, 1960, p. 123.
3. Not printed. (Department State, Central Files, 762.00/7–1860)
4. Ellipses in the source text.
5. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–660)
6. The Mission at Berlin reported on this meeting in telegram 30, July 13. (Ibid., 762.00/7–1360)
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.