246. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State 0
100. 1. Prime Minister summoned me today just prior his departure for Geneva (where he is going for medical and personal reasons) to make another urgent and fervent plea for immediate US intervention on Cyprus. Describing UK plan as “worst yet and completely unacceptable to GOG” Karamanlis vehemently reviewed all of Greek objections, described his increasing internal political difficulties, reiterated Greece was being “abandoned and humiliated” by its friends and allies and predicted flatly he could not much longer hold line here and would therefore be compelled to adopt more intransigent position shortly. He declared his reply to Macmillan keeping door open for further talks had to be “jammed down throat” of Cabinet. He continued that latest Macmillan letter1 following Averoff suggestions to UK Ambassador2 had merely referred to Prime Minister’s declaration in House of Commons and he thought this was clear evidence that UK and Turkey had connived to bring about situation wherein Greece, abandoned by US, would be forced to accept Cyprus solution dictated by Turkey. GOG had gone very far in concessions contained in Averoff suggestions in hope that US would utilize them by taking initiative for settlement, particularly in view of hope for progress we had earlier expressed. He was doubly disappointed at our lack of reaction and asked me to impress upon USG absolute necessity of taking urgent action. He hoped I would be able to give him some reply to GOG suggestions within week as situation was steadily deteriorating in Greece and if nothing were done he would be compelled to change his attitude. There was much more in same tenor, but as it has been previously reported, I do not repeat it here.
2. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] I told Prime Minister I could not follow his reasoning. I reminded him GOG had raised Cyprus in NATO,3 had declared it might have to withdraw from alliance if certain events came to pass and that Spaak had offered certain suggestions [Page 685] for procedure.4 I reminded him Averoff suggestions had not yet been considered but I had informed Foreign Minister of our hope his suggestions would provide impetus for constructive discussions.5 We had furthermore indicated our willingness to participate in advisory committee if Spaak and others so wish.6 I said these matters were now under consideration in Paris and we hoped Averoff would see Spaak in near future. This I thought could hardly be construed as abandoning Greece or refusing to consider its suggestions. I said that as Greece was opposed to tripartite meeting we had to find some forum for discussion of Greek suggestions and this seemed best procedure. In reply Prime Minister admitted there might be some virtue in this proposed procedure but that as practical matter it would mean little until US was prepared to indicate its position on substance. At this point his wife reminded him for third time he must go to airport and he concluded with another urgent plea for reply from US.
3. Because of atmospheric conditions we have not yet received number of telegrams and therefore not certain I am up to date on exact situation today.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–1058. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 4:18 a.m. on July 11. Repeated to London, Ankara, Paris for USRO, and Nicosia.↩
- In his letter to Karamanlis, Macmillan pressed for immediate and realistic negotiations on the basis of existing situations and proposed to meet with Karamanlis as soon as possible. A copy of the letter is ibid., 747C.00/7–858.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 242.↩
- On June 10; see footnote 4, Document 208.↩
- Spaak’s suggestions are summarized in Document 231.↩
- See Document 242, and footnote 2, Document 244.↩
- The U.S. position was outlined in Document 233.↩