Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

250. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State ⁰

Paris, July 28, 1958, 6 p.m.

373. From Thurston.¹ At Averoff’s request I saw him on July 24 and 25 and have passed on substance of our conversations to Ambassadors Burgess and Nolting. Latter suggested I make separate report on Cyprus aspects as supplement to information reported Poltos 356 and 361.²

First conversation took place before Averoff had seen Spaak. He said he was going to try to get Spaak interested in his suggestions for revision of UK plan along line he had taken with Ambassador Riddleberger. When reminded that Spaak was taking different approach which would call for provisional arrangement not prejudicial to any given final solution, Averoff said he was willing have a try in spirit Spaak formula but was very doubtful that it was practicably workable. He asked how could Greeks and Turks ever agree on provisional regime when both would look at every word and comma to see whether they were weighted in direction either Enosis or partition. Averoff also indicated concern about possible outcome of any NATO consideration Cyprus problem since if NAC should come up with recommendations for a solution having an unfavorable appearance from the Greek viewpoint, then the future of NATO in Greece would be very dubious indeed. On other hand, if through quiet efforts Spaak or any other means solid ground could be reached for settlement, then GOG would be delighted see NATO label put on settlement. In any event, Averoff emphasized, Spaak effort must move fast since GOG under compulsion of August 16 deadline for inscription Cyprus item UNGA agenda.³

At time our second conversation Averoff had seen Spaak and had received from him (as well as Melas) account of second luncheon mentioned Polto 356. Averoff and Seferiades, Greek Ambassador London, who also present, were both amused Sarper’s statement he had not shown Spaak paper to his government. They referred to presence Zorlu Paris and to unlikelihood that any Ambassador would withhold such a document from his government. Only two points of substance at luncheon, according Averoff, were (1) reiterations by Sarper of desirability equal representation Greek and Turkish communities Cyprus on Governor’s council, and (2) statement by Spaak that he would draft another paper and that he was wondering in that connection whether he should not bring into the picture either the full NAC or the twelve members thereof who were not direct parties to Cyprus issue.

In his account of conversation he had with Spaak after the luncheon Averoff said he had stressed the advantages of his two-point revision of the UK plans. Spaak’s reaction, Averoff said, was not unfavorable. Spaak indicated to Averoff he was thinking of action along two lines (1) whether it would not be possible to associate Turkish financial exigencies⁴ with a satisfactory Cyprus settlement and (2) whether he could get the twelve non-involved members of NAC to agree to a statement of principles which should govern a Cyprus solution, one guiding principle being the natural desire of peoples for independence; the other, full guarantees for the religious, cultural, and educational rights of minorities.

From this springboard Averoff and Seferiades argued for independence either within or without the British Commonwealth as the best all around solution for Cyprus. Averoff said that he would be willing to subscribe to a guaranty that for 25 years the Cypriots would stay within the Commonwealth. Seferiades opined that this would have the support of the British in both the Conservative and Labor camps. At this point I asked Averoff why he seemed to exclude partition entirely from the list of solutions and referred to conversations we had had two years ago on this subject.⁵ He replied that it was not a matter of the Greek Government itself refusing to consider partition but rather that it was absolutely impossible to get any support for his idea from the Greek Cypriots themselves. He then smilingly added that under these circumstances he could have no objection to the inclusion of partition as one of the alternatives in any Cyprus plebiscite.

Informal memorandum being transmitted on other subjects of interest covered in conversations with Averoff.⁶

Houghton

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–2858. Secret; Priority; Noforn. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, and Nicosia.
1. Raymond L. Thurston, Counselor at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe.
2. Regarding Polto 356, July 25, see Document 249. In Polto 361, July 26, Burgess reported Spaak’s analysis of the progress of the talks. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–2658)
3. The 13th Session of the U.N. General Assembly was scheduled to begin on September 16 in New York. The Greek request that Cyprus be on the General Assembly’s agenda was made on August 15.
4. The Turkish Government had requested a stabilization loan from the International Monetary Fund to deal with rising inflation.
5. Reference is to the August 18, 1956, Greek proposals for a solution to the Cyprus problem.
6. Not found.