266. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 0

Polto 803. Personal to Secretary Dulles from Nolting. Would like you to have the following background concerning the Cyprus issue in NATO as we see it.

As you know, bad relations between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus have been a festering sore in NATO for a long time. They have become worse since Macmillan announced his plan in August. The British certainly acted in good faith, but they misjudged what was negotiable and their timing was bad. Spaak’s proposals as of that time seemed to be, with effort, negotiable. The situation now, I believe, has become critical, threatening to cause the withdrawal of Greece from NATO. Ambassador Melas has told us that he expects soon to be withdrawn and not to be replaced. He is an honest man, not an alarmist. Casardi of NATO told us today he had the same thing from Melas. Norstad and Spaak, both of whom have recently been in Greece, are convinced this is not a bluff, as irrational as it may seem.

We have sent in over the past weeks several recommendations on this problem, the main thrust of which is that if the problem is to be moved from a dangerous deadlock, the US must take a firm and positive position. We did so in support of the Macmillan plan in August, but this would not go down with the Greeks. As Riddleberger said in a recent cable, we have fully discharged our commitment to support the UK plan.1 In my opinion it is necessary now to support with vigor the Spaak effort to achieve a conference of the interested parties both NATO participation [participants?]. The Turks have refused this (in violent and abusive speech in NAC Thursday,2 which was apparently written by Zorlu), and the British apparently are tending to limit it in a manner which will make it impossible for the Greeks to accept. But it is the Greeks who are apparently on the edge of desperation and irrational actions; the other two positions may have some give in them.

We sent a cable Saturday3 suggesting a possible line for the US to take, in capitals and at Monday’s NATO meeting. I hope you will have the [Page 713] opportunity to read that and to give us your personal advice on how to help take the heat out of this dangerous situation.

Foregoing written before receipt your instructions to London (Deptel 3199 to London, repeated Topol 1015 to Paris).4 We agree with Department’s thinking but from what Roberts has told us, we fear British will not take up suggestion. We have thought this matter over carefully and are convinced that US position should be that, in interest of the alliance, a conference of the three governments and two communities, with NATO participation, is essential.

I hope highest level approaches Washington and three capitals will permit us to state this line clearly and firmly at tomorrow’s NAC meeting with chance of success.

Nolting
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–2858. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.
  2. Telegram 842 from Athens, September 26. (Ibid., 747C.00/9–2658)
  3. September 25; see Document 261.
  4. Polto 802, September 27, urged that the United States exert its “best influence” to gain an agreement for a conference on Cyprus and that that conference be announced prior to October 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–2758)
  5. Telegram 3199 to London, September 27, reported on Dulles’ September 27 talks with Spaak on Cyprus and instructed the Embassy to determine whether the British Government would agree to the Spaak proposals by talking to British officials at the “highest level.” (Ibid., 747C.00/9–2758) A memorandum of Dulles’ conversation with Spaak is printed as Document 265.