287. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State0

1170. 1. Before departing for Bonn with Prime Minister,1 Averoff asked me to call to discuss where we stood on Cyprus. He reviewed reasons which had led GOG to refuse conference citing as primary cause UK and Turk determination to discuss modified Macmillan plan and little else. He held it to be self-evident from tenor of NATO discussions and from Zorlu and Lennox-Boyd declarations2 there could be no serious consideration of definitive solution and of GOG-Makarios proposal3 for guaranteed independence. In these circumstances conference could only fail which would be worse for NATO prestige than refusal of conference. I countered by citing the various texts on which agreement had almost been reached and underlined that whatever mental reservations might exist respecting possibility of definitive solution in near future, nonetheless UK and Turkey had accepted principles of discussion. I said that we were disappointed at failure to agree on conference and continued by expounding policy outlined in Depcirtel 531.4

2. Foreign Minister replied he did not agree with us gap had been narrowed, basically because GOT had not moved one step from partition while GOG and Makarios had come forward with important concession of guaranteed independence which could make settlement possible. Behind all procedural debate in Paris was to be observed GOT determination to uphold partition as only solution and this attitude was in effect supported by UK. Therefore gap had not been narrowed on substance and conference in these conditions was certain to fail. During summer GOG had followed counsel of its friends, Spaak had come up with reasonable proposal5 which GOG could accept, but UK had gone ahead with modified Macmillan plan as if Spaak proposal had never existed. Furthermore, UK was now proceeding to apply plan and Turks, [Page 737] in spite of their agreement with us, had now appointed governmental representative who was not Consul-General.6UK had refused time to discuss modified Macmillan plan although Spaak proposals were pending and it was clear from Paris discussions it had no intention of deferring application of plan. All this had been accepted with [without?] demur by NATO.

3. Therefore, said Averoff, GOG was compelled once more to go to UN where he would support guaranteed independence proposal. He hoped we would once more examine it carefully. He said he had informed Turkish Embassy if this could be eventually accepted GOG would be happy to see guarantees inserted in Cypriot constitution that proportionate number ministers would be granted to Turk Cypriots. This would be in addition to minority guarantees which GOG had always been ready to accept. Turk minority would therefore be assured of participation in government of island, including proportionate number of deputies. He would ask USG once more to review list of guarantees which GOG would accept: Participation of Turk minority in government; British bases; NATO bases; minority guarantees for freedom of religion, et cetera; guarantees against eventual enosis. He was convinced that if we would actively support such a program the solution on basis of guaranteed independence could be found.

4. Turning to UN debate, Averoff expressed optimism that if US maintained real neutrality, including neutrality “in the corridors” and particularly with LA delegations, GOG had chance of obtaining two-thirds for guaranteed independence. It doubted if it could do it without real neutrality by US. If we could not give active support, he expressed fervent hope that we would grant benevolent neutrality. I said I did not know as yet what our position would be but I assumed it would depend upon form of resolutions offered.

5. Averoff then said it should not be overlooked that if there were no progress on independence proposal it might not remain valid indefinitely and Archbishop might revert to self-determination and on other hand, if progress were made in UN, he implied Greece might come to NATO conference which would then have principle of independence endorsed by GA. (I find this highly speculative but am not informed of UN sentiment on guaranteed independence.)

6. In short conversation with Prime Minister at recent reception he likewise pleaded for our support for guaranteed independence proposal and requested that we draw up some sort of compromise if this idea did not appeal to us. Otherwise situation in Cyprus and Greece would continue to worsen.

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7. From Ankara’s 13437 assume Averoff is correct when he states GOT has not departed from partition. It always seemed realistic that London’s 1770 of September 278 represented fundamental UK position in spite of what was said in Paris during discussion of conference. If these two assessments are accurate then success of conference was indeed problematical. When I left Washington in February partition was not favorably regarded but I gathered it was felt Turks were entitled to more than paper guarantees. Proposal of Turkish base was rejected by GOG. British hope of early this year that after one more big explosion EOKA would be brought under control has not come to pass. Postulate of modified Macmillan plan is idea of Anglo-Greek-Turk cooperation but GOG has rejected it and GOT accepted with stipulation it was consistent with partition (to which GOG is strongly opposed). Therefore any hope UK plan can be integrally applied has disappeared. In meantime, Makarios has moved from enosis to guaranteed independence and is supported by GOG.

8. This analysis brings me to conclusion that Cyprus will continue a running sore and will cause continued disruption of defense arrangements in eastern Mediterranean unless beginning is made on some compromise. If we believe neither enosis nor partition will be accepted and if pacification of island is unlikely in near future, it is logical to conclude some form of independence with reinforced guarantees to Turk minority and base rights for NATO offers only immediate possibility of prog-ress. This of course is based on promise that UK intends to give up Cyprus as colony in foreseeable future. If this intention does not exist, which is opinion of many Greeks, obviously guaranteed independence is fantasy.

9. [9–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] believe we should have no illusions we are advancing toward solution on basis modified Macmillan plan. One glance at situation on Cyprus should dispel any such hope.

10. In these circumstances, if cannot support at this time any of basic solutions (enosis, partition, independence or continued colonial status) suggest that we revert to complete neutrality until such time when the three parties involved realized the senseless quarrel is not worth endangering their defense and disrupting military planning and aid programs. This will make it more difficult in Greece, as UK and Turkey [Page 739] are more satisfied with status quo, but may [have] long-term advantage of instilling more realism into Greek policy which continues to cherish hope we shall eventually support it on moral basis of colonial liberation.

Riddleberger
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–1058. Secret. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Ankara, London, Paris for USRO, Nicosia, and USUN.
  2. Karamanlis and Averoff visited Bonn November 10–14.
  3. During his October 9 speech at Blackpool, Lennox-Boyd reiterated that the British Government would implement its proposals of June 19 and August 15 in Cyprus. The Zorlu declaration is apparently a reference to an October 22 Turkish Government denial that it had abandoned partition as an objective for Cyprus.
  4. Makarios’ September 28 proposal called for a period of self-government under British rule followed by independence for Cyprus.
  5. Circular telegram 531, October 30, reported the Department’s view that discussions within the North Atlantic Council on Cyprus had helped to promote a solution to the crisis. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–3058)
  6. Reference is to Spaak’s July initiatives; see Document 249.
  7. Apparent reference to the appointment of Isin as Turkish representative on Cyprus.
  8. Telegram 1343 from Athens, October 31, warned that the Turkish Government had not ruled out a solution to Cyprus by partition. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–3158)
  9. Telegram 1770 from London reported that the British Government would not yield to Greek “pressure tactics” because it feared that an agreement based on Greek demands would lead to troubles in Cyprus and with the Turkish Government. (Ibid., 747C.00/9–2758)