Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

306. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State ⁰

Athens, January 31, 1959, 4 p.m.

1738. Ankara pass McGhee. Reference: Nicosia 338 to Department Repeated All.¹

1. Noel-Baker endeavored see me yesterday, but I was tied up with McGhee all day and unable see him. Phoned me last night from airport to ask me to pass Department importance he attaches Makarios returning Cyprus this juncture as it would make all difference in producing Cyprus settlement. Gave no indication he had seen Makarios and I did not ask. In reply merely said would inform Department his views.

2. Doubt wisdom our intervention. Feel if Greek Government felt this key to settlement it would make proposal direct to HMG or visit our help.

3. When I took McGhee to meet Averoff this morning Foreign Minister made following observations on Cyprus talks:

A. While publicly he is saying he is “neither optimistic nor pessimistic” privately he feels talks “are going well”. Have reached a large measure of agreement, and while still difficulties in way including some demands Greece cannot accept, prospects of reaching settlement soon are hopeful.

B. Feels Turks earnestly and seriously searching for settlement for three reasons:

I. They are tired of Cyprus and under domestic pressure to settle Cyprus.

II. Disturbing situation in ME, particularly Iran and Iraq, make it essential this problem be resolved so that tripartite alliance² can begin function again.

III. Turks came away from UN debate badly shaken, not so much because they failed to get their resolution through, but because they were soundly condemned in the speeches during debate and drew conclusion they do not have world opinion on their side. While he objects US stance UN debate, in retrospect feels it contributed to Turkish willingness to negotiate.

C. While talks with Turks going well—and this accounted for his hopefulness—his fear arose from what UK might do to sabotage talks. Said there are two elements in British Cabinet: Tory die-hards who are determined hold Cyprus and will use any means to torpedo talks; others consist of Ministers who are “indifferent” as to Cyprus but on whole prepared to be “helpful.” He placed Macmillan in latter group. Said Zorlu agreed with him that British Government divided in this fashion and was also disturbed.

D. Said renewal of military operations in Cyprus yesterday³ was sample of die-hard influence, and he could cite others. (This apparently reference to planned publication of electoral register, but he did not refer to this.) Said if EOKA reacted with a renewal of violence, it would make continuance negotiations with Turks impossible. Said since British aware of fact he will be seeing Zorlu again in few days, renewal of military operations was deliberately inspired by die-hards to upset the talks.

E. He had seen British Ambassador Allen yesterday to plead with him to persuade British Government to give him and Zorlu “ten days more.” He paid tribute to Allen who had been exceedingly helpful and understanding.

F. In response to point made by McGhee on importance restoring tripartite alliance, Averoff said that as soon as agreement reached on Cyprus they contemplated immediate announcement that tripartite alliance will be restored. This will be important stabilizing factor in ME. Greek-Yugoslav relations excellent and when alliance fully restored, he thinks this will make deep impression on Nasser. Unfortunately Turk relations with Arab countries and Egypt are not good, but Greek relations are good, especially with Egypt and with alliance restored he believes there will be important benefit to West in that it will open possibilities of better understandings with Turkey. Implied he has had some encouraging discussion with Nasser on this point.⁴

G. Averoff gave almost no details of content of his discussion with Zorlu,⁵ except make point that it provided for complete British sovereignty over bases.

4. In course McGhee’s call on Karamanlis January 29, Prime Minister said in respect Cyprus:

A. Greek-Turkish relations had improved. Turks were showing good will, but still several points on which Turkey insisted that impossible for Greece to agree. On other hand British actions unpredictable. Had that morning heard British plan circulate electoral lists.

B. He had gone about as far as any man could go. He had given up enough and was being called a traitor in some Greek circles. Although Turkish Cypriots only 18% of population, he had agreed to let them have representation of 35% all bodies.

C. Turkey wanted military establishment but this he could not agree to. He could not understand this since Cyprus security should be safeguarded by membership in NATO and presence of NATO forces.

D. He had run grave political risks in respect of concessions on Cyprus, far more risks than Turkish got, he could concede no more, and it was now up to Turks to show courage.

5. Eleftheria today reports Averoff may depart for Zurich tomorrow to confer Zorlu. Papers suggest this may be followed by Menderes-Karamanlis meeting some place depending on outcome next meetings.

Berger

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–3059. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Nicosia, and Ankara.
1. Telegram 338 from Nicosia, January 29, reported that Labour Party support for the British Government policy in Cyprus appeared to be waning. (Ibid., 747C.00/1–2959)
2. Reference is to the 1954 alliance of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. 1 2
3. On January 20, Lennox-Boyd announced that the British Army would continue its security operations in Cyprus in spite of EOKA’s declaration of a cease-fire.
4. Averoff met with Nasser during a July 8–9 meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, and Greece at Brioni.
5. Reference is to the January 18–20 meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Paris.