Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

401. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines¹

Washington, March 12, 1958—1:31 p.m.

3370. Re Embtel 2822; Deptels 2595, 2377.² Joint State–Defense Message. This message intended to supplement guidance Deptel 2377 for use during your discussions with Serrano to determine whether mutually acceptable agreement can be reached on issues outstanding at termination of Bendetsen Mission.

I. Correlation of Agreements.

A. Duration. In its “White Paper” February 18, 1957 to Magsaysay,³ Phil Panel mentioned as item of paramount importance correlation of Military Bases Agreement, Military Assistance Agreement,⁴ and Mutual Defense Treaty.⁵ In same White Paper, panel repeated stand taken during Bendetsen negotiations, pressing for US commitment that neither MAA nor MDT, each unilaterally terminable with one year’s notice, would be terminated as long as MBA in force. Panel cleverly did not urge that all three agreements be coterminous; but argued that while there may be continued need for MAA and MDT when bases no longer required, basis for MBA no longer exists if two other agreements terminated.

We are not in position to meet Phil demands. If issue raised, you may wish point out factors bearing on need for MAA and MBA differ. Provision for aid under the MAA is based on specific legislative authority which could, for various reasons, be terminated by U. S. Congress. Growth and strengthening of Philippine economy, technical advances and changes in strategic concepts could eliminate need for military assistance without decreasing need for bases for common defense both countries.

Similarly there may be continued need for bases if MDT ever technically terminated. For example, preamble MDT specifically recognizes agreement may be interim measure pending more comprehensive regional security pact or other arrangement. MDT could be terminated today and Phils would still be protected under SEATO.⁶

As practical matter, bases in Phils represent major strength-in-being for common defense US and Phils and are stabilizing factor for long-range defense relationship, giving US practical stake in defense of Phils. In view historically close special relationship between Phils and US it seems inconceivable that a situation could arise, whether or not a formal commitment existed, where US would not come to assistance Phils in case of an attack. Maintenance of bases in itself is evidence of intent of US to defend Phils.

We consider Phil concern about possible US retention of bases when no longer needed to be covered adequately by proposal, concurred in by Phil Panel, that both countries would consult together, at request of either, as to continued need for bases. Should they agree there is no longer a need for bases, MBA would be terminated.

In discussing issue of duration you may find it effective to point out that historically and legally MDT, MAA and MBA were negotiated and agreed to separately from each other and represent solemn undertakings, binding not only on US but also on Phils. It could not have been reasonably expected US would have made large expenditures necessary to establish, develop and maintain bases in Phils for mutual defense of US and Phils in absence of long range assurances as to their availability. By their very nature, bases are dependent upon continuing cooperation of host country.

B. Retaliation in Event of Attack. In same “White Paper”, Phil Panel pressed for formal commitment, “like NATO”, that US would assist, with force if necessary, in event Phils attacked. We cannot buy Phil position which goes beyond commitments under NATO. Nor are we willing to approach Senate even with NATO type language at this time.

Possible effective argument may be to show that US commitments to Phils under MDT and SEATO are, for all practical purposes, same as under NATO. Under MDT and SEATO, parties recognize an attack against one represents danger to peace and safety of other parties and parties are committed to take measures against common danger “in accordance with constitutional processes”. ANZUS pact, MDT’s with Korea and China⁷ contain same language. This differs little from North Atlantic Treaty which recognizes attack against one is attack against all, and that each party will assist by “such action as it deems necessary”. Further, under Art. 11 the provisions of NAT are to be carried out “in accordance with constitutional processes”. As Secretary Dulles’ note⁸ pointed out, attack against Philippines would as a matter of reality involve attack against US forces there and US would act immediately.

Politically, we are not in position to change US commitment as expressed in MDT. SEATO commitment is identical. We cannot give favored position to Philippines without endangering the SEATO alliance. Nor is it feasible to renegotiate the SEATO commitment.

C. War-time Development and Utilization. Phil Panel pressed for consultation and agreement between two governments on war-time development and utilization of bases. We again cannot accept. Wartime development of bases must meet requirements mission US forces which US alone can determine. Agreement on utilization during wartime is more difficult problem in light of public US commitments with UK that decision to use US bases in Britain during hostilities would be made jointly. However you may be able to fend off Serrano by stressing that bases developed purely for defensive purposes and that, of course, US would consult with Philippines before use to extent time and circumstances permit. Immediate establishment of Mutual Defense Board would assist materially in resolving this problem as well as war-time development of bases.

D. Mobilization Stockpile. Panel’s “White Paper” also presses for US commitment to provide military assistance for building up mobilization stockpile to be issued to reserves in event of national emergency. It is possible Garcia administration will not press this with vigor of Magsaysay. But if raised, you should point out to Serrano need for most judicious use of limited MAP monies appropriated by Congress. Immediate problem in Philippines is to ensure effective use of equipment slated for the one active Phil division. At present, we do not consider that three Phil reserve divisions are developed to extent that would warrant building stockpile. This problem would be matter of immediate concern to Mutual Defense Board. If agreement reached within Defense Board with respect efficiency of reserve divisions, Board could then recommend consideration of mobilization stockpile and MAP.

II. Mutual Defense Board and Liaison Officers.

Panel and US positions these issues so close that agreement in principle may be considered as having been reached, although problems raised this issue during April discussions may reopen issue. Agreement also reached during Bendetsen mission on composition metes and bounds commission. Believe you should stress to Serrano importance of Board to provide machinery for direct liaison and consultation on military matters; joint planning in peace and war and coordination of military assistance.

III. Natural Resources.

Phil Panel insisted that exploitation of natural resources should not be restricted unless mutually agreed otherwise for reasons of military necessity. US had proposed that bases be zoned unilaterally by US commander. Believe solution may lie in reviewing informally now with Philippine military zones established by US. If agreement can be reached by Philippine and US military on zones, we can then agree that mining would be permitted within areas of bases mutually agreed. Precooked zoning should allay fears on US and Phil sides. Once MDB established, procedures for processing mining applications set forth in Deptel 2922⁹ should be more acceptable to Phils. Miners receiving permits would of course have to agree to conditions already accepted by Phils in connection with the temporary permits already issued at Clark Field.

Message dealing with land requirements and relinquishments now being prepared.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/1–3058. Secret. Drafted by Robert A. Brand and William Lang of OSD/ISA; cleared with BNA, L/FE in draft, and RA in conference; and approved by J. Graham Parsons. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Telegram 2822 from Manila, January 30, asked for instructions on issues related to the bases other than criminal jurisdiction, although the resumption of negotiations was not imminent. (Ibid., 711.56396/1–3058) Telegram 2595 to Manila, February 5, informed Bohlen that these matters were under careful consideration and that instructions would be forthcoming. (Ibid., 711.56396/1–3058) Telegram 2377 to Manila is printed as Document 397.
3. The Philippine Panel “White Paper” of 1957 was a report on the 1956 base negotiations with the United States. In the report, the Panel listed problems related to U.S. bases in the Philippines, traced the negotiating history, and summed up areas of agreement and disagreement when negotiations were broken off in December 1956. Further information is in despatch 702 from Manila, March 5, 1957. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/3–557)
4. The U.S.-Philippine Military Assistance Agreement was signed and entered into force March 21, 1947. (61 Stat. (pt. 3) 3283)
5. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines was signed August 30, 1951, and entered into force August 27, 1952. (TIAS 2529; 3 UST (pt. 3) 3947)
6. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was signed at Manila, September 8, 1954 and entered into force February 19, 1955. (TIAS 3170; 6 UST 81)
7. The ANZUS Pact was signed by Australia, New Zealand and the United States in San Francisco, September 1, 1951, and entered into force April 29, 1952. (TIAS 2493; 3 UST (pt. 3) 3420) The United States signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea in Washington, October 1, 1953, which entered into force November 17, 1954; and with the Republic of China in Washington, December 2, 1954, which entered into force December 10, 1954. (TIAS 3097; 5 UST (pt. 3) 2368, and TIAS 3178; 6 UST 433, respectively)
8. Reference is to a note from Dulles to the Philippine Government, September 7, 1954, the relevant portion of which reads as follows: “Under our Mutual Defense Treaty and related actions, there have resulted air and naval dispositions of the United States in the Philippines, such that an armed attack on the Philippines could not but be also an attack upon the military forces of the United States. As between our nations, it is no legal fiction to say that an attack on one is an attack on both. It is a reality that an attack on the Philippines is an attack also on the United States.” (Quoted in telegram 1377 from Manila, October 12, 1959; Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/10–1259)
9. Reference is apparently to telegram 2822 to Manila, March 9, 1957, which contains a verbatim text on natural resources in the Bendetsen Report. (Ibid., 711.56396/3–957)