111. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Stoessel) to the President’s Special Assistant (Dungan)0
SUBJECT
- U.S.-Morocco Differences over Mauretania
The differences between the United States and Morocco over Mauretania are simply stated. Morocco maintains that the government of Mauretania is a puppet regime, fabricated and supported by France to prevent the return to Morocco of territory rightfully hers. Morocco was of course anxious for the support of the United States, as a great power. We have in effect refused this by recognizing the independence of Mauretania and by showing our willingness to vote for Mauretania’s admission to the United Nations. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has, for ulterior reasons, favored Morocco in this dispute.
Morocco’s political claims are not based on conclusive evidence, but there are cultural, ethnic and religious links between the two countries. Roughly two thirds of Mauretania’s mainly nomadic population of about 600,000 are Moorish. Only along the Senegal river in the south is the population predominantly negroid. So far as we can judge, most of the Mauretanian tribal and religious chiefs who presently dominate local politics acknowledge the authority of the government of Mauretania’s Prime Minister Moktar Ould Daddah, but there is some internal opposition and Morocco makes much of several prominent Mauretanians who have gone into voluntary exile in Morocco and hold important government posts there.
Morocco bases its claims on historical links (however tenuous) going back to the early days of Islam in North Africa, on the traditional fealty alleged to have been paid the Sultans of Morocco and, of course, on the “true wishes” of the Mauretanian population. To back the latter assertion Morocco has proposed the holding of a plebiscite under UN auspices.
France, on the other hand, alleges that national sovereignty in the present day legal sense did not exist in this remote and desolate land [Page 168] until the French arrived toward the latter part of the last century. The authority of independent Mauretania’s present government is held to derive from the French right of conquest and from the elections which led to self-government.
What has made the US position particularly uncomfortable is the open and determined espousal of the Moroccan claim by King Mohammed himself. Furthermore, the claim has at least the overt backing of all political tendencies in Morocco and it would now be virtually impossible for the King or anyone else in Morocco to back off from it.1 At the very least, a face-saving device of some sort would have to be provided.
We had hoped that there would be sufficient opposition to Morocco on this issue from other African countries to deflect Moroccan ire from us. This indeed appeared to be the situation at the time we recognized Mauretania’s independence but the situation since then has become a good deal more equivocal. While many nations have recognized Mauretania’s independence and, therefore, would presumably vote for its entry into the United Nations, Morocco by skillful horse trading with other nations with policies in need of support, has succeeded in lining up behind itself a group of assertive, radical Afro-Asian states. All of the 10-member Arab League, except Tunisia, and there is recent indication that Tunisia is falling back to a more guarded position, support the Moroccan position and do not recognize Mauretania. The three radical West African states—Ghana, Guinea, and Mali—recognized Mauretania but nevertheless approved a resolution at the recent Casablanca Conference which tacitly supports Morocco’s claims. Indonesia, also, has publicly come out in favor of Morocco’s claim, seeing therein a parallel to its claim to West New Guinea.
The Soviet Union has backed the Moroccan position by vetoing Mauretania’s application for U.N. membership, seeing in this dispute a chance to exacerbate U.S. Moroccan relations and put pressure on our bases. The Soviets did not take an unequivocal stand on the merits of the Morocco-Mauretania dispute but sought merely to link Mauretania’s admission to that of Outer Mongolia. However, the Moroccan Government and press have overlooked this subtlety and give the Soviets full credit for blocking Mauretania’s admission to the U.N.
The United States recognizes Mauretania, voted for its admission to the U.N., and sent a Presidential delegation to the independence celebrations in Nouakchott. Our Ambassador in Dakar is also accredited to [Page 169] Mauretania. Most Western European and Latin American countries, a majority of the non-Arab Asian countries, and all tropical African states have extended recognition to Mauretania. France and a number of Western-oriented French-speaking African states have vigorously championed Mauretania’s cause.
What had been a territorial dispute of murky antecedents, is now, as a result of Moroccan tenacity, being presented as an issue of colonialism versus independence, a test of those who support puppets and those that do not. While the other states probably are supporting Morocco for tactical reasons, there is no evidence that Morocco can be dissuaded from pursuing her claim.
In Rabat’s telegram 1589 of February 23,2 Ambassador Yost puts the problem vividly from the Moroccan point of view. In Dakar’s 379 of December 1,3 however, Ambassador Villard cogently defended the Mauretanian position. Ambassador Yost thinks we should proceed with “extreme caution” and not aid or support Mauretania “any more than is absolutely unavoidable.” Ambassador Villard’s recommendation was that we make a statement when the question of Mauretania’s membership in the U.N. comes up urging Morocco and Mauretania promptly to consult on means of overcoming their differences and of developing close and mutually valuable collaboration.
The US thus faces a dilemma in which it cannot entirely avoid antagonizing one side or the other. It is possible, however, that we can limit the damage to ourselves in strategically-located Morocco, where we have a particularly heavy military investment, by avoiding any initiative on this primarily African question. Where we are obliged to express a view, we should try to stress the interest which both parties have in an amical relationship.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770V.00/2-2761. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic and Root on February 24 and cleared by Ferguson, Root, Penfield, and Hartley and in substance with Lindquist. The source text is attached to a transmittal note from Stoessel to Dungan noting that the Acting Secretary had seen and concurred in the enclosed memorandum on Mauretania.↩
- While the above was written prior to King Mohammed’s death the new King can be expected to pursue this claim with equal, if not even greater, vigor. [Footnote in the source text. King Mohammed V died on February 26. (Telegram 1604 from Rabat, February 26; ibid., 771.11/2-2661)]↩
- Not printed. (Ibid., 771.022/2-2361)↩
- Not printed. (Ibid., 303/12-160)↩
- Printed from a copy that indicates Stoessel signed the original.↩