127. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 0
SUBJECT
- Aid to Moroccan Air Force
This memorandum is to inform you of at least a tactical modification which seems required in the policy you approved last September of offering aid to Moroccan air force. This program was to be predicated upon “satisfactory private assurances” that no further Bloc air aid would be accepted. If these assurances were not forthcoming, the policy was to be reviewed.
Since then Morocco has become more immediately interested in transports than in the jet fighters we were afraid we might have to give. Moreover, the Soviets have made a new aid offer (perhaps including planes) and the Moroccan Defense Minister went to Moscow to discuss it.
State is therefore anxious to move quickly by sending an Air Force colonel to survey Moroccan needs. While Bonsal has not yet been able to get to King (who is obviously stalling), he and State feel that we should take this next step on basis of Foreign Minister Balafrej’s statement that Moroccans will make no arrangements involving Soviet technicians in Morocco and that King’s interest is mainly in Soviet small arms. French were given similar assurances. State argues that even though Moroccans are obviously blackmailing us, it is tactically unwise now to insist on more formal guarantees. They point out that we could get additional assurances later on before making a final offer.
Defense will go along (it plans to send the colonel to Rabat this weekend), but is worried that in doing so we are in effect taking one more step down the road without yet getting firm preclusive guarantees the policy calls for. LeMay is concerned because the C-119s Moroccans want will have to come out of our own inventory, and over Spanish objections (French seem to have come around to our view that if we don’t help Morocco, Soviets will).
[Page 198]I feel that we should go along with State. Although we do not yet have the words from King we want, our overall interest is preclusion in fact, not in words. All recognize that this exercise is a gamble, and that it is how forthcoming we are on aid which will in fact determine whether King keeps Soviets out. While I too think we need and should try for more “satisfactory assurances,” we should allow State leeway as to how and when these can best be obtained.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 121. Secret. Attached to the source text is a transmittal note from Komer to Bundy, saying that the President should be informed immediately since an Air Force colonel was ready to leave for Morocco. Komer added: “I also plan NSAM asking for progress report on Moroccan base question to force State to plan scheme for getting assurances at appropriate point.” Another note to Bundy, attached to the source text and signed with the initials “ab,” noted that Komer was very anxious to know the President’s reaction and that the Department of Defense was postponing sending the colonel to Rabat until it knew that the President had no objection.↩