190. Brief of a National Intelligence Estimate0

NIE 60/70-61: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN COLONIAL AFRICA

This National Intelligence Estimate was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on 11 April 1961. Significant judgments of this Estimate are as follows:

Over the next three years, virtually all the remaining British dependent territories in Africa, as well as the Belgian trusteeship of Ruanda-Urundi, will almost certainly become independent. The Salazar regime has adamantly refused even to consider self-government for the Portuguese territories, much less eventual independence, despite the growing African agitation. We see no prospect for a change in Portuguese policy which could avoid violence and repression in the colonies [Page 285] of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. Nor do we believe that Portugal alone has the military and economic resources to bear the long and bloody struggle that its present policies seem to ensure. While no substantial nationalist sentiment has appeared as yet in the Spanish areas, the Saharan territories will be increasingly threatened by Moroccan adventures.

The areas containing sizable European populations (notably Kenya, the Rhodesias, Angola, and Mozambique) are the principal danger points for racial strife. Outbreaks among Africans are likely in areas in which there are deep tribal antagonisms, such as Ruanda-Urundi and Kenya. While in most areas presently available security forces will probably be able to cope with sporadic, localized disturbances, widespread violence could be controlled only with the aid of metropole or other outside reinforcements. After independence, the quality and capabilities of security forces are likely to deteriorate.

Both before and after independence, most of the territories will labor in varying degrees under the handicaps of strong tribal animosities, rivalries between competing political parties and leaders, weak and underdeveloped economies and shortages of trained personnel. These handicaps will inhibit the growth of effective and stable governments.

Most areas will expect and need outside support and economic aid after independence. They probably hope also to obtain military assist-ance. We believe that they will look first to the West but that most will adopt neutralist policies and be receptive to Bloc assistance.

In the dependent areas the Bloc will be alert to foment and exploit to the disadvantage of the West any dissidence or trouble, even to the extent of clandestine supply of arms. However, we believe that Communist activities in these areas have not yet reached significant levels.

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Africa 121-350.09, 1961. Secret; Noforn. The source text was transmitted to Secretary of Defense McNamara under cover of a memorandum from Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, USAF Director for Intelligence, that reads: “On 11 April 1961, the United States Intelligence Board approved an Estimate on ‘Probable Developments in Colonial Africa’ (NIE 60/70-61). A Brief of this Estimate is attached for your information in advance of the regular distribution which will be forthcoming.”