Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

207. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Achilles) to the Under Secretary (McGhee)⁰

Washington, May 10, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Soviet Civil Aviation Penetration in Africa

The Soviet Union’s success since January, 1962 in negotiating four civil aviation agreements in North and West Africa (Morocco, Mali, Guinea and Ghana) and in bringing almost to the point of final conclusion a similar agreement with the Sudanese which would lead to further routes in East and Central Africa have caused us to undertake ad hoc measures directed at the Sudanese problem and longer range planning designed to improve our organizational arrangements for policy formulation in this field.

Our efforts to block conclusion of a Soviet-Sudanese aviation agreement were at first based on strong diplomatic representations which stressed the disruptive political effect and the potential security dangers of Soviet aviation penetration for the Sudan and for African stability in general. The technical pitfalls of the proposed agreement were also emphasized (questions of reciprocity, settlements of disputes, rates and standards, soviet non-membership in ICAO and IATA). When the Sudanese indicated that they had committed themselves too deeply to be able to withdraw unless some substantial element “of principle” were introduced, and renewed their expression of interest in securing two Boeing 720B’s, high-level consultations between AID and the Department, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], produced a new proposal to the Sudanese based on two elements: 1) the immediate despatch to Khartoum of the Vice President of Seaboard International Airlines to discuss the possibilities of developing Sudan Airways, including the obtaining on favorable terms of additional equipment best suited to Sudan airlines needs; 2) notification that the US Government was prepared to consider favorably a loan application for financing Khartoum-Port Sudan Road best suited to the Sudan’s needs after the recently completed survey had been considered by that Government. We further informed the Sudanese that our willingness to assist the Sudan can be significantly influenced by a decision to proceed with the air agreement which would be viewed by Congress and the American public as assisting USSR penetration of Africa.

As a result of these representations, the Sudanese Government agreed on April 29 to hold off making a final decision for 10 to 14 days, “or even longer.” Discussions with the Seaboard representative are continuing and the relatively favorable Sudanese reaction to his proposal, just received, indicates a further period of postponement while the Seaboard offer is examined.

Even before the accelerated Soviet efforts to expand their air routes in Africa, there had been within various parts of the US Government concern that US policies with respect to civil aviation in developing countries were not being properly coordinated among the various interested agencies of Government and were not taking sufficient account of political and security requirements. A Department of Defense study of September 1, 1961 discussed this problem and made a number of useful proposals for making aviation in the less-developed countries a more responsive instrument of foreign policy. Within the Department of State one principal difficulty seemed to be that civil aviation matters were handled entirely within the Bureau of Economic Affairs by the Office of Transportation and Communications, and as a result political consideration of aviation policies was not achieved on a systematic basis or often at a high enough level. As a partial solution to this problem, efforts are underway to obtain the services of a highly qualified professional in the civil aviation field. The leading candidate for this position is Mr. Joseph Fitzgerald, now President of the Ozark Airlines, St. Louis, and formerly Chief of the International Division of CAB. Mr. Fitzgerald will be coming to Washington for an interview on May 11.

As a first step to arrange closer consultation among those Government agencies chiefly concerned, you wrote on May 1 to Defense, FAA, CIA,AID and CAB proposing an early meeting to discuss arrangements for some form of ad hoc inter-Agency consultation to discuss steps to counteract Soviet Bloc penetration of the developing countries through aviation activities as well as to assure a constructive response to the aviation aspirations of these countries.

As an important element for devising a coherent civil aviation development policy in Africa, the Advisory Group might consider the initiation of thorough surveys of individual countries in order to develop broad guidelines applicable throughout particular regions in Africa. Existing associations such as Air-Afrique and Springbok could be strengthened and the establishment of new regional airlines, for example in the Maghreb, should be explored. One of the elements of difficulty will be in preserving harmonious relationships with the former Metropoles which would, no doubt, resist any massive intrusion of US aviation competition. One proposal suggested by Mr. James Smith is to consider the aviation maintenance and support system separately from the operations of the airlines themselves and to promote, with Exim Bank participation, a series of consortia for building and controlling all national aviation facilities. In this way the basic aviation development of the country could not come under Soviet influence but would be developed as a cooperative economically viable venture with the West.

These and many other interesting proposals, such as those set forth in the FAA-Defense study just sent over by Mr. Halaby,¹ suggest the range and complexity of this problem. Our opponent has a strategic plan, a single aviation organization whose operations are closely linked with its foreign assistance programs, considerable resources of modern aircraft and technical personnel, no “colonial” heritage in Africa or Latin America and few problems of coordinating its efforts in the developing countries with other members of the Bloc. The Soviets clearly do not intend to let the momentum already gained to die down: within the last three weeks they have broadened their drive for air routes to four additional countries, Chad, Niger, Somalia, and Libya, although none has yet given any commitment. African States, whether they call themselves neutral or sympathetic to the West, will find the Bloc’s offer of new aviation links and quick aviation development on easy terms difficult to resist. The newly formed aviation advisory group has an important and urgent task before it.

As background information, I am attaching a memorandum by Mr. Wolfe dated May 5² on this same subject.

0. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group Meeting, May 11, 1962. Secret.
1. Attachment to a memorandum from the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, Najeeb E. Halaby, to McGeorge Bundy, May 10. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Standing Group Meetings, 5/1/62-5/17/62)
2. Not printed. Memorandum from Wolfe to Fredericks and Tasca, May 5. (Department of State,S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group Meeting, May 11, 1962)