215. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)0

Dear Alex: The problem of U.S. military assistance programs in Africa generally has been giving us considerable concern here in Department of Defense for some time. I recognize that the swiftly emerging and changing character of the African states presents especially difficult problems; but it seems to me that our own internal indecision contributes unnecessarily to the difficulty. After many years of experience with military assistance programs, we should now be able to agree on certain guidelines to apply when these same old questions arise in new African states.

I would further say that we all can agree that experience has taught us at least the following basic facts:

(1)
Military assistance programs must be tailored to fit each country and are not manageable by any sort of over-all “regional” organization.
(2)
New programs should not be encouraged except in cases where clear benefits can be foreseen; but once a decision in principle is made to provide assistance, it should be done promptly and vigorously or not at all.
(3)
The program should not be attempted if the recipient state finds it politically or practically impossible to meet our criteria for administration, auditing, training and control; including the understanding that a military assistance program is not simply a gift of equipment but must be a program designed to accomplish specific internal security or defense aims, and extending over a period of time.

The U.S. desire to appear forthcoming to the developing states of Africa has apparently led us to make, or imply that we will make, military assistance commitments without a previous decision here that such a program is wise or without making plain our requirements of prospective recipients. It would also appear that no clear-cut policy has fully emerged concerning our attitude with reference to the metropoles of former colonial possessions. We are generally agreed, for example, that we would defer to the metropoles and hope they would carry the military assistance burden; but we have never decided what we should do in event the African state continues to press for assistance but the metropole “voices objection” to our proceeding with a program.

The failure to profit from what we have learned over the years in other parts of the world, compounded by the failure to agree to a plan of [Page 328] action when we are caught between conflicting demands of metropoles and African states, have enmeshed us in many problems in the implementation of military assistance to Africa. I have attached some examples of such problems and also attached a draft Department of Defense position for implementation and administration of military assistance to Africa,1 which is designed to help correct some of the difficulties and deficiencies encountered and to establish a better basis for future programs.

The primary concern is to satisfy U.S. objectives and administer the military assistance program in a manner which will reflect credit on the U.S. It is not only essential that these programs be conducted under procedures responsive to the intent and continuing surveillance of Congress, but also in the manner which experience has taught us will make them succeed. If new programs are unable to meet these criteria, then they should be rejected; if a program in existence cannot meet this test, it should be terminated as soon as possible and the funds utilized elsewhere. It seems to me that a full understanding and agreement on the part of all of us in the Government as to our objectives and methods could bring about a rapid solution to present African military assistance problems and preclude the same mistakes in the future.

Sincerely,

Paul H. Nitze2
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 67 A 4564, 091.3 Africa. Confidential. Drafted by Junkermann and Sloan. A copy was sent to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Williams.
  2. Attached but not printed.
  3. Printed from a copy that indicates NITZE signed the original.