Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia⁰

Washington, November 25, 1963, 7:08 p.m.

263. For Forrestal. CINCPAC for POLAD. Re your visit Phnom Penh. Sihanouk’s gestures in our present tragedy¹ (personal message, declaration of three days national mourning and designation of Kanthol to represent him at funeral ceremonies) may offer special opportunity to ease somewhat present tensions in our relations with Cambodia. Accordingly we desire take fullest advantage your visit. As Presidential adviser on FE matters, you should see Sihanouk and also such close advisers, e.g., Penn Nouth, Nhiek Tioulong Sonn San as Ambassador Sprouse recommends.

When you see Sihanouk suggest you reiterate how deeply touched President Johnson was at his message and draw on your personal knowledge of President Kennedy’s own feelings toward Sihanouk. You may reemphasize that he will continue to receive same full sympathy and consideration as before. In our note on aid we indicated that request for withdrawal of our aid does not alter our desire to maintain warm and friendly relations with RKG or diminish our interest in maintenance of Cambodia’s independence and neutrality. Assure him our assistance is being withdrawn without recrimination and with due attention to minimizing harmful effects therefrom. Assure him also that the new administration is as determined as previous administration that Chicoms shall not establish hegemony in Southeast Asia. If, as likely, Sihanouk brings up desire for neutrality guarantees you should say we will study any proposal sympathetically and carefully. He is aware of the difficulties that his previous proposal posed for us, but we desire to be as responsive as possible and it is this attitude that will motivate our consideration of his new proposal. (FYI only. In view of evidence that smuggling from Cambodia is important source of Viet Cong supplies, we may find it desirable to agree to neutrality proposals if they are otherwise manageable and can be used to obtain effective sealing of Cambodian-Vietnam border. End FYI.)

Recalling Hilsman’s conversation with Nong Kimny (Deptel 254 to Phnom Penh, 845 to Saigon)² inform Sihanouk from your personal knowledge how concerned President Kennedy was about Sihanouk’s unfounded suspicions of US connection with plotting against him and his government. You may say that President Johnson shares this concern. You might add that President Kennedy had personally assured himself no evidence exists of any involvement of the US or its officers with Khmer Serei. You may draw on Deptel 253 to Phnom Penh, info 844 Saigon³ and also Saigon’s 1065 to Dept, 140 to Phnom Penh.⁴ Say that in interest of good relations between us it only reasonable we should have explicit information on any alleged evidence US complicity. We feel sure we can refute completely any such charges and we should be given an opportunity to do so. Tell Sihanouk that we consider tranquillity SEA and good relations between its neighboring states of paramount importance. We deplore therefore the Khmer Serei provocative broadcasts. If Sihanouk asks what we are doing about them you may say we are doing what we can to locate and silence transmitters. Be receptive to any indication Sihanouk would like help in his own efforts to find them. Make clear if need be that although we are no more able to give commands to Thai and Vietnamese than we are to Cambodians we will do what we can. FYI. In this connection see Deptel 837 to Bangkok, 262 to Phnom Penh.⁵ End FYI.

Finally, we hope Sihanouk shares our belief that charges and counter-charges between states and unbridled public accusations can only lead to turmoil on which communism thrives. We are sure that he does not wish to see his country or SEA in general a breeding ground for communism and it is our fervent hope that he will exercise restraint and thereby contribute to improved atmosphere in the area.

If question aid arises and context seems opportune, you should tell him (without commitment) he should not hesitate return to seek such aid from US if Cambodia finds itself in difficulties because assistance is not forthcoming from France or other non-communist countries.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) CAMB. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Koren; cleared by Arzac, Hilsman, and Robert Komer of the NSC Staff; and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, London, Paris, Vientiane, and CINCPAC.
1. President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, on November 22. Forrestal had cabled Washington asking to return to Washington. Both McGeorge Bundy and Hilsman asked him to go to Phnom Penh, noting that “President Kennedy would have wanted you to carry on.” (Telegram 859 to Saigon, November 23; ibid.)
2. See footnote 2, Document 117.
3. Document 117.

4. In telegram 1065 from Saigon, November 23, the Embassy reported that a review of available information on Khmer Serei activities in South Vietnam indicated the following general picture:

   “Son Ngoc Thanh has for past several years (probably since 1959) supported group of about 200 rebels, half of whom are armed, deployed along border in Phuoc Long-Binh Long-Tay Ninh area. Group was apparently used by GVN to acquire intelligence (with little success) and to provide escorts for deliveries of unidentified packages (possibly opium) across border. Under Diem regime group was supported partly by GVN and partly through contributions solicited from ethnic Cambodians living in Viet Nam. Thanh’s brother Son Thai Nguyen was also subsidized by former GVN and worked among Khmer Krom in delta supplementing Thanh’s work and counteracting to some extent work of Khmer Kampuchea Krom (KKK), Cambodian irredentist movement supported clandestinely by RKG. While no hard evidence available, there are grounds for believing GVN support to KS included radio equipment.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL CAMBS.VIET)

5. In telegram 837 to Bangkok, November 25, the Department suggested that the change of government in South Vietnam and withdrawal of U.S. aid to Cambodia called for closer U.S.-Thai consultation. Ambassador Graham Martin was to discuss the situation with the highest effective level Thai officials and solicit Thai cooperation for dealing with Sihanouk. (Ibid., POL 1 FAR EAST-US)