422. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand 0

960. Your 957.1 Deeply appreciate your succinct and cogent description Thanat’s views on Laos. We all seriously concerned by. Thailand’s attitude this issue. We are determined press ahead with our present course as long as we see reasonable chance achieving acceptable peaceful settlement. At same time we must not in the process lose friendship of valuable ally such as Thailand. As in past we counting on you to pull us through this delicate period and will rely on your best judgment on way this can best be handled in Bangkok.

We share view your 9462 that full restatement to RTG of our position on Laos probably called for. Thorough and full discussions may help allay what appear be fears by Thanat that we operating behind Thailand’s back. The following appear to be major substantive issues at stake between us: [Page 897]

1.
The Lao Cabinet. As you know we agreed at Paris Foreign Ministers’ meeting3 to accept Souvanna if he lived up to certain conditions. He now very close to having met those conditions with a final settlement hinging largely on formation by Souvanna of government national union. Such government appears impossible and would in any event be fundamentally unsound unless Defense and Interior given to Center group. Present Lao Government cannot realistically expect hold both portfolios. If it insists on one the other must obviously go to PL. We believe PL control over either would be most serious from Thailand’s standpoint as well as our own. Moreover split control over these key ministries, each with its own armed personnel, would almost certainly produce instability in Laos. This would virtually ensure that one of major conditions Thailand seeks to avoid would occur: i.e., that Lao Government would find itself incapable preventing Laos from being used as corridor against neighbors. We therefore believe that Defense and Interior will have to go to the Center group and believe Thailand should support this view in its own best interests.
2.
Souvanna. We are aware Souvanna’s limitations but believe Thailand seriously underestimates his abilities. We have every confidence he will do his best maintain independent Laos. He certainly far more strongly anti-Communist and anti-PL than RTG believes. Souvanna will of course require strong outside support to make go of his government. We hope RTG will join us in providing this support. One of surest ways force him to move in wrong direction is for anti-Communist nations obstruct his legitimate efforts or give impression we lack faith in him.
3.
Phoumi’s Role. We are particularly gratified by Thanat’s categoric denial that RTG encouraging Phoumi to sabotage formation Souvanna govt. (As you know we are still receiving some evidence to contrary.) You may wish assure RTG that we continue have highest personal respect for Phoumi. He is dedicated leader and his anti-Communist stand has been firm and consistent. Despite our present differences we hope he will continue fill an important role in Lao political life.

Re para H reftel4 you may wish again express our sincere appreciation for Thailand’s invaluable assistance in Geneva conference on Laos and in contingency planning re Laos. You may also wish assure Thai that we have not changed our policies on Laos. As before we are continuing to seek a stable and effective independent government. We have insistently [Page 898] supported adequate safeguards for interests of West in any solution and will continue do so.

In broader context we counting on you to bring home to Thai insofar as possible fact our fundamental objectives in Laos similar and course US now on is in best interests of us both. As you have aptly indicated this not easy task. RTG unlikely fully accept our view re Souvanna but believe we should continue chipping away at this. Hope we can make more immediate progress in narrowing gap between our differing estimates probability of present unstable de facto division Laos being maintained for any extended period and advantages thereof. Thanat appears argue continuation status quo preferable to Souvanna government. Believe we should inform him we do not believe present uneasy situation Laos can be maintained nor that present RLG could withstand major Communist offensive. Situation likely deteriorate in direction inimical Thai interests unless prompt measures taken. Moreover while Thailand not facing immediate problem infiltration through Laos, GVN is. Effective neutral Lao government which Soviets committed as a co-chairman to maintain offers best alternative.

You should assure RTG there certainly no lessening of our concern for SEA or of our determination to meet our obligations in area. Quite opposite is case as shown by our increased assistance to South Vietnam and other measures. We continue of course to view Thailand as one of our best friends and most loyal allies. This is reason for past assurances we have given RTG. Thailand can continue count on our support under these commitments. If you believe it would be useful you may wish to review these with RTG.

You may draw fully on above at your discretion. We need not reiterate that we are aware of need reinforce our position on Thailand. We cannot yet give you firm answers to points referred to in paragraph K of your 9575 but we have been and will continue to press these as top priority issues. Meanwhile RTG should have no doubt as to our continued firm support and our determination to aid Thailand to fullest extent possible.6

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–762. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Masters; cleared by Cleveland, Cross, Rice, and U. Alexis Johnson; and approved by Harriman. Repeated priority to the Geneva FECON and to CINCPAC/POLAD.
  2. In telegram 957 from Bangkok, January 6, Young reported on his discussion during a “long and solemn evening alone” with Thanat on the issue of Laos. (Ibid.)
  3. In telegram 946 from Bangkok January 5, Young predicted “stormy weather” with the Thai Government over Laos, but suggested that “we may be able to ride through it if I again present strong, even categoric statement of US policy.” (Ibid., 751J.00/1–562)
  4. Reference is to a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, August 7, in which a unified policy for a coalition government in Laos was agreed upon; see vol. XXIV, pp. 345353.
  5. In this paragraph, Young reported that Thanat complained that the United States was ignoring the restraint, caution, and cooperation Thailand had displayed during the Laos crisis.
  6. In this paragraph, Young reported that the Thai Government’s apprehension and difficulties over Laos would be substantially relieved if it knew where the U.S. Government stood on SEATO reform and revitalization, on U.S. military support and assistance for Thailand, and on what the United States was prepared to do to help meet the threat to Northeast Thailand.
  7. In telegrams 969 and 970, both January 9, Young reported that he met with Sarit and Thanat on January 9, but because of garbles and delay in telegram 960, he could not use all the points suggested. Young described the meeting as “serious, argumentative, but not nasty.” The Thai leaders believed that U.S. policy in Laos was mistaken, but agreed to disagree with the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–962)