Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

51. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁰

Washington, March 16, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Burma Allegations of US/SEATO Involvement in Separatist Movements

1. The Central Intelligence Agency is not engaged in operational activities either in Burma or in Thailand which encourage or support Shan insurgency in any way. CIA is aware of the rumors which increased after the Burma Army coup, to the effect that SEATO members were in sympathetic contact with representatives of the Shan and Karen separatist ist movements. In reality, no element of the U.S. Government is in contact with such individuals nor is there any known basis for an allegation of involvement. Reliable reports indicate that Shan insurgent requests for arms and ammunition from the Thai and Lao Governments have been rejected.

2. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a Karen rebel leader who visited Bangkok 8–12 February 1962, had his requests for supplies parried by Colonel Chalermsak Chutavong of the Thai Joint Intelligence Directorate, and that Prince Na Kham, seeking aid for the Shans from the Royal Lao Government, was refused by General Ouan Rathikoun on 22 February. On 5 March General Wallop Rochanawisut, Director of the Joint Intelligence Directorate, Thai Ministry of Defense, stated that Shan representatives who recently contacted his government on the matter of support for their insurgency were told that they might be allowed to obtain food and medicine, but not arms and ammunition, because to supply the latter would jeopardize good relations between the Thai and Burmese Governments.

3. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Rangoon has expressed the feeling that the allegations and rumors may have been started by the Burma Army to support its coup, but now that the rumors have served their original purpose, Army leaders may be attempting to squelch them for fear that their continuance would jeopardize Burmese relations with the U.S. and Thai Governments.

4. It is recommended that the Thai Government be urged to make clear their position regarding allegations of support to the Shan insurgents. It is noted that Brigadier Aung Gyi, Vice Chief of Staff, Burma Army, and Air Chief Marshal Thawi Chulasap, have dealt directly on the problem of the KMT Irregulars in the past and are reportedly on good personal terms. This channel might be suggested to the Thais.¹

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files. Secret. At the request of John McCone, this memorandum was sent to Maxwell Taylor, U. Alexis Johnson, Roswell Gilpatric, and Robert Kennedy.
1. In a March 27 letter to E.H. Knoche, McCone’s assistant, U. Alexis Johnson noted that, in light of Sarit’s March 9 strong public reassurance that Thailand was not assisting the Shans and Ne Win’s acknowledgement of it, special assurance by key Thai military figures to Burma seemed unnecessary. (Ibid.)