57. Letter From the Ambassador to Burma (Everton) to President Kennedy 0

Dear Mr. President: Following an exchange of correspondence with Secretary Rusk,1 it appears desirable to request that I be relieved of my [Page 121] charge here on or about May 20 of this year. It is with genuine regret that we leave Burma but also with deep appreciation for the honor and privilege which has been accorded us in serving under your Administration.

In spite of the problems we have encountered with political changes which have occurred here, we have not lost faith in the long-run future of Burma, although present trends are not encouraging. As I have noted in my correspondence with Secretary Rusk, I consider the coming months to be critical in determining the success or failure of the present regime. I trust that there will not be an extended period between my departure and the arrival of my successor, as the Embassy will require the best resources at its command to serve effectively in this critical period. I hope that my successor may have enough in common with General Ne Win to assure a closer relationship than most of us in the Diplomatic Corps now enjoy. In Burma, personal relationships are all-important, and this is particularly true in the case of the General.

The next period in U. S.-Burmese relations is going to be difficult under any circumstances. Anti-Western feeling on the part of the government is intense and there is no assurance of any early abatement of this feeling. The government has chosen political and economic systems more compatible with those of the Eastern bloc than with our own. We may very well see further curtailment of U. S. Government programs in Burma within the next several months. The objective of freedom of choice is not viable here now. Our objectives to keep Burma non-aligned and independent are shared by the Ne Win regime.

Mr. President, I am aware of the fact that much of our attention must, of necessity, be centered on the Viet-Nams, Laoses, and Cubas. However, I wonder whether it is not possible to develop a form of preventive diplomacy for countries like Burma which will save us from coming to the brink of disaster before decisive action. I am not prepared to admit that Burma has gone beyond the point of no return yet but it will take all of our best efforts to avoid this happening. The room for maneuverability is steadily diminishing. I hope that sufficient attention can be devoted to this problem to prevent this strategically situated country from a complete subservience to communism.

To end on a more hopeful note, one needs to distinguish between the attitudes of the government and the attitudes of the people. In Burma I am persuaded that the vast majority of the people are committed to Western ideas and Western institutions, and they view with apprehension and concern the steady drift to the left. There is a substantial reservoir of good will among the people which is characterized by friendship for the West, by belief in parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. If these democratic impulses can be kept alive under a system of increasing indoctrination, both economic and political, then there is still some real hope for the long-run future of Burma. Part of our task is to discover [Page 122] ways in which we may continue to nourish and sustain these Western ideas in an increasingly hostile climate. This is no easy task but I am confident it can be accomplished with the right leadership. I have confidence in the essential soundness of the people of Burma and hope we can find ways to tap these resources.

If there is ever any way in which I may be of further use to your Administration, please feel free to call upon me. I leave your service with my very best wishes for your continuing success and high confidence in the welfare of our country under your wise guidance. Thank you once again for the privilege of serving in Burma.2

My very best wishes.

Respectfully yours,

John Scott Everton 3
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, PER Everton, John Scott. Confidential.
  2. [text not declassified] this correspondence [text not declassified] has not been found, [text not declassified].
  3. On May 18, Everton had a final private discussion with Ne Win that lasted over an hour. Their discussion covered a wide range of issues, and Everton used the occasion to suggest that free elections should be held and democracy instituted “at an appropriate time.” Ne Win stated it would take from 5 to 10 years before that was possible. (Memorandum of conversation, May 18; Department of State, Central Files, PER Everton, John Scott)

    Everton returned to Washington on June 5—his resignation took effect on May 20—for a 10-day period of consultation. He met with Rusk on 3 p.m. on June 14, but no substantive record of their conversation has been found. (Memorandum from Hilsman to Rusk, June 4; ibid., POL BURMA–US) He requested a meeting with the President on June 11. (Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, June 11; ibid.) According to the President’s Appointment Book, Kennedy did not see Everton. (Kennedy Library)

  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.