Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

58. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State⁰

Rangoon, August 11, 1963, 2 p.m.

90. Department pass DIA and Army for ACSI. CINCPAC for POLAD. Manila pass Felt. Ref Embtel 72.¹

Part I (of two parts). This message in two parts. Part I will list elements comprising background political situation Burma immediately following arrest Friday morning two a.m. principal pro-Western and pro-democratic leaders who remained at large following March 2, 1962 coup. Part II sets forth Embassy analysis including views re future developments.

Part I. Main elements comprising background current political situation (excluding more permanent factors such as geographic location, colonial history, etc.)

1. Inability U Nu’s UP government meet minimum standards of effectiveness during interregnum of military government. Failure Parliament function as law-making body of nation, due U Nu’s insistence upon complete personal control all aspects of government (excepting military which he “left unto Caeser”) and fact opposition (AFPFL) intimidated by knowledge army watching from wings and prepared retake government on any excuse, particularly that of sharp disagreement among the civilian politicians. Stagnation of economy.

2. Objectives of March 2, 1962 coup:

a. Excise former political leaders, and under leadership of army:

b. Re-establish national unity;

c. Vigorously propel country along road to socialism;

d. Create new political atmosphere which would have roots in his administration and constitute definite break with system of parliamentary democracy and former constitution.

3. Failure of RGUB:

a. Faulty implementation of socialist measures introduced without adequate preparation has resulted in sharp decline economic well-being peasants;

b. Attack on private enterprise has resulted in sharp decline in general business activity creating large-scale urban unemployment;

c. Disillusionment of virtually all other elements of populace—dissatisfaction of preponderant majority;

d. Minority insurgents sustained if not increased;

e. Dissatisfaction overwhelming majority of people with RGUB encouraged leaders of older political parties and, after period of about one year, served reawaken interest in former parties and leaders among people who resent army rule and see no future for themselves in new regime;

f. Impact of foregoing within armed forces, where dissatisfaction with regime combined in some circles by shock of seeing armed forces used as vehicle for expanding Communist influence in government. Departure of Brigadier Aung Gyi and Colonel Kyi Maung from army.

4. Absence of even single competent political leader within government of RC hierarchy. The lack of political sophistication on part of General Ne Win and his naivete in government—as distinct from army—matters should not be underestimated.

5. Visit of Liu Shao-chi last spring²—In any Burmese government, relations with Communist China form cornerstone foreign policy. General Ne Win appears to have become even more concerned than previous leaders or to have chosen use fear of China as a means of persuading others to support his regime. During last eighteen months this fear of China on part General has become increasingly evident.

6. Increasing unpopularity of his regime has caused the General to seek new sources of support.

a. Old line political leaders and parties are rejected—the purpose of the revolution was to rid the country of their influence. (However, he is reported to have recently stated that if it ever came to turning the government back to civilians he would rather [turn] it back to those he took it from than to Ba Swe, Kyaw Nyein and company.)

b. He considers minority insurgents as traitors wishing bring down the nation—no room for agreement except on terms which provide for centralized control and authority.

c. The Communists, in eyes of the General (according to many who know him well) are nationalists at heart. They may advocate extreme form of government but they stand for a united Burma. Furthermore, the mission of government in Burma has ever been to develop a socialist state. Finally, there is requirement to develop Burmese state along lines least apt prove irritating to Communist China while providing for continued independence.

7. For the past three months the major efforts of General Ne Win directed towards reaching accommodation with the Communist insurgents, including [garble—both?] Red and White Hag.³ Embassy does not know conditions General would find acceptable in agreement establishing peace between government and these factions, but it significant that negotiations have been progressing so long and that they have recently provided an opportunity for the General to bring back from China, and the Chinese leaders to send back, twenty or more Burmese White Flag Communist leaders, including the deputy party leader and senior military commander. These leaders had been given refuge in China (some for ten years or more) and heretofore all efforts of Burmese leaders to meet them or discuss their status with the Chinese have been unavailing. Bo Zeya, one of the returned leaders, was a “brother” of the General’s in the “Thirty Comrades”.⁴ Bo Ye Htut, military leader of the BCP in Burma, is another of the “Thirty Comrades” to come above ground in recent months.

8. Concurrently there have been discussions with minority insurgents, but except for the left-wing Karen group they have not appeared promising. Negotiations with the right-wing Karen forces slated to begin soon, preliminary talks having provided a basis for further talks. No other minority insurgent groups representing significant numbers appear prepared negotiate seriously. Success with Karen factions might start a minority move toward settling differences with the RGUB.

9. Obvious lack popular support for regime, evidence army division and growing evidence that General is prepared make some sort arrangement with Communists combined to convince leading non-Communist political leaders and many other interested observers that the present an opportune time in which endeavor coalesce opposition into effective anti-government force if they are to be in position take advantage stresses they believe are bound to surface in agricultural areas at harvest time, next November and December.

10. Calls to resistance issued first by U Ba Swe on July 19 and followed by U Win, and the subsequent circulation of these speeches at rallies their respective political parties throughout nation.

11. Inauguration of a series of Phongyi rallies which while ostensibly focused on Buddhist matters in fact constituted first public organized anti-government demonstrations.

12. Continuation of RGUB-Communist discussions, supplemented last week by reports that U Nu (some reports add Justice Myint Thein) had been moved to the government guest house, where General Ne Win had also taken up residence and that he had a series of discussions with the General. (Embassy believes these reports accurate.)

13. Prompt RGUB announcement in support of the partial test ban treaty, published on the same day that the ChiComs issued blast and subsequent decision of RGUB to sign on August 14.

14. For one month the RGUB has been deferring signing FY-63 MAP agreement.

Foregoing list not all inclusive and might well have included several earlier developments. One earlier event of particular importance in reviewing current situation in Burma is purge of Brigadier Maung Maung and other high-level pro-Western officers from army in February 1961.

End Part I.

Part II.

1. The imprisonment of eleven of the most influential pro-democratic and pro-Western leaders under circumstances prevailing Burma today, and in particular at time when Revolutionary Council engaged in serious negotiations with Communist underground leaders—including leaders who have returned from China for these negotiations—constitutes another major move in the direction of a Communist-oriented government.

2. Given the apparent ascendancy of Chinese influence in the Burmese underground Communist movement, the return of about twenty top BCP leaders from China for the current negotiations and the growing prestige and influence of the underground Communist groups in the over-all Communist movement in Burma, this move toward Communism also constitutes a move in the direction of establishing greater Chinese Communist influence in Burmese internal affairs.

3. While Burmese position of neutrality and non-alignment may not be overtly affected by this development, the quality of Burmese neutrality will change; henceforth Burmese neutrality will to an increased degree be a matter of lese majesté on the part of the ChiComs. As Burma has always considered China first in any major foreign policy issue, this is a shift in degree rather than kind, but a shift which alters the essential quality of Burmese neutrality. Some support for the foregoing is found in a report of the Japanese Ambassador’s conversation yesterday with a high official in the Foreign Office, in the course of which the Ambassador inquired whether the return of the Burmese Communists from China did not constitute Chinese interference in Burmese internal affairs. The Foreign Office official promptly replied: “Oh no! Proof that isn’t so is the fact that we are signing the test ban treaty.”

4. I do not think the General is deliberately leading his country into the ChiCom orbit. I believe that in recent months he has come to believe that his first objective in foreign affairs must be to protect Burma from what he finds be an increasing danger of a Chinese takeover and that he believes the best chance of doing this is by establishing an internal regime compatible with the Communist regime across the border. Whether the report is accurate or not, I believe his attitude is reflected in a recent report of a conversation in which he is alleged to have stated that “the Americans and the British will never attack us, but they will never fight for us”. In my own mind I think it possible that to some extent the General may exaggerate this fear of China to convince others of the necessity of going along with the new order he envisions for Burma.

5. Conceivably the General may have been trapped by his confidence in being able to wean away from the Communists his former army colleagues (Bo Ye Htut, Bo Zeya) who he hoped would join his leftist-oriented national peace movement which would also be led by other members of the “Thirty Comrades” and be based on the army. There is a theory that one reason for the return of the BCP group from China was the fear that this might happen, a fear which may have been justified according to statements made by Bo Ye Htut both before and after the return of the BCP group from China. By the time the Communists from China made known their opposition to such a development, the General may have been too deeply committed to pull out. Quite apart from this caricature, it would appear that the General had crossed the Rubicon when he permitted the BCP men to return for these negotiations, for at that time he must have recognized that from then on he had to come to some agreement with this group or incur the displeasure of the Chinese, a risk I cannot conceive of him taking in his present frame of mind.

6. The release of the three Thakin leaders of U Nu’s Cabinet may be a balancing act to take some of the sting out of the announcement of the arrests but it probably also serves the purpose of unloading some men he no longer needed to keep in jail and might also foretell Thakin support for his regime. The Thakin faction of the UP Party has appeared prepared to join the General since the first week after the coup, but were embarrassed by the continued detention of U Nu. I believe more Thakins will be released in coming weeks, and that there will be more arrests of democracy leaders.

7. We do not know anything about the conversations between U Nu and the General. The general impression in political circles is that the General has not yet succeeded in getting U Nu to front for him. One contact with a connection with the detainees says that U Nu continues to sign his chits and other papers “Maung Nu, P. M.” My own impression of U Nu at the time he was arrested is that he had ceased to be in contact with political reality. The release of the Thakins does not necessarily indicate that a deal has been made between the General and U Nu. U Nu had resigned from the party leadership before the coup, Thakin Tin is the nominal leader and it would have been characteristic of U Nu to have advised the others that they are free to follow any course they choose.

8. It is questionable whether Thakin support could significantly alter the general picture of non-support for the regime. Support by the Communists would tend to solidify the anti-Communist opposition (the U Bos and the AFPFL are virtually united now) to the regime, but, in theory at least, there might be a favorable reaction among the peasants if they ceased to be the object of Communist Party attention. In fact, one cannot expect the Communists to reduce their political activity as a result of any agreement with the regime.

9. Conversations with U Ba Swe, U Kyaw Nyein, U Win, and other AFPFL stalwarts since their arrests lead me to expect a definite move to open up a new insurgent front led by AFPFL and U Bo secondary leaders who are already positioned in the districts and who have some arms. I do not feel capable of foretelling public reaction, but unless these elements are joined by army units, I do not think that they can do more than mount harassing actions for the foreseeable future. I believe the basic concept is that they will be organized and in being should opposition to the government reach an explosive degree among the peasants or should an opportunity develop for action with disaffected elements of the army

10. Elements working toward a counter-coup will be encouraged, a basic question is where will they find leadership. I do not believe Brigadier Aung Gyi will assume such a role until he finds there is an effective organization in being with a good chance of succeeding. I would expect other potential leaders to be picked up in the near future. I anticipate that the top leadership of the army will remain loyal to the General or leave the army, but will it start a three-pronged civil war.

11. There are reports that Colonels Chit Myaing, Khin Nyo and Saw Myint objected to the arrest and asked to resign from the RC. There are also reports they have been arrested, but not confirmed.

12. I anticipate that the Burmese will soon have to reconsider our MEDT program (if they are not doing so right now) but that our other relations will not change abruptly. For some time the Burmese will be anxious to avoid the impression that they have fallen deep into the Chinese area of influence and I tend to think the Chinese will accommodate them although their dispute with the Soviets might result in their talking a harder line. I expect the Burmese will be particularly anxious to avoid measures which would cause concern to the Thais. I think Soviet influence will not be much affected as it does not appear to be very marked, but that Embassy’s relations with the Communists will prove even less fruitful.

Schnee

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BURMA. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, New Delhi, Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Manila, Hong Kong, CINCPAC, and Mandalay.
1. Telegram 72, August 6, reported that Ne Win seemed on the point of making a major decision on negotiations with minority and Communist insurgents. Although unable to predict whether major concessions would alienate the Burmese Army enough to act, the Embassy recommended a “policy of quiet observation” and stated its intention to offer recommendations “should the situation jell.” (Ibid.)
2. Chairman of the People’s Republic of China Liu Shao-chi and Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Burma April 20–26.
3. The Burma Communist Party, founded in 1939, split in 1946 over doctrinal and personal differences into two factions, the Communist Party (Burma) (CPB) or Red Flag Party and the Burma Communist Party (BCP) or White Flag Party. By the early 1960s, the two parties were operating independently in trying to overthrow the government. The Red Flag’s strength was estimated to be around 200 while the White Flag had approximately 1,000 members. Neither was a real military threat to the Burmese Government. (Telegram 108 from Rangoon, August 19; Department of State, Central Files, CSM 9–6 Burma)
4. The Thirty Comrades was a group of Burmese nationalists given military training by the Japanese during World War II. They formed the core of the Burma Independence Army.