59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Burma 0
57. Ref: Embtel 134.1 While sharing Embassy’s concern over disturbing trends in Burma, particularly in this latest phase of efforts made by Burma since independence to control its own left-wing and seek accommodation with China, Department nevertheless believes MEDT/MAP is one of most important of the few avenues open to US for maintaining some influence in Burma. Precisely because of risks implicit in current Burmese political maneuverings, we believe it is important that US not give up or jeopardize this key tool which serves to maintain US position and keeps open to Burma, during this difficult period, the possibility of an alternative to increasing dependence on China. Moreover, an eleventh-hour refusal to conclude agreement would not only discourage pro-free world elements of Armed Services but might counter-productively tend to push RGUB further into Chinese arms rather than the reverse. As Embassy points out, refusal to sign Agreement is a one-shot action which, in absence of some clearly demonstrable threat or provocation, would achieve no useful purpose. As indicated Deptel [ Embtel ] 99,2 we believe [agree!] that present circumstances do not call for US refusal to sign Agreement to which we are clearly deeply committed through past negotiations.
We recognize desirability of frank exchanges views between US and RGUB, but believe approach to Ne Win at this time, relating MEDT to political trends in Burma, would be interpreted by Ne Win as an unacceptable pressure tactic and might well lead to Burmese termination MEDT, thereby causing US to lose this foothold without gaining any political advantages thereby. Therefore, you are instructed to proceed with arrangements to exchange signatures at earliest date convenient to GUB.
[Page 130]We have noted RGUB desire to exchange notes informally at relatively low-level, but do not think this destroys value of program to US nor does it destroy its political rationale. As Embassy points out, RGUB may desire soft-pedal signing because of Chinese audience. On other hand, RGUB willingness delegate signing of future notes to military channels may also reflect fact MEDT has been fully accepted at political levels as a stable part of Burma’s program which can be handled in future on military technical level. Therefore we see no objection to informal signing by either you as Chargé d’Affaires or Col. Naudts as Chief, MEDT. Presumably whoever signs for Burma will be given full authority to sign. Hope you can arrange final signature by end first week September as desired by Burmese. Do not desire delay until arrival Ambassador Byroade who would prefer to have this matter disposed of satisfactorily before engaging in talks with Ne Win.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–2 US–BURMA. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hannah and cleared by Henry A. Byroade who was appointed Ambassador to Burma on September 10, Heinz, John S. Thompson of INR/RFE, Carl F. Salans of L/FE, and the Program Coordination Staff of AID. Repeated to CINCPAC, New Delhi, Bangkok, and Hong Kong.↩
- In telegram 134, August 29, the Embassy commented on and made recommendations on the Burmese request for an exchange of notes on the FY 1963 Military Assistance Program. The Embassy’s main concern was whether Burmese-Chinese relations had become so close that Burmese independence could not be furthered by the agreement. The Embassy also noted that failure to sign an agreement might impel Burma into even closer association with its neighbor China. The Embassy Country Team recommended that Chargé Schnee request a chance to explore the matter with General Ne Win before making a decision. (Ibid., DEF 19 US–BURMA)↩
- Dated August 13. (Ibid.)↩