Attached is a copy of the memorandum which Mr. Steeves took for the Secretary’s signature last night.
Attachment3
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman is
expected in Washington for discussion of substantive issues affecting
Thailand within the next two weeks. He will meet with you and with me.
To cope with his assertions that SEATO
is not effective as presently constituted and needs to be changed, I
believe it may be desirable to explore with him a change in the
organization’s voting formula.
In substitution for the present rule of unanimity, under which any member
of SEATO can prevent action by the
organization, we might propose an arrangement similar to that applying
under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio
Pact).4 Major decisions would then
be taken by vote of a majority of the members, but no member would be
required to use its armed forces without its consent. Whether to favor a
majority vote (5 of the 8 members) or a three-fourths vote (6 of the 8
members) is a matter for further discussion.
The Government of Thailand is concerned that France and the United
Kingdom may prevent SEATO military
action which other members of the organization would be ready to
undertake, and wants assurance that this will not occur. This sentiment
underlies Thailand’s desire for a bilateral defense treaty with the
United States. Foreign Minister [Page 23]
Thanat has already warned that his
government is prepared to request that one of two changes in SEATO be made not later than the next
Council meeting of foreign ministers in April 1962. These are: (1)
withdrawal of “those countries unwilling to defend Southeast Asia”, or
(2) a change in the rule of unanimity.
Although there are indications of some exaggeration by the Foreign
Minister, our assessment is that Thailand is genuinely concerned, in the
light of developments in Laos, that if the need arises, SEATO would be paralyzed by French and
British unwillingness to take military action in defense of Thailand.
This concern will be heightened if the Harriman–Souvanna
Phouma talks result in a decision by the United States to
accept Souvanna Phouma as Prime
Minister of Laos—a move about which Thailand has expressed grave
reservations and which it has consistently opposed. Although our
immediate problem is with Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines have
also openly criticized British and French restraints in SEATO. Even the Australians have informed
us privately of their concern with British policy in the
organization.
If Thanat should feel that we are
unwilling to consider any change in SEATO, he will probably take his case against the British
and French to the press, and increase his pressure upon us for a
bilateral defense treaty. Failing satisfaction in these moves, I foresee
that Thailand will withdraw from SEATO
in favor of a neutralist policy. Strong pressures toward this are
already being exerted by the USSR
through its Ambassador in Bangkok. If Thailand withdraws, we will be
confronted with the dissolution of SEATO, which could only be interpreted as a major defeat
for the United States at a critical juncture in history, and the
possible negotiation of some new treaty arrangement in the Pacific
area.
On balance, therefore, I conclude that the change in the voting formula
is the least troublesome of the prospective developments before us. It
would lessen Thai pressure for a bilateral treaty by otherwise providing
Thailand the security assurances it seeks in a form to which it could
refer publicly as it cannot do with our highly classified unilateral
assurances. It would allow the British and the French a means to avoid
involvement of their forces in Southeast Asia without preventing action
by other members of SEATO in the name
of the organization. Finally, Senate action would not be required since
the voting procedure is governed by Terms of Reference adapted by the
Council of Foreign Ministers and is not stipulated in the treaty
itself.
I must emphasize, however, that if British and French restraint were thus
eliminated, the burden of responsibility for decision in respect of
military action will fall almost entirely upon the United States. We
know, at the same time, that we have the staunch support of
Australia.
We distinguish between the SEATO
policies of France and the United Kingdom. Although the United Kingdom
SEATO policy is [Page 24] undoubtedly one of restraint, we believe
that it would ultimately commit its forces if the United States were
going to do so in any event—at least under conditions consonant with our
bilateral discussions. DeGaulle,
however, has made it clear to you that France has no intention of
committing any French forces in Southeast Asia no matter what the
circumstances. In any event, it seems unreasonable that either should
insist upon the right to oppose military action by SEATO which others are prepared to take
if they should decide not to commit forces and are free from obligation
to do so.
Before discussing this solution with Foreign Minister Thanat, we believe it proper to consult
with the Australians, the British, and the French. Because the rule of
unanimity was discussed at some length in the Senate hearings when the
treaty was adopted, we also believe it essential to inform the foreign
affairs committees of the Congress in advance of our discussions with
the Thai Foreign Minister.
In summary, we propose to acquiesce in a Thai initiative to change the
rule of unanimity proposing instead that decisions be taken by majority
vote with no member obligated to use its armed forces without its
consent. If this is agreed, in preparation for Foreign Minister
Thanat’s visit here within the
next week or two, we will proceed immediately to talk with the
Australians, the British, the French, and the foreign affairs committees
of the Congress.
