169. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk1

SUBJECT

  • Toward a Strategy for the United States in the United Nations

Now that the Resumed Session of the United Nations General Assembly has adjourned, it is none too early to be planning for the General Assembly session in the fall, and more generally for the future of the United Nations. In this memorandum I will suggest a widespread program of consultation with governments on UN matters.

I

Before coming to recommendations on procedure, I think it would be useful to set forth some facts of life about the UN.

1.
As we all know, the growing importance of the UN combined with rigid application of the one country-one vote principle, makes for increasing difficulty in mobilizing a two-thirds majority in the Assembly for sensible and moderate programs and policies. The presence of “swirling majorities” in the Assembly in turn tends to raise the emotional temperature of the atmosphere in debates in the smaller councils, notably in the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council, but to some extent in the Economic and Social Council as well.
2.
However, the Resumed Session did demonstrate that it remains possible, even in a General Assembly of 99 members with 25 African states in attendance, to keep action (as differentiated from talk) under control. Despite our well-publicized difficulties in New York during the last few weeks, there was literally no (repeat no) action item which was able to get a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly over our active opposition. The Arab bloc could not sell its proposal for Alien Property Custodian in Palestine. The Mexican resolution on Cuba fell far short of a two-thirds vote. The provisions in the Indian resolution calling for Belgian withdrawal from the Congo within 21 days and the threat of sanctions were not approved. Even the demand for economic sanctions against the Union of South Africa because of its apartheid policy was not accepted.
3.
On the other hand, a two-thirds vote was put together, with much sweat and sleeplessness, for acceptable resolutions on (a) the Cuban situation, (b) financing the Congo operation, (c) reaffirming the [Page 334] UN role in the Congo, (d) exhortations to the Portuguese on Angola and to the Belgians on Ruanda Urundi, (e) approving and implementing the plebiscite to split the Cameroun trust territory, (f) a Credentials Committee report recommending that the Assembly take “no decision” on Hungarian credentials, and (g) several non-controversial items, including the US–USSR resolution deferring General Assembly discussion of disarmament.
4.
Thus in the actual event, the less constructive proposals were defeated and the most necessary actions taken. It must of course be recognized that the absence of economic and social items on the agenda of the Resumed Session, the decision to defer the disarmament debate, and the deadline set for adjournment contributed to this result. The Assembly did not consider certain questions on which we have the greatest difficulty mustering either a blocking third or a two-thirds majority. While no agreement was reached on a “bob-tailed” session, this was in fact what we got.
5.
The picture is by no means of swirling majorities under the leadership of the Soviet Union defeating the US at every turn. The US is not-yet at least-being defeated at every turn; and the swirling majorities are far from being subject to Soviet leadership. Indeed, the Soviets do not operate in such a way as to exercise the leadership they could in this forum, since they take a relatively extreme position on nearly every issue, often change their positions suddenly in the later stages of debate, and have not yet learned to use their financial influence in the UN. (They could jeopardize the Congo operation far more by participating in its financing and then threatening to withdraw than by boycotting the agreed assessment from the outset.)
6.
In the midst of all these stirring parliamentary events, highly significant executive operations are going on outside of the Assembly debates. The UN Emergency Force continues to sit on the Gaza Strip. The mediation machinery in the Middle East survives the April 20 Israeli parade in Jerusalem. By far the most important of all, the UN executive has been building its Congo force back up to nearly 20,000 again, in spite of earlier defections. Also during this period, the UN is managing a sufficient show of firmness to convince the central Congolese Government that the best way to get rid of the UN in the long run is to cooperate with it in the short run. At the same time, unnoticed and unsung, the UN Congo staff is conducting in the technical, economic and financial fields one of the world’s largest civilian advisory operations.
7.
In spite of all the talk about the devastating effects of the Soviet attack on the Secretary General, that estimable executive clearly won the 1960–61 round in what will doubtless be a continuing fight.[Page 335]Khrushchev came in like a lion with his proposal last fall for a tripartite Secretary General; Gromyko ascertained in March that in its present form this proposal was strictly no sale; and Zorin was duly instructed to go out like a lamb.

The predicted timidity of the Secretariat, as a result of the Soviet attack, has materialized among subordinates to some extent, but is not much in evidence in the Secretary General’s office. Mr. Hammarskjold is currently working out a new “UN presence” in connection with the difficulties between Cambodia and South Vietnam. And some of the countries most concerned with avoiding trouble in West New Guinea are, in consultation with Mr. Hammarskjold, putting together a proposal for a new UN operation—a trusteeship over that disputed territory.

II

These are lessons that can be derived from past experience. If we look now to the future of the United Nations, some additional facts of life are discernible.

8.
There is hardly a major subject in international politics which does not have a United Nations angle, presently or prospectively. To put the same thought another way, nearly every major matter handled by every Foreign Office in the world had to be handled both in bilateral diplomatic channels and in the multilateral channels of international organization.
9.
Every United Nations matter (thus, by the definition I have just suggested, nearly every major matter of foreign policy) is sooner or later subjected to the full glare of international publicity. The United Nations has become a world news center rivaling and, on some subjects, upstaging the traditional news centers of London and Washington.
10.
The United Nations and other international organizations are developing and can much further develop a capacity to take executive action on behalf of the world community as a whole. The unnoticed lesson of the events of the past few weeks is the great potential importance to our national interest of these international operations. The Kennedy Administration inherited three prime trouble spots: the Congo, Laos, and Cuba. It is not without meaning that of these three, we have had to move backwards or sideways on Cuba and Laos, where either no international field operation has been developed (Cuba) or the UN operation was inadequate for the task (Laos). In the Congo the presence of a field operation maintained by an international organization has enabled us to move forward (by fits and starts, to be sure) precisely because the world community can “intervene in the name of non-intervention” while a single nation, however powerful, cannot. The development of [Page 336] the United Nations operational capability should now be a central target of American foreign policy.
11.
It will be important, as we go along, not to confuse actions and operations with the rhetoric and symbolism of public debates. We have to be able to operate at the level of symbolism as well as the level of reality; but in order to do so successfully it is important not to confuse the one with the other. At the symbolic level, for example, we can assume that the imprecision of resolutions and the extremism of rhetorical hyperbole will continue to increase as the square of the membership in the General Assembly—and can afford to be a good deal more relaxed about it if we have learned to apply our dignity and our power effectively in support of UN operations.
12.
For the new nations and their even newer representatives, the discussions in the General Assembly and the smaller United Nations Councils and Commissions, including the regional commissions and the Specialized Agencies, have a very important role to play as a global training ground for responsibility. The development of voting blocs in the Assembly is deplored by some people; yet they are not only inevitable in so large a body but also potentially a force for more responsible actions by individual delegates. During the Cuban debate, the Nigerian delegate proposed to amend the Latin American resolution in an unfriendly way; he was brought to his senses by a Latin American threat to prevent a two-thirds majority for a resolution on the Cameroun issue that was favorable to the Nigerian point of view. The immersion of excitable diplomats in practical politics of this kind has its educational value.

As we work through the final years of the colonial era, for example, the primary problems facing the new nations will not be those associated with generating opposition to the “colonialists” or speeding the day of self-determination for their non-self-governing brothers. The primary problem for the leaders of these nations—in different ways in Africa, Asia and Latin America—is how to govern their own societies effectively and by the consent, whether or not expressed in traditional forms, of their own people. The task of institution building for social and economic development; the invention of appropriate forms of public communication and political leadership; the recruitment and training of internal security forces at once politically loyal and militarily effective; the reconciliation of a mystique of nationalism with the hard facts of international interdependence—these are the big items on the agenda for the national leaders of the less-developed parts of the world. It will be important for us, and for others of the “more developed nations”, to find ways of making sure that these leaders and their successors are continually reminded of the obligations of public responsibility, which are not only (in the words of the [Page 337] Charter) “to promote social progress and better standards of life” but to do so “in larger freedom,” protecting “fundamental human rights” and “the dignity and worth of the human person”, and “to practice tolerance and live in peace with one another as good neighbors.”

III

If the United Nations is to be made more effectively operational, if the symbolic debates are to be used to put pressure on the newer and more revolutionary governments as well as on the older and more democratic ones, if the United Nations is to fulfill its mission as a training ground for public responsibility, then there will have to be some changes made in the way we have traditionally operated in the United Nations. Most of them are obvious from this rehearsal of “the facts of life”; and some are already contemplated or under way in New York.

For example:

1.
The United States Mission in New York, taken as a whole, needs to be on a day to day first-name relationship with about 600 key individuals in 98 national delegations. The subject matter of this relationship cannot and should not be limited to tactics on particular issues that may arise in the United Nations; it should instead be a process of continual consultation across the whole range of shared concerns about foreign policy. This requirement raises important problems about recruitment of staff, and the assignment of political officers from the Department at peak periods; it also makes the question of quarters allowances and representational funds in New York an important matter of United States foreign policy.
2.
The requirements of the situation argue for a strong United States delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, with a minimum number of delegates (preferably none) who are there for show rather than for hard diplomatic work. The delegation should be of the highest professional caliber.
3.
We also require urgently a modernization of our communications system with New York. When quick instructions are required in New York, we are having to send them over an ordinary, open telephone line. We are looking into ways to assure instantaneous and secure transmission to New York so that the long telegraphic delays are avoided as well as open telephone calls.
4.
The planning of our work in the Department and in New York should provide for careful advance preparation through diplomatic channels (and on some issues in the public prints as well) on each item of each General Assembly agenda—and major items in the Councils, too.
5.
The United States Embassy in each UN country needs to be generally familiar with United States thinking on the United Nations angles [Page 338] to all major questions of foreign policy—not only those which happen to be of concern in that particular country or region. Thus the United States Ambassador in Baghdad should be briefed on any change in thinking on Korea; the United States Ambassador to Japan should know what we intend to do about the African item; the United States Ambassador in Buenos Aires should be brought up to date on the Palestine Refugee problem; and so on around the circle.
6.
We should arrange full and frequent discussions between responsible officers of the Department and of USUN with the Foreign Office people in key countries, particularly those officials who formulate instructions to their delegates in New York. This can partly be done by embassies on the basis of instructions from the Department; but there is much that can be accomplished in informal views across the whole range of United Nations affairs. You and I have already discussed plans for visits on my part to some of the European capitals for this purpose; later it may be useful to cover key bases in other parts of the world.

We surely have the courage and leadership to organize to do this job right not only in New York but in Washington and in every diplomatic post overseas. Whether the Congressional support for a first-rate effort will be forthcoming cannot be predicted; but the Congress has normally responded when the full weight of Presidential leadership has been publicly placed behind a major foreign policy push. In agreement with Ambassador Stevenson, I will shortly be making further detailed proposals to improve our technique and our capacity for effective “parliamentary diplomacy”.

Beyond repairing the repairable deficiencies in technique, our preparations need to cover a detailed assessment of the situation surrounding each item now or likely to be on the agenda of the XVI session of the General Assembly, now scheduled to begin September 19, 1961, at the United Nations in New York. Here again detailed analyses and recommendations are in preparation at USUN and in the Department. They will be presented for your review as they are ready, in an effort to avoid the last-minute pile-up of United Nations policy questions and to emphasize the strategic rather than the merely tactical issues involved.

There are, however, three overriding questions on which it is necessary to develop a general sense of direction, as they affect nearly all the more specific items on the United Nations agenda. These three questions are:

  • —The financing and management of an operational United Nations
  • —The Secretary-General and “tripartitism”
  • —The issue of Chinese Communist representation in the United Nations.

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IV

Financing and Management of Operations

I have referred earlier to the symbolism which the UN represents-a parliament of peoples from the nations of the world replete with rhetoric and resolutions which at times appear to counter the aims of American foreign policy-and to the need for making a distinction between undisciplined parliamentarianism and the responsibility of executive operations. I venture to predict that the coming months will require, perhaps more so than in previous years, serious deliberations by this Government whether or not to use the UN as an “executive agent” in areas experiencing political, economic or social upheaval. If it should be determined that the UN will be so employed then we must do some rethinking about its managerial capacity.

Because of the one country-one vote principle the political debates which may rage around the UN presence in troubled areas of the world are inevitable. Inevitably, criticism will be heaped upon whatever agent—be it this Government, a consortium of countries or the UN—is employed to maintain peace and security. But this principle and criticism should not be allowed to throttle the tools required for the task.

Peace and security is a responsibility of every nation, but our foreign aid effort is testimony to the fact that every nation does not have the wherewithal to meet the cost of attaining these goals. These nations are also members of the UN. And here, many countries are finding it impossible to meet the costs of UN peace and security operations based on the prevailing assessment scale.

To continue this system will pit against each new proposal for an operating function three groups of delegates—those, like the Soviets, who are opposed to the development of operating functions at all; those who think that the particular operation proposed might adversely affect their national interest; and those who believe the proposed operation will be too expensive for their treasuries.

The last category of countries is able to meet less costly obligations such as those supporting the UN Special Fund, the Expanded Technical Assistance Program and certain refugee activities. They are in fact, willing to delegate action to the governing bodies directing such activities. Thus, it appears to us that these precedents might be applied to emergency operations. To be sure, such operations have political implications far greater than UN technical assistance or refugee relief, and the General Assembly would continue to remain the forum for the airing of views on these questions.

But a large share of the financing burden of peace and security operations must inevitably fall on UN members with a capacity to pay. [Page 340] If there are a number of such operations, the burden probably will fall on the same members. The membership as a whole is probably willing to contribute moderate amounts annually toward peace and security (say $18–20 million), but some other provision has to be made for the bulk of the expense of an operation such as the Congo.

We are considering presently a number of alternative means of financing, including a plan which would provide for loans to a UN emergency fund with initial capital to come from the capital exporting countries and with repayments to be made by all UN members over a number of years. Any such arrangement should, following a determination that emergency action must be taken, be accompanied by a delegation of authority from the General Assembly to a consortium of nations making the major contributions to the operation both in cash and in kind. This consortium would then support and advise the United Nations executive in carrying out the operation. As long as the one member-one vote principle prevails, it is unlikely that the Assembly would be willing to delegate outright the political control of such an operation to a consortium group. It might, however, be willing to give such a group, in recognition of its contribution, a greater voice, perhaps in an advisory capacity, in the management of the operation. Without such a delegation of authority it is doubtful that continuing financial support of the major contributing powers could be expected and maintained.

In the absence of some such arrangement it is feared that the peace and security efforts of the UN will take on a quixotic character whose weakness adds to the strategy of the Sino Soviet Bloc, receives the derision of a De Gaulle, and causes erosion of United States support.

The Secretary General and “Tripartitism”

Another major question of strategy arises from the Soviet attack on both the Office of Secretary General and on the Secretary General personally. Dag Hammarskjold’s present term of office expires in the spring of 1963. The question of what happens after that will be on the agenda of the 17th General Assembly, convening in September 1962 since Article 97 of the Charter provides that the Secretary General shall be appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. This question will therefore presumably be under active consideration during the summer of 1962, hardly a year from now.

The first General Assembly, in its appointment of the first Secretary General, followed the recommendation of the United Nations Preparatory Commission that he be appointed for a five-year term. (The Commission also recommended that the Security General be eligible for reappointment for a further five years.) When in 1950 Trygve Lie’s term was about to [Page 341] expire, the Security Council, meeting in closed session, was unable to reach a recommendation because of lack of unanimity among the permanent members. (The USSR vetoed the reappointment of Lie because of his strong support of the United Nations action in Korea and the United States let it be known that it was prepared to veto anyone other than Lie.) The General Assembly then adopted by a show of hands vote of 46 to 6 (Soviet bloc), with 8 abstentions, a resolution in which the Assembly simply “decides that the present Secretary General shall be continued in office for a period of three years.” The legality of the action was challenged by the Soviet bloc and certain other members. It was justified on the grounds that the Assembly having set the term of office could extend it and that it was essential to insure the uninterrupted exercise of the functions vested by the Charter in the Office of Secretary General.

Trygve Lie, whom the USSR refused to recognize as Secretary General after the extension of his term, submitted his resignation in November 1952. In April 1953, acting on the recommendation of the Security Council, the General Assembly appointed Dag Hammarskjold and decided that “the terms of appointment of the second Secretary General shall be the same as those of the first Secretary General” (i.e., a five-year term). In 1957, Hammarskjold was reappointed by unanimous vote in both the Council and the Assembly, later deciding the “terms of appointment . . . . during his second term of office shall be the same as during his first term.”

Khrushchev, in his address to the General Assembly on September 23, 1960, proposed replacement of the Secretary General by a “collective, effective body of the United Nations comprising three persons, each of whom would represent a certain group of states” (i.e., “colonialist,” “socialist”, and “neutralist”). This proposal followed the forced withdrawal of Soviet bloc personnel from the Congo and endorsement of the Secretary General’s role there by the Fourth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly after a Soviet veto in the Security Council. Khrushchev enlarged upon his proposal in the Assembly on October 3, stating not only that “we” do not and cannot trust Mr. Hammarskjold but also that “any other Secretary General will also fail objectively to represent the interests of the three different groups of states.” Soviet spokesmen subsequently explicitly extended this tripartite concept beyond the Office of the Secretary General to include the Secretariat, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council and its functional commissions and have raised it in other international meetings, such as the current Nuclear Test Ban talks and the recent Conference on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities.

On February 14, 1961, the USSR issued an official statement on the situation in the Congo, denouncing the Secretary General and declaring that “the Soviet Government will not maintain any relations with [Page 342] Hammarskjold and will not recognize him as an official of the United Nations.” The Soviet bloc has since refused to have any official communication with the Secretary General. The response among the UN membership generally has, however, been so negative that the USSR did not really make an issue of the Secretary General at the resumed General Assembly. A Guinean proposal to delete in the Congo resolution a request to the Secretary General to take executive action was defeated 83 to 11, with 5 abstentions. While the USSR will undoubtedly continue to press its tripartite proposal and to attack Hammarskjold personally, the focus of this attack so far as the Office of the Secretary General is concerned is likely to shift to the Under Secretary level, where it has a better chance of obtaining some Afro-Asian support.

Unless there is a change in the Soviet attitude toward Hammarskjold, his reappointment is probably not feasible. Should the USSR decide to push its triumvirate proposal, the Soviet veto would probably preclude agreement on any successor and in any event, great-power agreement on a successor sympathetic to the West is highly unlikely. In these circumstances there appear to be five alternatives:

1)
Persuade Hammarskjold to allow himself to be “continued” in office by Assembly action as Lie was. Since Hammarskjold is already being given the “silent treatment” by the USSR, he may be hard to convince but it might be done if he believed the future of the United Nations was at stake.
2)
Persuade the General Assembly to designate some other Secretariat official as Acting Secretary General pending great-power agreement on a successor. This would require planning, since it was tacitly agreed at the San Francisco conference that the Secretary General would not be a national of one of the five permanent members of the Security Council and all the Under Secretaries General are great-power nationals. It is also unlikely that an Acting Secretary General from one of the great powers would be acceptable to the General Assembly.
3)
As the price for the USSR’s abandoning its “triumvirate” proposal, agree to some “neutral” acceptable to the USSR. However competent such an individual, this would inevitably mean a downgrading of the Secretary General’s role in the Organization. He could not be expected to act without a Soviet blessing and the USSR would undoubtedly withhold its blessing if there were any chance his actions could thwart Soviet designs.
4)
Accept a “neutral” as Secretary General with administrative responsibility for the Secretariat and for the conduct of UN sessions but place the responsibility for UN operations in the hands of semi-autonomous individuals or committees. This solution raises a serious question of how such an individual or group would be designated, [Page 343] since 1) the Charter vests the power of appointment in the Secretary General, 2) a neutral Secretary General could not be counted on to designate either an individual susceptible to Western influence or a group in which the Western influence would predominate, and 3) the composition of any committee designated by some other UN organ, given the present membership of the UN, is much more likely to approach the Soviet tripartite concept than to be Western in its orientation. Similarly an individual appointed by a UN organ is much more likely to be “neutral” than Western in sympathies. Moreover, unless there is one strong head of the Secretariat, it is not likely to be administered effectively; various organs and sub organs operating more or less autonomously are likely to result in more disparate, uncoordinated action within the UN system.
5)
Accept the Soviet tripartite concept at Under Secretary level in exchange for Soviet acceptance of a Western-oriented Secretary General. This alternative probably would appeal to some Afro-Asians but is almost certain to hamstring the Secretary General and to be reflected throughout the Secretariat, thus undermining the Organization’s capacity for executive and operational action.

Chinese Representation

The many opportunities to develop the United Nations as an executive operation depend for their fulfillment on our not allowing the United Nations to be blown apart on the issue of Chinese Communist representation. For ten years now this issue has been an ubiquitous element of discord in the United Nations and almost all other important international bodies. While the Chinese Communist behavior has been abominable, the United States rightly or wrongly bears a large measure of the onus for failure to solve the Chinese representation question. This attitude is to be found not only among those who are opposed to the moratorium resolution, but also among those who support it at our request. It has limited the exploitation of the full powers of the United Nations and has inhibited the orderly development of some important activities and programs.

The China issue has debilitated the vigor of the United Nations and frustrated its natural development and evolution as its membership increased and the scope of its responsibilities and programs expanded in number, depth and type. The Communist bloc has utilized this issue not only to provoke acrimonious debate but to cynically exploit it as an excuse to prevent the adoption of action desired by the majority. Solutions to such problems as the enlargement of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, and consideration of such problems as Charter review have been frustrated by the Soviet bloc on the excuse that China is not properly represented.

[Page 344]

This problem, like an unhealing wound, has required considerable effort to maintain the position of the Republic of China. The United States has had to spend an inordinate amount of effort and good will to insure that the composition of the United Nations Councils, Credentials and other committees and subordinate bodies and the instructions given to them were consistent with its position on this question. Pressure and hard bargaining have also been necessary to insure that resolutions, invitations, treaties, conventions and other diplomatic documents were drafted with the view to preventing the Chinese Communists from being included. Many (including some of our friends in the United Nations) believe that disarmament agreement would be facilitated if the United States would alter its position on the question of Chinese representation.

United States objectives and interests in the United Nations require that the onus for the continuing failure to resolve the issue be shifted to the Communists. This means new tactics must be evolved that permit the United States to remain faithful to its commitments to the Republic of China; that assure the continuing membership of the GRC in the United Nations; that GRC can accept (or at least not oppose); that the majority of the United Nations finds reasonable, and that keep the Chinese Communists out of the United Nations as long as they persist in defying the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Consultations

As we develop and refine our policies on various issues of concern in a United Nations context, we will want to carry on a more intensive program of consultation with other countries. This program of augmented consultation that I am suggesting would provide for a stepped-up exchange of views on four levels.

1.
The Department: General. IO and interested geographic bureaus will continue to discuss with representatives of foreign governments in Washington the continuing problems of the United Nations. It is important that these consultations take place early in the consideration before policy has hardened. Many nations maintain ambassadors in Washington who double in brass as United Nations Representatives. Similarly most of the embassies on Washington have at least one person responsible for keeping current with the Department on United Nations matters. It is important that we give these traditional diplomatic exchanges a new dynamism by keeping the flow of information meaningful, mutual and current. Furthermore, it is desirable that consultations be frequent across the board and not confined to the more aggressive of our allies.
2.
The Department: IO. I believe it is particularly desirable at this time to send people from IO to consult with policy making officials concerned with United Nations affairs in various world capitals. We need [Page 345] to do more in the way of exploratory exchanges rather than converting people to “our” firmly determined policy. In our redoubled efforts to reach the uncommitted countries, particularly in Africa, as well as to strengthen the ties that exist with our allies, it would be helpful to have policy making officials in various countries consult directly with officers in IO who have an intimate knowledge of the particular problem. I hope to do some of this on the trip that I will take this summer along the lines that I have already discussed with you. It is no reflection on the hard-working Foreign Service generalist not to expect him to know in detail the involvements of United Nations problems as complicated as the Congo problem, Palestine Refugees, etc. But by the same token it is important that the Foreign Office of a small African country which has to instruct its delegation on these matters should understand them clearly. Furthermore, on such field trips our IO officers can contribute to a fuller understanding of UN matters by our own Foreign Service Officers.
3.

USUN. Our Permanent Mission to the United Nations maintains daily contact with the representatives of ninety-nine countries. This daily contact becomes much more intensive during the General Assembly. It is important that these foreign United Nations Representatives not feel that our contact with them is motivated solely by a desire to obtain information or support. Much can be done between General Assemblies in developing a fuller understanding of United States policy, but this has to be a part of skillful diplomacy involving the creating of a firmly based rapport. The staff in New York is being strengthened so that our liaison will be more continuous, regular and effective. We are also seeking housing allowance so that able Foreign Service Officers can afford to serve in New York.

The need for this rapport is complicated further by the fact that during voting periods in the various committees of the United Nations, our permanent staff buttressed by Departmental support often has to move with great speed. An additional facet of this consultation at the United Nations would be the exploration of pre-General Assembly conferences with groups of our allies and provision of educational trips throughout the United States at our expense for newer UN delegations at various levels to increase their understanding of the United States.

4.
U.S. Foreign Service—the Capitals. On numerous occasions it is necessary “to go to the capitals” to enlist support for the United States position on a particular issue. When this happens U.S. policy implementation is dependent on the skill of our Foreign Service. No matter how skillful our Foreign Service is, if the particular officer does not understand, for example, the involvement of the concept of a property custodian in the complex welter of the Palestine Refugee problem, he can be of only limited help if this is the issue that is being decided. This means that we must [Page 346] improve our continuing flow of current information to the field, possibly by a special reports officer for field dissemination or by circulating more widely in the field the unclassified daily summary which comes to the Department from USUN. Trips to the field by USUN officers should be encouraged as should a more regular UN briefing for all political officers en-route from Washington to the field. IO has attempted in previous years to implement the field’s understanding by circular airgrams to the field detailing our preliminary thinking on U.S. policy on the various items to be considered by the General Assembly—these circulars are sent out a month or so before each General Assembly.

You would not expect such a memo as this to contain pat answers to all (or any) questions pending in the United Nations. It is instead an attempt to inventory the strategic questions to which we have to address ourselves between now and September, all the while dealing from day to day with the tactical crises of the moment. With your permission and encouragement, I would like to make this memorandum (and any first reactions which you and the Under Secretary may have at this stage) the basis for some intensive discussions with Ambassador Stevenson and his associates in New York, and with my colleagues in other Bureaus of the Department here in Washington. I would moreover propose to use this memorandum to generate some correspondence with a number of our Ambassadors abroad, on United States strategy in the United Nations.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, United Nations (General), 1/61–7/61, Box 310. Confidential.