226. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Meeting with The President—United Nations Matters

PARTICIPANTS

  • The President
  • Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations
  • Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland

1. General Assembly.

Governor Stevenson reported on a relatively quiet and orderly beginning of the General Assembly, with Zafrulla Khan proving to be an admirable Chairman. He said there seemed to be a widespread awareness by Assembly members of a political season in the United States, and predicted that major excitement would be withheld until after the U.S. Congressional elections.

2. Cuba.

The President of Cuba, Dorticos, will speak in the Assembly next week. Governor Stevenson said he was tentatively planning to speak under the Right of Reply Assembly procedures. The President warmly commended Governor Stevenson on his quick reply to the Gromyko speech last week, and suggested that this time, in addition to the U.S. reply, a Latin American be recruited to chime in if possible.

3. Southern Rhodesia.

The President commented that at the Sunday, September 30 luncheon with Lord Home,2 the British did not indicate any inclination to take any new steps, but wanted to hold things still until after the spring elections, because they thought that would best serve the purpose of keeping Whitehead in power. Governor Stevenson and Mr. Cleveland discussed the desire of most members of the General Assembly for assurance that the British would not leave Southern Rhodesia to become an independent country until the franchise had been broadened to include many more Africans. Governor Stevenson said he had suggested to Lord Home a simple statement which the British might make, [Page 497] giving this assurance in a way that should not upset the political prospects of Whitehead in Southern Rhodesia.

4. Nuclear Testing.

After some discussion of the arrangements for the debate on nuclear testing, the President indicated he thought it would be appropriate for Governor Stevenson to make the opening U.S. speech in Committee I on that subject; the presumption is that Arthur Dean will make a major speech on Disarmament, and will of course handle the day to day debate on both of these, and related subjects, in Committee I.

5. Johnson Plan.3

A discussion of the present state of the Johnson Plan produced ready agreement that the present purpose of the exercise, from our point of view, is to keep the matter open until November, and meanwhile to discuss with the Israelis some of the specific problems involved, including the point they have raised on the ceiling of the number of Arab refugees who would be repatriated to Israel.

Governor Stevenson expressed the hope that what would be kept open would be the substance of the Johnson proposals, and not merely the manner in which they might be buried. In the course of the discussion, Mr. Cleveland described the essence of the Israeli position as an unwillingness to make a side arrangement with us on a ceiling (for example, one refugee being repatriated for every nine resettled outside of Israel) if this crucial part of the arrangement was not known and at least acquiesced in by the Arab states concerned.

In this connection, Governor Stevenson reported on a conversation yesterday with Foreign Minister Fawzi of the UAR, who had seemed prepared to discuss the matter of a ceiling on repatriation but was anxious to discuss two other questions:

a.
the number of refugees who would be accepted by Israel, and
b.
some indication of how they would be treated when they went to Israel.

Governor Stevenson reported that the Israeli Delegation in New York seemed to be recruiting co-sponsors for the “Brazzaville Resolution” calling for direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The President expressed his understanding that the Israelis had undertaken not to introduce it. Mr. Feldman, who joined the meeting for a few minutes at this point, said the Israelis had assured him that they would not introduce it unless there was a major change in the situation. [Page 498] An illustration of a major change would be if the U.S. decided to support a pro-Arab resolution such as the Arab Custodianship Proposal or the reconstitution of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC). The President asked Mr. Feldman to convey to the Israelis his (the President’s) understanding that they were not going to introduce the resolution and the President’s desire that they let him know if this understanding was, or turned out to be, incorrect.

6. Hungary.

Governor Stevenson reported that the vote on inscription of the Hungary item had gone rather badly; the item had been inscribed, but with a considerably smaller vote than in previous years. He thought there was some possibility of negotiations with the Hungarians on amnesty for political prisoners, but that the vote might stiffen their resistance again.

7. Congo.

Governor Stevenson said that Foreign Minister Spaak of Belgium is about to go back to Brussels and consider with his government whether they should now move to a decision to consult with Union Miniere that revenues would be paid only to the Central Government and that in the event of Tshombe’s resistance to reconciliation, the mines would be shut down. He thought that Spaak might add withdrawal of Belgian technicians to the agenda of possible measures. He commented that Ambassador MacArthur believes that there is only a fifty-fifty chance they could take such measures in the present state of Belgian politics. The consequence of failure in the Congo, Governor Stevenson said, would be extremely serious. Adoula would fall and his successor would be far less satisfactory from our point of view. There would be pressure in the UN, particularly from the Africans, for some kind of military action against Tshombe. If the U.S. refused to go along with such action, it would be like breaking faith with the United Nations action and its own Congo policy. The prospect of U Thant’s reelection or indeed his willingness to run for reelection would be dimmed. And on the ground in the Congo, there would be a break-up of the Congo, continuous civil war, and a golden opportunity for the Soviets.

Governor Stevenson mentioned the idea of Wachuku and possible other African moderates’ coming in as conciliators, but referred to it as a last resort after the West’s and the UN’s efforts to bring the situation to a head had seemed doomed to failure.

The President hoped the Belgians would be willing to use as much influence as they have, but did not indicate what the U.S. policy would be in the event of failure of the present efforts toward reconciliation. He indicated he would await a report from Under Secretary McGhee, particularly on his trip to Elisabethville this week.

[Page 499]

The President asked Mr. Cleveland to secure from the Defense Department an up-to-date appraisal of the military balances in the Congo, taking into account the latest information available on the apparent build-up of both ground troops and air capability on the part of Katangese forces.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, United Nations (General), 9/62–10/62, Box 311. Confidential. Drafted by Assistant Secretary Cleveland.
  2. Not further identified.
  3. Documentation on the Johnson Plan is in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volumes XVII and XVIII.