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  3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters
  4. Document 262

262. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy 1

New York, August 19, 1963.

Dear Mr. President:

I understand you want my views as to whether you should attend the General Assembly.

Yes, I think you should because:

1.
The United States must stay in the forefront of the “peace” issue, and this would be a good occasion and forum to carry forward the American University speech.
2.
The Assembly would afford an opportunity to make our desire for further detente and disarmament emphatic and sincere.
3.
A more affirmative and hopeful posture about the Test Ban Treaty breakthrough will be desirable after all the deflating talk during the ratification process.2
4.
You could give some balance to an Assembly that will be largely an “African session”, by demonstrating that anti-colonialism is not the only problem the world faces.
5.
The Assembly would afford an opportunity to reaffirm emphatically our policy on colonialism, self-determination and human rights, and perhaps temper the next assault by the Africans and Soviets.
6.
With so many African and other Heads of State coming to the Assembly, it might be misinterpreted if you did not come.
7.
I think Khrushchev will come to exploit the “peace” and “end colonialism” issues to strengthen his position in the dispute with China. If you should then decide to come, it would look like “me too.”
8.
It would be helpful in the Congress and the country to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the United Nations and the building of international organizations for peace and progress. The Assembly would be a good time to do it after the Test Ban Treaty which grew out of the U.N. Committee of 17, the U.N. Congo operation, which is now popular even in England and Belgium, the U.N. settlements in New Guinea, Yemen, and now Malaysia.
9.
A good speech can be built on developments since your last appearance in 1961, successful U.N. peacekeeping, the test ban and further steps to peace, other fields of East-West cooperation large and small, “openness” as an ingredient of cooperation, human rights and change, etc.

But, there may also be reasons for not coming that should be considered:

1.
While they may come anyway, I think your decision to come would insure the attendance of Macmillan and Khrushchev (and Nasser, Tito, etc.)—Macmillan for domestic political advantage and Khrushchev for the reasons mentioned above. An informal “Summit” meeting would logically follow. But, as I wrote you in July, I think periodic and more casual Summit meetings at U.N. sessions would actually be better than the occasional over-dramatized meeting.
2.
While there are plenty of good generalities and atmospherics for a speech, the “hard content” might be modest, depending on how much you could say at that point on next steps in disarmament and détente. Of course, East-West cooperation in space, medicine, communications, cultural exchanges and other fields of research could be dealt with but there may not be enough new programmatic content for a Presidential speech.
3.
It is unlikely that an “African Assembly” can be diverted from colonialism, human rights and the problems of Southern Africa. Any frailties or omissions in your speech in this area would be conspicuous. I think, by the way, that we must promptly formulate our own policy on these questions and not risk being dragged along reluctantly, thereby losing influence and friends on both sides.
4.
With the Congress still in session and the program so far behind schedule, there may be domestic reasons why public attention should not be diverted by a full dress affair and your presence at the General Assembly.

An alternative to a comprehensive Presidential speech in the general debate might be a ceremony for the registration of the Test Ban Treaty with yourself, Khrushchev, Macmillan and U Thant making brief speeches, as suggested in my letter of July 29, a copy of which is attached.3 To arrange this would require some initiative on our part with Khrushchev and Macmillan, and I doubt if we could be sure that Khrushchev would restrain himself.

I think it would be well to have a general strategy conference about the Assembly, including the question of your appearance, the speech and the timing of the announcement.

Sincerely yours,

Adlai E. Stevenson 4
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, United Nations (General), 8/63, Box 311. Confidential. A covering memorandum from Benjamin Read to Bundy, also dated August 19, indicated that the text of the letter had been received telegraphically from Stevenson that afternoon.↩
  2. On July 25 representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union initialed a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.↩
  3. Not printed.↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩