266. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Strategy at the 18th General Assembly

PARTICIPANTS

  • The White House
    • The President
    • Mr. Bundy
    • Mr. Schlesinger
    • Mr. Sorensen (in part)
  • The Department
    • The Secretary
    • Ambassador Stevenson
    • Mr. Ball
    • Mr. Harriman
    • Mr. Cleveland, IO
    • Mr. Sisco, UNP
    • Amb. Thompson, S/AL

The question of the President’s possible attendance at the General Assembly is discussed in a separate memorandum.2 The Secretary indicated that the enlargement of the Councils and the question of the Congo were two important issues before the Assembly.

1. Enlargement of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

The Secretary asked Mr. Cleveland to outline briefly the question of the enlargement of UN Councils. Mr. Cleveland said there were indications that the USSR may be prepared to support or take an initiative on enlargement of the Economic and Social Council and possibly the Security Council by unlinking the latter from the Chinese representation question. Mr. Cleveland pointed out that we have come out publicly in favor of enlargement, but we must recognize that, bearing in mind recent difficulties, we would be in a weaker position in an enlarged Security Council. He pointed out also that any Charter amendment would require ratification in accordance with our Constitutional process, including the Senate’s advice and consent. He indicated also that ratification requires a two-thirds vote of the UN membership, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. Ambassador Stevenson indicated the strong interest [Page 589] of the Africans in this matter and expressed the fear of possible defection of the Africans on the Chinese representation question if we are not able to adopt forthcoming positions on such questions as enlargement of the Councils, the Portuguese territories, apartheid and other similar issues. The President decided that we should restate our public position in favor of enlargement of the Councils, but that we should not push the Security Council proposal, leaving the initiative to others.

2. Extension of UNOC.

Ambassador Stevenson outlined the difficulties we are encountering with Secretary-General Thant regarding retention of UNOC for six months beyond the end of this year. The President suggested that he might write to four or five African Prime Ministers. Ambassador Stevenson suggested deferring this matter until he has had a further opportunity for discussion with key Africans, including the Nigerians. The President agreed. He also agreed we should include an appropriate reference in favor of an extension of UNOC in the United States speech before the Assembly.

The President asked whether an OAU Force is not a viable substitute. Mr. Cleveland pointed out that, while such a force might be helpful in the Congo, there is danger that it might be used in other places in Africa, i.e., Angola and Mozambique. Mr. Ball likewise agreed. The President thought we might talk to the Portuguese on this matter with a view to seeing whether they would be willing to talk to the French. He thought the Portuguese might tell the French that the alternative to UNOC extension is an OAU Force which, in turn, carries risks for Portugal in Angola.

3. United States Speech in the General Assembly.

It was decided that the following additions would be made to the United States speech: (a) a stronger section on the significance of the test ban designed to offset some of the negative thinking that has been projected as part of the ratification process; (b) a paragraph or so indicating our support for continuation of the Congo operation; (c) a reference to the trade negotiations and the World Trade Conference scheduled in early 1964; (d) references to the hard issues, including Laos, Viet-Nam, Berlin and Cuba; (e) material on enlargement of the Councils; (f) reference to the Buddhist issue in Viet-Nam; and (g) strengthening the “Man’s Mastery over Environment” section based on suggestions made by the President’s Advisory Committee. Ambassador Stevenson was asked to provide the President with suggestions on the above material.

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4. Submarines for South Africa.

The question of supplying South Africa with three submarines was discussed inconclusively after the Secretary raised the question. The President felt the question was primarily one of balancing the foreign exchange advantage (one hundred million dollars) against the anger which it might cause among the Africans. Ambassador Stevenson felt that, from the point of view of our position in the United Nations, it would be better not to provide the submarines, but he realized there were other considerations that must be weighed in making a decision on this matter. The President said we would need to discuss this matter further at a later date. Moreover, no decision was taken regarding the sending of a technical mission to South Africa.

5. Chinese Representation.

After Ambassador Stevenson outlined the difficulties confronting us if the Soviets should decide to relax their position and opt for a two-China solution, the President said we should do what is necessary to keep Red China out and to maintain our position.

6. Hungary.

The Secretary said there did not appear to be much concern domestically over this question. The President took note of the fact that no item will be submitted this year. The question of whether the United States should state a reservation in the Credentials Committee, as it did at the Fourth Special Session, was left open.

7. Human Rights.

There was a very brief reference to the human rights questions as the meeting was breaking up. The President said that this matter could be decided in the context of what to include in the United States speech.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, United Nations (General), 9/9/63–9/30/63, Box 311. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco. Approved in S on September 12 and in the White House on September 13.
  2. Document 267.