Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations ¹

Washington, November 8, 1963, 7:44 p.m.

1364. Re Enlargement Councils. Dept in general agreement positions and tactics recommended Urtels 1442 and 1457.² Dept’s specific comments follow:

1. In general, we should maintain our public posture in favor of enlargement of both Councils. There are obvious advantages to us of approach by stages, concentrating on ECOSOC in first instance in order to test Soviet intentions before getting into details of a much more complex nature of Security Council enlargement. Best results from our point of view would be to have reasonable enlargement of ECOSOC but for Security Council remain as it is. Our hope is that division of forces on question of Security Council enlargement will be such as to result in impasse. We know you are fully aware that any enlargement of Security Council less likely to be favorable to us than with present composition. Moreover, Security Council enlargement would raise difficult questions for us in ratification process which not case with respect ECOSOC.

While our bargaining power should not be over-estimated in light of strong feeling that has developed over the years in favor enlargement both Councils, and our public position in favor of enlargement, we would hope it would be possible for USGADel to use as appropriate leverage we have in direction of amendments acceptable to us; no Charter amendment is possible without our agreement.

We realize fully that it may not be possible to focus action on ECOSOC enlargement alone. Therefore, following is supplementary guidance as it relates to possible Security Council enlargement.

2. It of major importance we hold any SC enlargement to 2 in order protect US interests in Council. In this connection Dept fully concurs line taken with LAs (Urtel 1811)³ with respect importance coordination WE and LA positions, and encouraged both WEs and LAs apparently prepared agree on 2 (Urtels 1654, 1866).⁴

3. Dept prefers voting majority of 8 with increase of 2. While voting majority of 9 would make it easier defeat proposals in SC, it would at same time make it more difficult obtain necessary majority for Western proposals. Nine would therefore not appear desirable and is unnecessary from viewpoint protecting our interests since our position already protected by veto if situation sufficiently serious from standpoint US interests to warrant its use.

4. Dept agrees that the 2 additional seats should be allocated Asia and Africa, respectively, with “floating” seat reverting Eastern Europe. History our efforts deprive Eastern Europe seat originally allocated to it makes it clear any effort continue do so in enlarged Council would encounter stiff opposition and seriously prejudice chance, if any, Soviet ratification, thereby leaving us open charges bad faith. Moreover it obviously causes fewer political complications for US to accept formula permitting Eastern Europe retain seat it has either held or shared (with one exception) since 1946 than to seek amendment Charter to give Eastern Europe seat de novo.

5. Dept shares your doubts it will prove practical retain both Commonwealth and 2 LA seats. Recent SC elections would appear already to have seriously undermined concept Commonwealth seat and Dept would expect Africans to insist on two seats so long as LAs hold two, even though argument can be made that with Commonwealth seat they would in fact have one plus seats, since Commonwealth seat would for most part be shared between Asia Africa.

6. If Commonwealth seat goes to Africans and Council enlarged by 2, over-all geographic distribution including 5 permanent members would be as follows: Asia—2, Middle East—1, Africa—2, Latin America—2, Eastern Europe—(including USSR) 2, Western Europe-3-, and U.S. Any allocation less favorable our position would raise serious problems for US ratification.

7. Dept also shares your doubts A–As (or EEs) will be satisfied with “understanding” rather than resolution with respect allocation since it clear from experience under “gentlemen’s agreement” such understandings unlikely remain firm.

8. We, of course, would like to avoid resolution on across-the-board reallocation non-permanent SC seats entirely, but realize this may not be possible. Dept inclined believe any resolution allocating seats likely be considered procedural as in nature amendment GA rules of procedure and therefore difficult avoid even if LAs and WEs stand firmly together.

9. Re ECOSOC, Dept agrees we should hold line at increase of 6 and believes you should seek encourage LAs join forces with WEs in maintaining this position. With respect allocation these additional seats, Dept would hope see WEs regain seat lost in 1961, 2 seats go to Asia, 1 seat to Middle East and 2 seats to Africa. Dept believes 4 seats for Africa sufficient (2 additional plus 2 it now has) and that 2 additional seats Asia desirable in order permit India and Japan serve more frequently than they can now hope to. With respect return seat lost by GRC in 1960, Dept recognizes this may not prove feasible but believes question should be discussed GRC Del before final decision reached on this point. Re resolution now pending Committee II to enlarge committees of ECOSOC, Dept prepared consider this as interim step to Council enlargement if debate in SPC is concluded without action.

10. Re General Committee, Dept believes plan outlined Urtel 1442 about as much as we can hope for and agrees we should be as flexible as possible with respect its size and geographic allocation in order bolster our position with respect SC and ECOSOC. At same time Dept would hope see increase in number of vice-presidencies held to 2 on grounds GC should not become too unwieldy in size.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, UN 8 SC. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley on November 8; cleared by Nathaniel McKitterick, John P. Walsh, William B. Buffum, George N. Monsma, Curtis C. Strong, Louise McNutt, Abram Chayes, Cleveland, and William C. Burdett; and approved by Sisco.
2. In telegrams 1442 and 1457 from USUN, both dated October 17, Stevenson reported on consultations with the French and British Delegations concerning enlargement of UN councils. The British would support an increase of two seats in the Security Council in the hope that a seat could always be held by a Commonwealth member. Should the Security Council be enlarged, the French had been instructed to seek an increase in the majority necessary for passage of a resolution from seven to nine. (Ibid., UN 8 SC)
3. In telegram 1811 from USUN, November 1, Stevenson reported that the Latin American delegations had agreed to support enlargement of the Security Council, ECOSOC, and the General Committee. (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 1654 from USUN, October 28, Plimpton reported that the Western delegations agreed to adding two seats to the Security Council, six to ECOSOC, and “a small increase in General Comite.” Whether eight or nine votes should constitute a majority and preservation of the Commonwealth seat were still at issue. Telegram 1866 from USUN, November 5, reported that the Latin American caucus agreed to support enlargement of the councils, to oppose redistribution of seats, and to seek cooperation with other groups on a formula for expansion that could command a two-thirds vote. (Both ibid.)