411. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Acting Secretary of State Ball 1
SUBJECT
- In Outer Space, Too, It Takes Two To Tango
As I mentioned in our recent conversation, my colleagues and I have tried to sort out what Adlai Stevenson could appropriately say, in his basic General Assembly speech on Outer Space next week, about the President’s September 20 proposal that manned flight to the moon be a cooperative, rather than competitive, affair.2 The following is a suggested line of approach on which I should appreciate your comments:
1. Last September the President made a formal and consciously dramatic public offer to the Soviet Union to cooperate in putting men on the moon, saying:
“Finally, in a field where the United States and the Soviet Union have a special capacity—in the field of space—there is room for new cooperation, for further joint efforts in the regulation and exploration of space. I include among these possibilities a joint expedition to the moon. Space offers no problems of sovereignty; by resolution of this Assembly, the members of the United Nations have forsworn any claim to territorial rights in outer space or on celestial bodies and declared that international law and the United Nations Charter will apply. Why, therefore, should man’s first flight to the moon be a matter of national competition? Why should the United States and the Soviet Union, in preparing for such expeditions, become involved in immense duplications of research, construction, and expenditure? Surely we should explore whether the scientists and astronauts of our two countries—indeed, of all the world—cannot work together in the conquest of space, sending some day in this decade to the moon not the representatives of a single nation but the representatives of all of our countries.”
2. This month, the United States and the Soviet Union have completed negotiations on an agreed statement of legal principles for outer space which, among other things, solemnly declares”:
- —that “in the exploration of outer space States shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance . . .”; and
- —that “States shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space . . .”
These principles reflect the semantic value—and the political force—of “international cooperation”.
3. In the meantime, Chairman Khrushchev has maneuvered himself into this public position: he is not racing the Americans to the moon because life on earth is so good that he is not in that much of a hurry and, because he doesn’t want to risk human life; he has a large and active moonlanding project on the boards which he fully expects to succeed but which is unencumbered by a rigid time schedule; he sees limits to the possibility of cooperation because of the secrecy unhappily engendered by the arms race, but he is interested in the President’s offer. This would seem to rule out the possibility—suggested by the President—of “a joint expedition to the moon”.
Mr. Khrushchev’s somewhat erratic statements no doubt reflect internal differences in the Soviet leadership over the desirability of cooperation with the U.S. They may also reflect financial difficulties. And they may reflect indecision about scientific problems in connection with a lunar landing—or even a conviction that the Soviet Union cannot get there first.
4. Nevertheless, this is a well-thought-out position from Khrushchev’s point of view. If the Americans succeed in landing and recovering the first man from the surface of the moon by 1970, the resulting national prestige will be modified by the fact that we did not win “victory” in a “race” against the Russians; we simply—if dramatically-met a self-imposed deadline—and self-restraint would inhibit global gloating about that.
If the Americans put the first man on the moon after 1970 the resultant prestige will be further modified by the fact that we got there late according to our own timetable.
If the Soviets put the first man on the moon, the resultant prestige for the Soviets would be greatly amplified by the fact that they did not get there first because they were racing with the Americans but because their technology was so far ahead that there was no point in waiting around.
If the Americans should try first and fail—and especially if this involved loss of life—Khrushchev not only would appear to have better judgment but could express his sympathies in the garb of the true humanitarian.
By postulating that it takes two to make a race, Khrushchev has put himself in the best position available in the circumstances-unless it can be demonstrated that it is he who is declining international cooperation.
[Page 931]5. Given the alternative outcomes it seems clear that net national U.S. advantage lies in sticking with the policy of going to the moon as quickly as possible-alone if need be but preferably with the maximum feasible international cooperation-without the Russians if need be but preferably with them. Credit would accrue to the U.S. for national success in sending an American to be the first man on the moon; even greater credit, in the minds of most non-Americans, would accrue to the nation which leads a cooperative enterprise and makes the leading contribution to it.
6. But if it takes two to race, it also takes two to cooperate. The President has committed the United States to try to pursue that course; the door has not been closed on all hope for cooperation; the ball is back in our court; the U.S. Delegate is scheduled to speak in the U.N. Outer Space Committee next week; and if the U.S. were to go silent on a dialogue initiated by the President, the conclusion no doubt will be drawn that the President has given in to advocates of noncooperation. So having made an offer of maximum cooperation—a joint U.S.-USSR flight to the moon—the U.S. can hardly fail to push for lesser forms of cooperation.
7. The principal objections raised to cooperation on our side—and no doubt on the other-seem to be (a) that technology is too far advanced to marry up U.S. and Soviet space exploration systems; (b) that joint teams of astronauts are not feasible for technical and training reasons; (c) that there are military security problems; and (d) that the U.S. [the USSR] cannot be in a position of having its program stymied by the failure of the Soviets [the Americans]3 to carry out projects allocated to it under a cooperative program.
8. These objections—even when accepted at full face value—do not themselves preclude effective steps toward achievement of the President’s stated objective of exploring “whether the scientists and astronauts of our two countries—indeed of all the world—cannot work together in the conquest of space . . .”
9. It is assumed that the Soviet Union has much more difficulty with the mere thought of cooperation than we do and that they will have more serious “security problems” at any realistic level of cooperation than we will have—for all the reasons flowing from the fact that they run a closed society and we run an open society. We therefore can take it for granted, with considerable confidence, that the Russians will in no event be willing to go so far as to raise serious military security problems for us: we are safe in shooting for the maximum amount of cooperation that the Soviets can be talked into yielding.4
[Page 932]It therefore is important that—while detailed negotiations would be largely bilateral—we egg on the Russians to cooperate in an open forum where the maximum influence of the on-looking world community could be brought to bear.5
10. To pursue U.S. policy of going to the moon with the maximum amount of international cooperation that will not interfere with our program, our next objective should be not to integrate the two national lunar programs but to add them up together with the efforts of other nations, into a world program of lunar exploration in which both prestige and failure could be to some extent shared—in which the scientists and astronauts of all participating nations can “work together in the conquest of space” as “representatives of all our countries”. This would have to be done in a way which does not require us to weld a U.S. capsule on a Russian rocket, or to mate a clean-cut American astronaut with a chubby Soviet cosmonette, or to compromise the security of either state, or to make progress of one national program dependent upon progress in the other.
The point is to put a largely symbolic international umbrella over both national programs, plus the contributions of other countries, and to create the image of a mutually cooperative world program to put men on the moon as “representatives of all our countries” regardless of the nationality of the first arrivals.
A good analogy is the “World Weather System” which will depend very largely upon U.S. and Soviet technology, which will maintain World Data Centers under national control in Washington and Moscow, but which enjoys the blessing and the nominal parenthood of the World Meteorological Organization and which draws into the program whatever supporting resources can be contributed by other countries.
Once the protective mantle of the international community is thrown over a project, symbolism and terminology can reinforce the desired impression. For example, if the Americans are ready to send out the first team, and the Russians the second and third teams, we could begin to refer to them as Moon Teams I, II, and III in the World Program for Lunar Exploration.
11. Neither nation would put aside its national program to work this out; negotiations could proceed on a subject-by-subject basis, taking the easiest ones first; national chips could be tossed into the international pot one at a time; and both sides could reserve the right to get acclimated to cooperation gradually. Cooperation could take the form of mutual support through coordinated national activities—cooperative tracking of astronauts, coordinated observation and sampling of the lunar surface, exchanges of information on man’s biological performance in space.
[Page 933]If this approach does not work, the U.S. would get political credit for trying.
If it does work, U.S. interests would be furthered generally by another step toward de-fuzing the cold war, toward keeping outer space peaceful, toward engaging the Soviet Union in responsible mutual enterprise, toward building international institutions, toward an atmosphere more conducive to genuine measures of arms control and disarmament. More specifically, U.S. interests would be furthered by promoting that alternative outcome of the moon project in which net national advantage resides.
12. Meanwhile, and in any event, we should certainly get on with our own Apollo program. The fundamental reason for getting to the moon is not to beat the Russians but to get to the moon. Neither Congress nor the Administration should let Chairman Khrushchev influence the level of our appropriations or the degree of our resolve.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, SP 6 UN. Confidential. Drafted by T. Wilson (IO) on November 19. Copies were sent to Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, William R. Tyler, Walt W. Rostow, and Ragnar Rollefson.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 412.↩
- Brackets in the source text.↩
- A handwritten marginal note reads: “depends on who is to do what in coop. venture.”↩
- A handwritten marginal note reads: “not necessity.”↩