456. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Antarctica Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (Owen) to the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher)1
SUBJECT
- Exercise of Rights of Inspection under Antarctic Treaty
Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty provides that “in order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions” of the Treaty, each party has the right to designate observers to (1) inspect, in effect, the activities of others, and (2) carry out overflights anywhere in Antarctica.
Among the main provisions of the Treaty are: (1) Antarctica is to be used for peaceful purposes only; (2) a prohibition of nuclear explosions and disposal of nuclear waste; (3) cooperation in science.
The Treaty was signed December 1, 1959, entered into force June 23, 1961, and the First Consultative Meeting under the Treaty was held at Canberra in July 1961.2 The inspection provisions (other than paragraph 5 of Article VII referred to below) have not been the subject of discussions either during the “interim talks” (between the signature and the entry into force of the Treaty) or at the Canberra Meeting. However, the opening statement of the United States at the Canberra Meeting contained the following:
“The provisions of the Treaty are complemented by a system of inspection designed to promote the Treaty’s objectives and ensure the observance of its provisions. We expect that the exercise of the rights of inspection established by the Treaty will be a normal activity under the Treaty. We would not regard the exercise of these rights as necessarily indicating that there is suspicion of activities contrary to the Treaty. Indeed, the practice of inspection is the best way of assuring the absence of suspicion. The inspection system is a useful and practical feature which will contribute to the effectiveness of the Treaty and the realization of its basic objectives, which are peace and co-operation.”
In the course of the “interim talks” and at the Canberra Meeting, the Soviets have hardly commented at all on the inspection provisions. In a published article (in February 1960), G.I. Tunkin, Legal Adviser of the Soviet Foreign Office, who participated in the Antarctic Treaty [Page 1038] Conference, briefly outlined the inspection provisions and discussion thereof at the Conference and concluded with this statement:
“Thus, the specific conditions prevailing in the Antarctic, where inspection cannot be used against national security, permitted agreement on unlimited inspection.”
The present question is whether or not it would be advantageous to exercise our rights of inspection under the Treaty, in particular of Soviet activities. Since this is the only Treaty with the Soviets providing for inspection to control its observance, the exercise of our rights there-under may significantly relate to our attitude or policy in other negotiations where inspection rights are important.
In Antarctica, the Soviets have three year round stations. As regards Soviet activities in Antarctica itself, we have received no evidence that the Soviets are engaged in any activity in violation of the Treaty’s provisions.
Moreover, during five of the six years in which the Soviets have been active there, a U.S. resident exchange scientist has wintered over at Mirny, while a Soviet scientist was assigned at our McMurdo Station.
Logistic problems being what they are in Antarctica, observers’ inspection visits, whether by ship or aircraft, would inevitably require diversion of transport facilities for that purpose from our own regularly scheduled activities there, i.e., logistics support of scientific programs. Our resources in ships and aircraft are usually fully committed to these programs. It would be most appropriate if the Navy could spare an icebreaker for a trip along the Antarctic coast, visiting the two Soviet coastal stations, Mirny and Lazarez—which are over 2,000 miles apart—as well as Australian and other stations in between. Designated observers could be aboard and perform inspections at places visited. But we have hardly enough icebreakers for our regular programs.
About the only inspection trip which our logistic capability would allow this year would be to have an officially designated observer accompany a flight that is planned (subject to weather and other logistic considerations) to go from McMurdo to Mirny Station in connection with a gravity research program. The purpose of the flight is to transport a U.S. physicist to Mirny Station to make gravity measurements. The type of aircraft which will probably be used would require refueling at Mirny. The flight may be feasible in November or as late as January 1962.
The question of whether the time is appropriate for the United States to exercise its inspection rights under the Treaty has been discussed with DOD, NSF, and CIA. In these discussions the following points have been considered:
- (1)
- The argument has been made that it may be desirable that inspections be carried out under the Treaty, whether or not there is evidence [Page 1039] indicating a special need for inspection. Establishing the “routine of inspection” during the early stages of the Treaty would minimize the probability of interference with inspection at a later date.
- (2)
- The argument has also been advanced that this being the first treaty providing for inspection, the Soviets might argue that our failure to exercise Treaty given inspection rights would demonstrate that our insistence on inspection in other contexts is insincere.
- (3)
- The actual conduct of an inspection operation might provide useful experience in inspection procedures.
- (4)
- On the other hand, the advantages to be gained by exercising the Antarctic Treaty inspection rights, may not be substantial enough to outweigh the possible risk of arousing suspicion and adversely affecting the climate of friendly cooperation by “bringing the cold war” to Antarctica. Relations among the scientists in Antarctica, and also in the diplomatic field with the Soviets on negotiations concerning Antarctica as late as the Canberra Meeting in July, have been outstanding in the absence of Soviet cold war tactics and maneuvers and recriminations.
- (5)
- It might also be borne in mind that to exercise inspection rights when there is no evidence of wrongdoing, may provide the Soviets with an argument that our predilection for inspection systems is based on inspection-for-its-own-sake.
In any event, I would not wish to proceed further in a decision to undertake an inspection under the Treaty without thorough consideration being given to the relationship of such action on our part to our attitude and policy in other fields where inspection is important.
Article VII also provides that each party inform the others of its expeditions and stations in Antarctica and any military personnel or equipment it introduces there. This feature has been the subject of discussion both at the “interim talks” and at the Canberra Meeting. In fact, representatives of the signatories agreed to exchange this information before the Treaty entered into force, and we provided the most comprehensive information on our expedition. The Canberra Meeting approved a recommendation (Recommendation VI) listing in some detail the kind of information that should be provided. We are compiling the information we will distribute to the other Governments this year, and when we do so will state to the others, including the Soviets, that we expect them to provide us with similar information.
There are attached copies of the Antarctic Treaty and of the Report of the Canberra Meeting. There is also attached an excerpt of Tunkin’s article in which he dealt with the inspection provisions.3
[Page 1040]I would appreciate discussing this problem with you at your earliest convenience.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IO Files: Lot 69 D 169, Antarctica Files, Inspection 1962–63. Confidential. Copies were sent to Cleveland, Wallner, the Science Adviser, the Special Assistant for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, and the Office of Soviet Union Affairs.↩
- See Document 455.↩
- The attachments are not printed.↩