494. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of the Interior (Briggs) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Johnson)1

Dear Mr. Secretary:

During recent weeks representatives of the Department of the Interior have been discussing with representatives of the Departments of State and Defense a proposal from Canada and the United Kingdom that the United States join them in a canvass of various foreign governments aimed at determining the attitude of those governments toward a multilateral convention on the breadth of the territorial sea and the extent of national jurisdiction over fisheries in coastal waters. The proposed convention would incorporate the essential elements of the formula which the United States supported at the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. These essential elements are a six-mile territorial sea; an additional six-mile contiguous zone in which, at the end of ten years, the coastal nations would have exclusive jurisdiction over fisheries; and, in special circumstances, a preferential right on the part of coastal nations to fishery resources in waters seaward of the contiguous zone.

Although this Department’s representatives have explained our position on this matter on several occasions, I wish now to set it forth [Page 1112] more formally for your benefit. We are opposed to United States participation in the proposed canvass. Indeed, we believe that the United States should not only decline to participate, but should also discourage further efforts in this connection on the part of Canada and the United Kingdom. Our opposition goes not so much to the canvass as it goes to the ultimate objective—a multilateral convention—toward which a canvass is the first step. We are not convinced that the benefits which would accrue from a multilateral convention would justify the concessions which the United States would have to make in order to obtain those benefits. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense has taken a similar position.

In our judgment an orderly approach to the problem involves three basic determinations. First, what are the benefits which will accrue to the United States from a multilateral convention incorporating a six-mile territorial sea provision with 30 signatory nations? With 40 signatory nations? With 50 signatory nations? I may say at this point that, in our view, the likelihood of any convention’s attracting 50 signatures is remote. Second, what concessions will the United States be required to make in order to obtain 30 signatures, 40 signatures, or 50 signatures? Third, do the benefits which accrue in each case justify the concessions? We believe that the factors involved in these determinations have to date received insufficient attention.

In approaching the first of these determinations, while we would not presume to specify benefits, we think it reasonable to conclude that any convention which obtained substantially fewer signatures than the final proposal at the Second United Nations Conference received supporting votes would result in benefits, substantially less than those which might have been obtained at the Conference. Here again, it is my understanding that the Department of Defense has taken a similar position.

With regard to the second determination, no further canvassing is needed to enable the United States to establish at least the minimum concessions which would be necessary. We think it obvious that any multilateral convention which did not incorporate a provision for preferential rights on the part of the coastal nations to fisheries beyond twelve miles, in addition to a six-mile territorial sea and a six-mile contiguous zone for exclusive fishery jurisdiction, would fail to attract even the smallest number of signatures noted above. This is a critical issue, one which the United Kingdom and Canada have understandably avoided meeting, and one which has been glossed over in discussions in this Government. Without provision for this preferential right, the proposed convention will be acceptable to few Latin American countries. With such a provision, the convention will become most difficult for the European fishing countries and Japan to accept.

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Coming to the third determination, I reiterate the position which this Department has taken previously. This Department agreed to the concession to coastal nations of exclusive jurisdiction over fisheries in a zone extending twelve miles from the coast in order to achieve the objectives of the United States at the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, i.e., agreement, in the interest of United States security, on a six-mile territorial sea in the context of codification or progressive development of international law. This constituted a maximum concession and this Department opposed the offering of concessions in regard to preferential fishing rights beyond twelve miles. We are not now prepared to agree to the concession of jurisdiction over fisheries in a twelve-mile zone for advantages substantially less than those which might have been obtained at the Second Conference. We do not consider that such lesser advantages warrant the sacrifices which the United States will be called upon to make. It follows that we are not prepared to agree to the offering of concessions in regard to preferential fishing rights beyond twelve miles for the lesser advantages.

One further comment may be made in connection with concessions. To this point this discussion has been limited to concessions related to fisheries. It would be foolhardy, however, for us to conclude that the offering of fishery concessions would bring about the desired result. An enormous effort at persuasion was necessary prior to and during the Second Conference to bring the United States even within reach of its goal, an effort which was prodigal in its expenditure of political goodwill. A similar effort would be necessary in connection with the proposed multilateral convention. The political capital which would be expended in such an effort must be added to the suggested fishery concessions in totaling the cost.

To recapitulate, this Department does not consider the advantages from a convention with the largest number of signatures which may be expected to justify the concessions which would be required. It consequently is opposed to United States participation in the suggested canvass.

One additional factor must be taken into consideration. The attitude of the interested public in the United States to the proposal which the United States and Canada put forward at the Second United Nations Conference, i.e., a six-mile territorial sea and a six-mile contiguous fishing zone, was one of reluctant acceptance of the need for sacrifices on its part in the interest of achieving an objective vital to the security of the United States. Although fearful of the results, the industry with some exceptions supported the Government. Without this support, this Government’s problems would have been multiplied immeasurably, and it is questionable in our minds that this Government would have been able to proceed as it did, without this support. Industry did [Page 1114] not, however, agree to the additional concession involving a preferential right to fisheries beyond twelve miles, but opposed it to the end.

It is our view that industry will continue to oppose concessions involving waters beyond twelve miles, and that in addition it will oppose the lesser concessions for advantages which in its judgment will appear less substantial than those which might have been obtained at the Second Conference. We believe it essential, in coming to a decision on this matter, that the inevitability of strong opposition from industry and severe criticism of the Administration be taken into account. We think it also necessary to consider as a distinct probability, if not a certainty, a determined effort by industry to prevent ratification of any convention which the United States might sign.

Sincerely yours,

Frank P. Briggs
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, 399.731/7–2561. Confidential.